Evaluation of the IIRR BICOL Program: Final Evaluation Report
Evaluation of “Institutionalizing Community–Based Integrated Watershed Management within Local Government Units in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Scaling Up and Sustaining Capacity–Building Outcomes at Local Level” for the IIRR BICOL Program
27 May 2008
Economic and Political Development Workshop Project
School of International and Public Affairs
Columbia University in the City of New York
420 West 118th Street
New York, NY 10027 USA
Report prepared by:
Scarlett Lopez Freeman
Seung Bok Lee
Katrina Ngo
Veena Vasudevan
Diana Wu
Acknowledgements
This evaluation report was prepared by a team of graduate students at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) participating in the Economic and Political Development Concentration’s Workshop in Applied Development. Katrina Ngo and Veena Vasudevan led the team as project managers. Seung Bok Lee managed budgetary matters, and Scarlett Lopez Freeman and Diana Wu served as client and advisor liaisons, respectively.
The evaluation was conducted under the guidance of Miguel Pinedo–Vasquez, serving as faculty advisor; Eugenia McGill, the director of the Workshop in Applied Development; and Jackie Klopp, director of the Economic and Political Development Concentration. In addition, the evaluation team greatly benefited from consultations with Pratima Kale, former president of IIRR and current adjunct professor of International and Public Affairs at SIPA, and Michael Pinches, who served as a visiting professor at Columbia University in fall 2007.
The SIPA team also acknowledges the support and cooperation of its client, the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), specifically from IIRR’s Regional Center for Asia in Silang, Cavite: Hallivin Arevalo, Orlando Buenviaje, Francisca Namia, Sammy Operio, Philip Penaflor, Nhing Reyes, Arnold Sabio, Jitendra Singh, and Charles Zulu; from the U.S. Office: Leslie Enright, Director, Anthony Gooch, Chair of the Board of Trustees, and Susan Grove, former U.S. Office Director; and Juan Miguel “Mike” Luz, President of IIRR.
Finally, this evaluation could not have been possible without participation from the Bicol communities in the Lagonoy and Masaraga–Quinale A watersheds, particularly Barangays Cagaycay, Genorangan, Minoro, Mampirao, Herrera, Balinad, and Napo in addition to the cities and municipalities of Goa, Lagonoy, Ligao, Oas, Polangui and San Jose.
Abbreviations and Acronyms
BICOL Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood
BUCAF Bicol University College of Agriculture and Forestry
CBO Community–Based Organization
CMDRR Community–Managed Disaster Risk Reduction
CMHN Community–Managed Health and Nutrition
CML/RE Community–Managed Livelihood/Rural Enterprise
CMNRM Community–Managed Natural Resource Management
CSSAC Camarines Sur State Agricultural College
DAR Department of Agrarian Reform
DENR Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DRR Disaster Risk Reduction
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IEC Information, Education, and Communication
IIRR International Institute of Rural Reconstruction
LaGoSan WaSA Lagonoy–Goa–San Jose Watershed Stakeholders’ Association
LDC Local Development Council
LGU Local Government Unit
LMO Lingkod Masa Organization
M&E Monitoring & Evaluation
MAQUIWASA Mt. Masaraga–Quinale Watershed Stakeholders’ Association
NGA National Government Agency
NGO Non–governmental Organization
NZAID New Zealand International Aid and Development Agency
PM&E Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
PO People’s Organization
PPMEL Participatory Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation and Learning
PPP Purchasing Price Parity
PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSU Partido State University
RCA Regional Center for Asia
RHW Rural Health Worker
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission
SIPA School of International and Public Affairs
UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Executive Summary
Since 2001, the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR) has been implementing its Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood (BICOL) Program in the Bicol Region of the Philippines. Through this program, IIRR utilizes a participatory community-based integrated watershed management (CBIWM) approach to combat poverty and environmental degradation.
Between November 2007 and April 2008, a team of five graduate students of Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) conducted a participatory and consultative evaluation of the BICOL Program’s activities in two of the three watersheds where IIRR works. Located in Mt. Masaraga-Quinale A and Lagonoy watersheds, the specific project evaluated is entitled “Institutionalizing Community-Based Integrated Watershed Management Within Local Government Units in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Scaling Up and Sustaining Capacity-Building Outcomes at Local Level.”
Through two field visits to the Bicol region, documentation review, and extensive analysis of the data collected, the SIPA team assessed progress, lessons learned, and achievements of IIRR’s efforts to institutionalize CBIWM in Mt. Masaraga-Quinale A and Lagonoy watersheds. Key findings have been organized into three topical areas.
1. Organizational Development of Watershed Networks: A key component of institutionalizing CBIWM has been the formation of Watershed Networks—multi-stakeholder groups representing diverse interests within a watershed area. Although Networks actively engage local government units (LGUs), civil society, and the academe, they remain dependent on IIRR for financial and technical support. Moreover, the three-year term of local government officials presents a challenge to maintaining partnerships between Networks and LGUs.
2. Community-Managed Projects: With IIRR’s guidance, Watershed Networks have initiated a number of community projects. While these projects actively target community-identified priorities and involve multiple stakeholders, there is still low community ownership, high dependence on IIRR, and low financial sustainability.
3. IIRR Management of the BICOL Program: IIRR has extensive international experience in community mobilization but has underutilized the opportunity to transfer relevant institutional knowledge to the BICOL Program. The evaluation team observed that IIRR’s activities are documented, and the budget and allocation process is transparent. However, the Program’s information management is in need of improvement. Other limitations of IIRR’s management of the Program include high staff turnover, an underdeveloped monitoring and evaluation system, and a field office that is not easily accessible by all field staff.
In light of key findings and Phase II plans to scale-up the BICOL Program, the evaluation team proposes a series of actions to strengthen IIRR’s ability to guide the institutionalization of CBIWM in the Bicol region. To this end, the evaluation team recommends that IIRR strengthen existing Watershed Networks prior to expansion of the Program. Six key areas the team identified for improvement are as follows:
SIPA Team Objectives
In November 2007, a team of five graduate students from the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University paired with IIRR. The objective of this partnership was to conduct a participatory and consultative evaluation of the NZAID-funded project that is part of IIRR’s Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood Program (BICOL Program), located in Mt. Masaraga-Quinale A and Lagonoy watersheds in the Bicol Region, Philippines.
The evaluation team’s objectives were to:
II. Context
The Philippines
Situated in Southeast Asia, the Republic of the Philippines is comprised of 7,107 islands in the western Pacific Ocean. A mountainous, tropical country, the Philippines is highly susceptible to destruction from calamities such as volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, landslides, and typhoons. Typically, the dry season is from December to May and the wet (monsoon) season is from June to November. Its population of over 92 million mainly resides in the interior plains of the islands and along the country’s extensive coastlines.2 The Philippines is comprised of 17 regions, 81 provinces, 118 cities, 1,510 municipalities, and 41,995 barangays.3
In July of 1946, the Philippines gained independence from 48 years of U.S. colonial rule.4 With the second–highest ratio in the world of university students to population, English widely spoken throughout the country, a democratic political system, and access to overseas trade routes, many were hopeful about the future prospects of the young Republic of the Philippines.5 However, a stagnant economy, coupled by years of political turmoil, has perpetuated a rise in poverty there. In 2003, the World Bank reported that 43 percent of the Filipino population was living under $2 a day.6 National figures show that over 38 percent of the population live in rural areas, of which 50.7 percent live below the national poverty line.7 In 2006, the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (PPP) was estimated at $3,330.8 In order to reduce this widespread poverty, both governmental and non–governmental sectors focus on fostering growth and development in the Philippines. (For more information on development initiatives in the Philippines, see section 1.1 of the Appendix.)
The Bicol Region
Located in the southeastern tip of Luzon island, the Bicol region comprises four mainland provinces— Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay, and Sorsogon—and two island provinces—Cantanduanes and Masbate (see map, right). The region is comprised of 7 cities, 107 municipalities, and 3,471 barangays. 9 Bicol is largely dependent on the agricultural sector. Approximately 68 percent of its 4.6 million residents live in rural areas, and farming employs nearly half of the region’s workforce.10 The chief crops of Bicol are coconut, banana, rice, abaca, and corn, with commercial fishing and mining also contributing to the region’s economy.11
The Bicol region is particularly vulnerable to destructive natural disasters due to its location along a typhoon path. Moreover, the volcanic range dominated by Mount Mayon, Mount Masaraga, Mount Iriga, and Mount Isarog puts Bicol at high risk for earthquakes and volcanic activity.
Rural poverty remains a major obstacle to the development of the Bicol region. In 2000, all six provinces in the region were named among the “Poorest 44 Provinces” in the Philippines.12 The latest poverty data indicates that more than 48 percent of the population, or 2.2 million people, live below the poverty threshold. 13 Bicol’s per capita GDP in 2006 was the second lowest in the nation—less than half of the national average and about one fifth that of Metro Manila.14 Nearly 80 percent of the population in Bicol is dependent on natural resources for food and income.15 Rapid environmental degradation combined with insufficient livelihood opportunities in rural areas has
trapped many Bicolanos in a perpetual cycle of poverty. 16 IIRR has indicated that “[poor
households] exploit the natural resource to survive (marginally); the depletion of the natural
resource, however, further impoverishes them, making their survival more difficult.”17 (For more information on natural resource management in the Philippines, see section 1.2 of the Appendix.)
Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A and Lagonoy Watersheds
The Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A and Lagonoy watersheds are the main areas of focus of this evaluation. Both locations are characterized by high prevalence of poverty, high degree of natural resource degradation, and a severe shortage of social services.18 Current challenges facing these areas include “forest decay, heavy soil erosion leading to reduction in agricultural activity, and a lack of non–farm activities.”19 In the Lagonoy watershed, lack of employment opportunities has led to increased levels of out–migration.20
Table I (below) provides a brief profile of Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A and Lagonoy watersheds.
Table I. Summary Profile of Project Areas21
No. of Municipalities
| Mt. Masaraga-Quinale A Watershed | Lagonoy Watershed | |
| Provinces | Albay and Camarines Sur | Camarines sur |
| 4 | 4 | |
| No. of barangays | 293 | 37 |
| Eco–zones covered | Upland and lowland No coastal zone – river systems drain into Lake Bato |
Upland and lowland |
| IIRR presence in watersheds | 8 barangays | 4 barangays |
III. Program Background
IIRR’s BICOL Program
In 2000, motivated by the extent of poverty in Bicol, IIRR initiated a watershed management program by reaching out to local stakeholders in the region. Through a series of participatory community assessment activities employing PRA techniques, IIRR worked with barangay officials, community leaders, and existing civil society groups to identify root causes of poverty in Bicol. The outcome was a common understanding that community problems, ranging from seasonal flooding to child malnutrition, were linked to environmental degradation. Moreover, IIRR and the network of stakeholders determined that water management and water quality were central to poverty reduction interventions in the region.22 The watershed was defined by IIRR as follows:
…the natural boundaries of a diverse yet logically–connected eco–system [that serves] as a unit for development…The watershed approach is based on the understanding that
communities in three broad ecosystems—the uplands, the lowlands and the coastal areas— share natural resources formed by watersheds, irrespective of their affiliation to administrative or political units like province or municipality.23
Following the initial workshop, IIRR initiated its Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood Program (BICOL Program), which aims, through the context of the watershed unit, to combat poverty within participating communities.
The established aims of the BICOL Program are:
1. To strengthen capacities of community groups and people’s organizations, local government agencies and partner NGOs in the watershed;
2. To strengthen the regional network of local government agencies, NGOs and peoples’ organizations in the region to better link rural poor communities with regional and national policies, plans and programs;
3. To learn from working with communities and partner agencies about what works and why, in watershed development programs; and
4. To use field–based lessons for promoting community–based, people–centered, participatory and integrated approaches among development practitioners through IIRR’s training courses, study programs, workshops and writeshops.24
In 2001, the BICOL Program began in the Diwata watershed area of Masbate province. In 2005, IIRR secured funding from New Zealand’s International Aid & Development Agency (NZAID) to widen the reach of the BICOL Program into Mt.Masaraga–Quinale A and Lagonoy watersheds. Drawing from its experience in Diwata watershed, IIRR focused its new efforts on the institutionalization of community–based watershed management through increased involvement of local government officials. Thus, the “Institutionalizing Community–Based Integrated Watershed Management within the Local Government Units in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Scaling–up and Sustaining Capacity–Building Outcomes at the Local Level” project was launched.25 This project is the subject of this evaluation.
The objectives of the NZAID project within the BICOL Program are:
1. To improve coordination and institutional arrangements at the local level for effective and sustainable management of watershed resources;
2. To educate communities about their watersheds and their importance to long–term water quality, quantity, ecological biodiversity, and poverty alleviation/reduction;
3. To enable communities and local stakeholders (government and private sectors) to form partnerships and take collective action to protect and enhance the integrity of their local watershed as a source of quality water, economic resources, recreation, and employment opportunities; and
4. To demonstrate the application of community–based integrated watershed management for addressing ecological and socio–economic problems at the local government level.26
Project Theory Model27
The overall goal of the program is to empower and benefit local households and communities. The mechanism used to implement the program is through the mobilization of stakeholders situated within a given watershed area to form multi–stakeholder groups, referred to as Watershed Networks. For this project, IIRR assisted in mobilizing the Masaraga–Quinale Watershed Stakeholders’ Association (MAQUIWASA) in Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed, as well as the Lagonoy–Goa–San Jose Watershed Stakeholders’ Association (LaGoSan WaSA) in Lagonoy watershed. IIRR works through these Watershed Networks to address community needs related to health, livelihoods, environment, and education. Diagram I (below) outlines the way in which IIRR works to achieve the objectives of the NZAID Project.
Diagram I. Institutionalizing Community–Based Integrated Watershed Management:
Project Theory Model
In this model, key stakeholder groups include:
IIRR’s role is to interact with both Watershed Networks and external entities. IIRR not only facilitates the formation of Watershed Networks, but also provides resources and trainings to strengthen the Networks’ skills in program development, management, monitoring and evaluation (M&E), and proposal writing. In addition, based on the needs expressed by Network participants, IIRR provides thematic trainings to Watershed Networks on environmental conservation and vocational skills.28 IIRR leverages these trainings by enabling Watershed Networks to coordinate community–managed projects and information, education and communication (IEC) campaigns in local communities and households (Objectives 2 and 3).
By including multiple stakeholders within Watershed Networks, IIRR aims to strengthen the relationships between the different institutions that Network members represent. Moreover, IIRR and Networks engage in advocacy with key policymakers and funding sources in order to secure formal relationships as well as financial support from LGUs (Objective 1).
In achieving the previous objectives, IIRR will be able to demonstrate how community–based integrated watershed management can be implemented at the local government level in partnership with civil society and local communities (Objective 4).
The formation and trainings of multi–stakeholder Watershed Networks toward the NZAID project goals feed directly into the main aims of the broader BICOL Program. (For BICOL Program goals, see p. 4).
BICOL Program Management Structure
As mentioned, the “Institutionalizing Integrated Community–based Watershed Management” project is managed as part of the broader IIRR BICOL Program. BICOL Program management links IIRR’s Regional Center for Asia (RCA) to local communities through its core team. The core team is envisioned to be composed of the following staff members:
The core team is responsible for the BICOL Program’s operational management and development. Apart from the core team, various members of RCA are also involved in supporting the BICOL Program. The RCA director oversees the Program’s long–term strategic planning. Program specialists within RCA facilitate trainings and workshops and provide M&E support to the BICOL Program.
At each level of the Program—from the community to the core team to RCA staff—all BICOL activities are guided by the Participatory Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (PPMEL) framework.31
The PPMEL Framework
The PPMEL framework is rooted in the participation of diverse stakeholders from program conceptualization and planning to monitoring and evaluation. In planning activities, the PPMEL framework engages multiple stakeholders to identify objectives and strategies to meet community needs. The framework also outlines expected timeframe, resources, budget, roles, and responsibilities for each activity. For project M&E, the PPMEL framework outlines indicators and allows for the identification of evaluation tools, procedures, and target audience. All aspects of the PPMEL framework are viewed as learning opportunities for those involved, assessing progress and extracting lessons learned from program activities.32
Field Coordinators: At the community level, it is the role of the field coordinators to organize trainings for communities (barangay officials and community members) on the use of PPMEL to develop a community–based planning, monitoring and evaluation system. The field coordinator advocates for the linkage of this community–based M&E in the Barangay Development Plan, which is a three–year plan drafted by the barangay–level government outlining its aims for development. The field coordinator’s role is also to empower communities to contribute annually to the Barangay Development Plan and its implementation.33
Watershed–level PPMEL should also be facilitated by the field coordinator. The aim is to conduct quarterly, mid–year, and annual PPMEL assessments with key partners and stakeholders at the community and watershed levels. Out of these meetings, the field coordinators develop monthly, quarterly, and annual reports from Watershed Network meetings. As needed, the field coordinator must also draft reports to inform donor agencies on program progress.34 (For PPMEL forms used by Watershed Networks, see section 2 of the Appendix.)
Program Coordinator: The BICOL Program coordinator should manage the overall PPMEL activities. The coordinator is expected to consolidate and disseminate watershed–level reports, assessments, and lessons learned to both donor agencies and RCA.
BICOL Focal Point and RCA: Charged with overall program oversight, RCA—through the BICOL Program Focal Point—should use reports and assessments to work with donors and potential partners in order to support the work of the BICOL Program.35
IV. Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation team employed a participatory and consultative methodology, engaging IIRR and numerous key stakeholders of the NZAID project. Following extensive context and program analyses, the team selected performance indicators based on IIRR–identified key result areas and interviews with relevant stakeholders. With these indicators, the team identified key informants and developed and validated evaluation guides. (For a full list of interviewees during the March evaluation and the evaluation guides, refer to sections 3 and 4 of the Appendix, respectively.) These guides were used to assess program relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact. During data collection in the field in March 2008, the team applied the following tools:
Focus Group Discussions: The evaluation team facilitated focus group discussions with Watershed Network members and CBOs in order to:
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Site Visits: The team observed the Watershed Networks’ project activities in order to:
In–depth Interviews with government and university stakeholders: The team met with a number of municipal government officials, barangay council members and area university professors in order to:
In–depth Interviews with IIRR staff: The evaluation team conducted interviews with IIRR’s BICOL Program core team. These interviews were conducted in order to:
Despite these limitations, sufficient information was obtained to proceed with the evaluation of the NZAID project. The following section details the team’s findings from research gathered during the context analysis, program analysis, and data collection phases of the evaluation.
V. Summary of Findings
This section presents the three main areas of the evaluation:
1. Organizational development of the Watershed Networks (MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA)
2. Community–managed projects
3. Management of the BICOL Program by IIRR
Within these three areas, the progress–to–date of each topic will be discussed followed by an analysis of its strengths and limitations.
1. Watershed Network Organizational Development
Progress to Date of Watershed Network Organizational Development
Table II (below) outlines the progress to date of the institutionalization of the two Watershed Networks. The sections below elaborate on this progress.
Table II. Progress to Date of Watershed Network Organizational Development
| MAQUIWASA | LaGoSan WaSA |
| SEC registered since 2007 | Revising bylaws to expedite decision-making process |
| Revising bylaws to expedite decision–making process | SEC registration in process |
| Initiated community–managed activities
Successfully engaged three municipalities to secure financial commitments Identified and pursued partnerships with local government, civil society and academe
Identified and pursued partnerships with local government, civil society and academe |
SEC Registration
With IIRR’s facilitation, MAQUIWASA was registered with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) in January 2007. This means that the Network is now officially recognized by the government as an independent legal entity. This registration also gives the Network the ability to receive government and private funding. IIRR also has helped LaGoSan WaSA to submit their application for SEC registration. As of March 2008, they were still waiting for SEC approval.
Membership Representation
MAQUIWASA has 35 listed members who have been with the group since it was established more than two years ago. The network is comprised of LGU officials at the municipal and barangay levels and local PO members from farmers’ associations.
LaGoSan WaSA has 33 members that represent LGUs at the municipal and barangay levels, Rural Health Unit midwives, and representatives from six CBOs (farmers’ associations, women’s groups, and youth groups).
Trainings Disseminated
MAQUIWASA members have participated in several trainings, such as Sloping Agricultural Land Technology (SALT) and Bio–intensive Garden (BIG) training. LaGoSan WaSA members have also participated in several trainings, including the Rural Enterprise Development Workshop and Kalinga Food Processing Training. (For a list of IIRR trainings by date and location, see section 5 of the Appendix.)
Members of both Watershed Networks expressed interest in receiving training on information, education, and communication (IEC) campaigns, organizational management, and fundraising. The members interviewed felt that access to training on fundraising would help them to become more financially independent from IIRR.
Bylaw Reorganization
MAQUIWASA recognizes that the strength of their organization is tied to the effectiveness of their sub–committees, which are the mechanism by which community projects are implemented. However, during the course of the evaluation, members of MAQUIWASA explained that not all of the 35 listed members participate in the organization’s activities and this makes it challenging for the group to maintain steady progress. For instance, their existing bylaws require that quorum be met in order to conduct votes. However, truant members have impeded the Network’s decision–making process. As a result, MAQUIWASA is currently updating its bylaws to do the following:
Strengthening Partnerships with LGUs
Both MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA are making efforts toward developing strong partnerships with LGUs. The Networks are trying to leverage their members’ relationships to LGUs, especially those who work for the municipal– or barangay–level governments, to collaborate on projects that achieve the goals of the BICOL Program. During the evaluation trip in March, the team found several opportunities for both Watershed Networks to continue to strengthen their relationships with LGUs and also to work in conjunction with LGU development plans. Some examples include:
IIRR has helped LaGoSan WaSA to establish the following three revenue generation projects:
Table III. Strengths and Limitations of Watershed Network Organizational Development
| Strengths | Limitations |
| Actively engaging local government, civil society and academe for partnerships | Networks dependent on IIRR support |
| Highly motivated and dedicated watershed network members | Challenge to maintain LGU partnerships due to three–year term of office |
| SEC Registration | Little knowledge sharing between watershed networks |
Strengths
Both Watershed Networks have begun to leverage their relationships with LGUs and local POs/ CBOs to form partnerships within their watersheds. An aim of the Watershed Networks is to promote education and awareness of watershed management, especially to the communities’ youth. Both Watershed Networks have achieved this by directly involving youth in their activities. Also, the team observed that Network members join on a voluntary basis. Their willingness to make time for Network activities demonstrates a genuine commitment to the mission of the organization. This motivation is a key driving force for the current success of the Networks and will be critical for their future success as well.
In addition, the Watershed Networks have diverse memberships that span across different groups within the Philippine civil society. Members of both Watershed Networks include POs, CBOs, LGU officials (barangay and municipal levels), rural health workers, municipal health workers, and members of local universities such as Bicol University’s College of Agriculture and Forestry (BUCAF) and Camarines Sur State Agricultural College (CSSAC).
MAQUIWASA’s registration with the SEC in January 2007 is a step towards the institutionalization of CBIWM and achieving financial independence. However, SEC registration potentially compromises the multi–stakeholder nature of the Watershed Networks. This may occur if no formal mechanism exists to link member organization interests to their Network representatives, who may increasingly associate with Networks rather than their original organizations.
Limitations
Financial Dependence on IIRR
Activities of Watershed Networks ranging from meetings and awareness campaigns to community–managed projects are largely supported by outside donors. Prior to April 2008, both MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA activities were primarily funded by a NZAID grant obtained through IIRR. According to the project budget for Year 3 (1 April 2007 to 31 March 2008), NZAID bore 69.9 percent of the budget, IIRR provided 13.5 percent, other funders covered 15.3 percent, and the communities contributed 1.3 percent of financial costs.36 Thus, the termination of NZAID’s funding to this program in April 2008 may impact the sustainability of both Watershed Networks if no other funding is secured.37
MAQUIWASA generates a small amount of revenue from membership fees and a handful of community projects on which they collaborate with other organizations. Because IIRR is its main source of funding, this fledging Network becomes vulnerable to fluctuations in IIRR’s own funding capabilities. While members of MAQUIWASA recognize that the Network must become financially self–sufficient, they have not succeeded in determining how they will reach this point. Some members mentioned that they would benefit from having workshops or trainings on fundraising.
Similarly, LaGoSan WaSA generates a small amount of revenue through membership fees and a handful of community projects. Although the three municipalities in the Lagonoy watershed have recently offered a one–time contribution of 450,000 pesos (around $11,100) to LaGoSan WaSA, the majority of the Network’s funding continues to come from IIRR. As a result, LaGoSan WaSA is similarly vulnerable to fluctuations in IIRR’s funding capability.
Informal Government Partnerships
While the members of the Watershed Networks represent both the barangay and municipal levels of local government and do have some recognition within the LGUs in the two watersheds, they have not succeeded in developing contractual partnerships with the different LGUs.
Another concern related to government relationships is the three–year election cycle for government officials, which makes it difficult for the Networks to maintain partnerships with governments, especially if the political party or government official changes. Both IIRR and the Watershed Network members in both watersheds have been unsuccessful in deciphering how best to institutionalize their efforts while working within the constraints of the political culture in the Philippines.
Minimal knowledge sharing between Networks
Though IIRR strongly supports learning as a pillar of community development, there is little learning exchange between MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA. Only once during the Networks’ formation did IIRR facilitate a joint meeting between MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA. Moreover, both Watershed Networks could greatly benefit from information exchange between their organizations, given their unique experiences and shared challenges.
2. Community–Managed Projects
Since IIRR engaged in a reengineering process in the summer of 2007, community–managed projects have become a new focal point of the first phase of the BICOL Program. The community projects serve to address the needs of communities in a number of sectors to build their program management capabilities toward institutionalization. These projects are still in their nascent stages; only six had been started when the evaluation team visited in March 2008. The four sectors of intervention for community–managed projects are as follows:
Progress to Date of Community–Managed Projects
The evaluation team observed community projects in both watersheds. An example of a project that embodies the coordination between the three program components is the child feeding program briefly discussed earlier. This program falls under both the Health and Nutrition and Livelihoods sectors.
The child feeding program is a pilot program initiated in March 2008 where malnourished children come for feedings of Insumix.38 The program is a coordinated effort between local barangay council members, rural health workers, women’s groups and CBOs, municipalities, LaGoSan WaSA, and IIRR. The following table illustrates the contributions each stakeholder has made towards achieving success with the child feeding program.
Table IV. Stakeholder Contributions in Child Feeding Program
| Stakeholder Group | Contribution to Child Feeding Program |
| Local barangay councils | Provide barangay hall or other local community space for feedings |
| Rural Health Workers | Feed and weigh the children |
| Women’s Groups / CBO’s in the barangays | Prepare the Insumix |
| Watershed Network – LaGoSan WaSA | Bring stakeholders together, provide forum for groups to share best practices |
| IIRR | Financial support, training on Insumix production, and help watershed network facilitate the project. |
The women’s groups and CBOs who engaged in the production of the Insumix hope to use the training they received with IIRR’s support as an income generation activity. During this pilot phase, the feeding program offers the nutrient mix free of charge to needy families. However, the women’s groups involved in the program aim to eventually produce the mix to sell in the local markets.
The evaluation team has prepared a detailed analysis of all the existing community projects that have been identified in the Detailed Implementation Plan and other IIRR programmatic documents. (For further analysis, see section 6 of the Appendix.)
Strengths and Limitations of Community–Managed Projects
The following table describes the major strengths and limitations that were observed by the evaluation team with respect to the community–managed projects that IIRR has helped the Watershed Networks to implement.
Table V. Strengths and Limitations of Community–Managed Projects
| Strengths | Limitations |
| Network projects actively target priority issues identified by the community | Low community ownership, high dependence on IIRR |
| Trainings responsive and appropriate to project needs | Low financial sustainability of projects |
| Projects involve multiple stakeholders |
Following a number of community workshops and interviews, the evaluation team found that the community–managed projects work to address community–identified needs. The top priority issues identified by community members in both LaGoSan WaSA and MAQUIWASA were the following:
(For priority issues identified by stakeholder groups, see section 7 of the Appendix.)
Therefore, the trainings and community–managed projects were aligned with the needs of the community, especially in the areas of assisting communities to access livelihood diversification opportunities. In addition, the community projects involve a diverse set of stakeholders often including LGU officials, members of the Watershed Networks, and other community members such as health workers and local families.
The most significant issue facing the community–managed projects is that they are reliant on IIRR funding and that they have required a high level of involvement from IIRR staff to move forward. Since only the child feeding pilot project has been completed within the LaGoSan WaSA Network, it is difficult to determine whether the same issue will arise within MAQUIWASA.
3. IIRR’s Management of the BICOL Program
Program management of the “Institutionalizing Community–Based Integrated Watershed Management” program, as previously described, encompasses program planning, implementation, and M&E. This section will describe the work of IIRR in the overall planning, M&E, and coordination of this program. This section will also highlight some strengths and challenges facing program management based on SIPA team observations.
Progress to Date of IIRR’s Management of the BICOL Program
BICOL Program Planning
The BICOL Program core team facilitated a number of activities in preparation for program planning. In 2005, IIRR established an office in Ligao City and hired additional staff. It consulted with LGUs in Lagonoy and Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed areas in order to identify barangays for participation. IIRR then used participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods to assess the needs of all participating communities.39 However, the data from these PRA activities were largely qualitative with little gathering of quantitative information. Moreover, to date, there has been no consolidation of the baseline data that resulted from these assessments. Also, since these initial PRA activities, there has been no further collection of community indicators.
BICOL Program Monitoring and Evaluation
In monitoring the progress of the overall BICOL Program, IIRR has been fairly consistent. Program staff thoroughly has documented their work with the Watershed Networks. However, the monitoring reports and assessments of the BICOL Program have been limited in scope. Originally, the BICOL Program’s M&E system was conceptualized to assess three program components:
1. Project objective achievement;
2. Activity implementation; and
3. Relevance of BICOL Program activities to RCA’s Goal.40
From a review of IIRR progress reports, along with discussions with IIRR staff, it was determined that IIRR’s M&E of the BICOL Program only discusses the first two components.41
Field Level Coordination
In regard to coordination of program management, there have been a number of unexpected shifts in program staffing at the field level. The result of staffing inconsistency has been a negative impact on Program progress. When the BICOL Program expanded to include Lagonoy and Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed areas in fall of 2005, the BICOL Program coordinator covered overall coordination as well as field coordination for the Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed area. For three months in 2007, with the sudden departure of the field coordinator for the Lagonoy watershed area, the BICOL Program operated in three watershed areas with one program coordinator, an administrative assistant, and only one field coordinator. By December 2007, the BICOL Program operated with all positions filled, but this quickly ended when the program coordinator resigned in February 2008, followed by a field coordinator in the following month. At the time of writing, the BICOL Program field staff is limited to one full–time field coordinator, one administrative assistant and one program coordinator who is also acting as field coordinator for the Diwata watershed area.
Strengths and Limitations of IIRR Program Management
Table VI. Strengths and Limitations of IIRR Program Management
| Strengths | Limitations |
| IIRR institutional experience (especially with community mobilization) Clear roles and responsibilities for staff Thorough documentation of meetings and Transparency and accountability in budget Field coordinator effective in mobilizing |
High staff turnover
Weak institutional knowledge sharing within Limited opportunities for professional development Underdeveloped monitoring and evaluation system Inconsistent information management Field office not easily accessed by LaGoSan WaSA |
IIRR management of the “Institutionalizing Community–based Integrated Watershed Management” project has demonstrated both strengths and limitations in regard to the sharing of institutional knowledge, field–level operations and overall M&E.
IIRR possesses a wealth of institutional experience in regard to community mobilization, which is reflected in the commitment and enthusiasm of its Watershed Network participants. The use of this knowledge, however, has been limited by weak institutional knowledge sharing within the organization. For example, in each focus group discussion during the SIPA team’s March field visit, the team asked the groups to identify the priority issues of their communities. Two issues frequently identified by the interviewees were the need for post–harvest technology and methods for disaster risk reduction. Through various discussions with the RCA staff, the SIPA team discovered that IIRR has experience in both these areas.
Within the program, information management is not always consistent, limiting the usability of its documents. Many documents that the evaluation team reviewed were not marked with dates or authorship, making them difficult to analyze. Furthermore, without an information back–up system and limited internet access, program staff also reported losing some program documents.
Operationally, field coordinators and the administrative assistant maintain thorough records of watershed activities. The system of financial accountability and budget allocation is well organized and transparent. While staff roles and responsibilities were clearly defined, they were not consistently followed. This was particularly due to the high staff turnover and consistent understaffing of the program. Due to this situation, BICOL Program staff had limited opportunities for professional development. Moreover, while the Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed coordinator benefited from the field office and administrative assistant, the Lagonoy watershed coordinator could not easily access the office and, instead, uses the facilities of municipal offices and internet cafes in order to complete her work.
In terms of planning and M&E, IIRR’s work remains driven by local community needs. Moreover, its detailed implementation plans are clearly written, outlining project goals, steps, and timeframe. However, the overall monitoring and reporting system reflects some weaknesses. First of all, since there are no baseline indicators and most available data is qualitative, it is difficult to measure the impact of IIRR activities in participating communities. As a result, the M&E system has been constrained. Furthermore, the M&E system for this project is limited in scope. In only measuring progress in terms of project objectives and implementation, the BICOL Program could lose sight of the greater goals of enabling households and communities to affect meaningful change.
VI. Recommendations
Phase II of the BICOL Program
With the end of the Program’s first phase in April 2008, IIRR looks forward to Phase II of the BICOL Program. A main component of IIRR’s current plans is to expand the program. The table below represents this anticipated scale–up.
Table VII. Number of Barangays Involved in BICOL Program at Phase I and Targeted for Phase II
| Watershed | Phase I (2005-2008) # of Barangays |
Phase II (2008-2012) # of Barangays |
| Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A | 8 | 3042 |
| Lagonoy | 4 | 1243 |
| Total Barangays | 12 | 42 |
The numbers targeted in each watershed were established by the Watershed Networks themselves and represent a critical mass the Networks believe is needed for full implementation of the institutionalization of an integrated community–based watershed management program within their respective watersheds. While reaching a critical mass is an important goal, in light of the SIPA team’s evaluation of the first phase of the BICOL Program, it is strongly recommended that IIRR first strengthen its existing Networks before launching into expansion. To meet this task, the following actions are recommended:
1. Enhance Staff Structure
1.1 Establish second field office and hire administrative assistant in Lagonoy watershed
While the BICOL Program design envisioned a field office and administrative assistant to support both watershed areas, in reality, it mainly serves the Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed. Such inconveniences create inefficiencies in the Program’s operations. For the field coordinator in Lagonoy, her administrative work detracts time from her primary role and responsibility to promote community activities.
1.2 Provide managerial and technical training for the BICOL field team
Another area to address is staff trainings. In interviews with the field coordinators, both cited a desire to further their professional development. Two specific areas mentioned were in community–managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR) and in information management. In providing such trainings, IIRR will be transferring skills that will both enhance performance and provide field staff with an opportunity to further their professional management skills. In addition, the skills that field coordinators build will also help enhance the activities of the watershed networks. With years of experience in training NGOs in community–based management, IIRR has the ability to provide its BICOL staff with such expertise.
Ultimately, by establishing another field office and administrative assistant position in Lagonoy as well as providing more training opportunities for BICOL’s staff, IIRR will allow the core team to operate more effectively. Also, these changes may address the issue of high turnover by incentivizing staff to remain at IIRR for a longer period of time. Lastly, fostering a good work environment and an effective field team will move the BICOL Program closer to its end goal—the phase–out of IIRR facilitation in the Program and independence of the Watershed Networks.
2. Improve Information Management
2.1 Standardize documentation
While the evaluation team was able to review a myriad of documents, key information was often missing (i.e. authorship, date, location) making it difficult to analyze IIRR’s recorded information. Without having data that is properly labeled, IIRR runs the risk of losing important institutional knowledge as these documents become irrelevant or unusable. Therefore, IIRR should establish documentation standards on the recording and reporting of BICOL Program activities and progress. Moreover, it is suggested that all documents contain the following elements:
2.2 Install data back–up mechanism
The evaluation team also strongly recommends that IIRR install a proper information management back–up system in order to prevent the loss of data due to computer failures—a problem the field staff has encountered in the past. A data back–up mechanism could include regular updates on virus protection software and periodic saving of documents on properly labeled CDs, zip disks, or flash drives.
The standardization of documentation and establishment of a data back–up mechanism provides IIRR with important benefits. One critical outcome will be the ability to harness accurate information while monitoring and evaluating the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability of the BICOL Program.
3. Systemize Monitoring and Evaluation
A proper information management system is only one component of an effective monitoring and evaluation system. In terms of M&E, the following additional recommendations are made:
3.1 Collect baseline indicators
Though IIRR has facilitated the collection of a large amount of qualitative information from the participating watershed communities, this data has not been used to establish baseline indicators. Moreover, quantitative data is greatly lacking in the BICOL Program. The evaluation team recommends that IIRR immediately begin collection of this data.
3.2 Establish socio/economic–environmental indicators
Program indicators can come from a variety of sources. Examples include information from Watershed Network members, watershed communities, local academic institutions, RCA’s program specialists, and Philippine census data from the municipal and national government. In addition, Bicol Watershed Networks could identify appropriate indicators from watershed management projects developed in other areas and incorporate those indicators into the BICOL Program’s M&E system.
Currently, BUCAF is already planning to collect environmental and socio–economic data related to the Mt. Masaraga–Quinale A watershed. In this regard, MAQUIWASA has the opportunity to collaborate with BUCAF in this baseline collection project and utilize the information gathered in the Network’s own activities.
Section 8 of the Appendix provides examples of baseline indicators identified from three sources:
1. “BICOL Program Document” written by IIRR’s RCA;
2. SIPA team interview with BUCAF staff; and
3. Other natural resource management projects.
3.3 Assess relevance of activities to broader program goals
A second recommendation for the BICOL Program’s M&E practices is for IIRR to assess project activity not only by degree of implementation but also by the relevance of the projects to the greater BICOL Program and RCA goals. This would enable IIRR to consistently target key issues of the communities. In addition, it is recommended that these assessments take place at regular intervals.
3.4 Conduct regular assessment of community–managed projects
At the community–project level, M&E of each community–managed activity should also include baseline indicators and regular assessment of the activities progress as well as relevance to its overarching objectives.
Applying all the recommended improvements will offer IIRR more robust and timely information on its programmatic work. This information can be used to identify key challenges, successes, and lessons learned to guide the BICOL Program’s work. Moreover, being able to accurately demonstrate progress also leverages IIRR’s ability to seek funding. Ultimately, both of these outcomes will contribute to the success of the BICOL Program’s Phase II.
4. Leverage Knowledge–Sharing Opportunities
The evaluation team observed many information–sharing opportunities at several levels of the Program that could be leveraged to enhance the BICOL Program. This includes un–tapped opportunities between Watershed Networks, within IIRR, and with external partners such as local universities, government, and NGOs.
4.1 Facilitate learning between Watershed Networks
In terms of the Watershed Networks, it is recommended that IIRR organize periodic meetings between the Networks to enable the exchange of information and ideas. Differing both in their organizational development as well as in project activity, each Network has much to learn from the other. For example, MAQUIWASA received SEC registration in January 2007 and is currently working towards streamlining its membership and decision–making processes while LaGoSan WaSA has not. On the other hand, LaGoSan WaSA has successfully implemented several pilots for community–managed projects by bringing together several different stakeholders in the Lagonoy watershed and could share these experiences with MAQUIWASA. Accordingly, MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA would greatly benefit from more periodic meetings to discuss their challenges, successes, and lessons learned.
4.2 Utilize IIRR’s past experience to meet Bicol community needs
Due to IIRR’s wealth of institutional experience and expertise in community–based management through the developing world, it also is recommended that IIRR utilize its past experiences and apply them to the context of the BICOL Program. Two such areas identified for this action include post–harvest technology and community–managed disaster disk reduction. In Vietnam, IIRR has gained recognition for its work with farmers on post–harvest technologies. Also, IIRR in conjunction with Cordaid has produced a manual on community–based disaster risk reduction.
4.3 Improve communication and exchange with local government, universities, and NGOs
The last area that the SIPA team saw as a knowledge–sharing opportunity is with Bicol’s local government and universities. In terms of the local government, the City Councilor from Ligao City, within the Mt. Masaraga Quinale A watershed, discussed plans to launch an educational campaign on environmental conservation. If the Watershed Network were able to work with Ligao’s municipal workers in this campaign, both parties would benefit. MAQUIWASA could gain information, education, and communication (IEC) campaign skills while the city could utilize the Network’s ties to the community to expand the depth and reach of the campaign’s impact. These IEC campaigns should also engage various political parties in the region in anticipation of potential political transitions. In doing so, Networks may be able to immediately establish relationships with LGUs, thereby decreasing possible lag time in Network–LGU partnerships during the transition phase from one administration to another.
In terms of knowledge–sharing opportunities with universities, BUCAF plans to educate youth about environmental issues. This initiative is scheduled to take place summer 2008 and consists of a series of traveling plays to be performed in barangay communities. In partnering with MAQUIWASA, BUCAF could benefit from the Networks ties to the communities while MAQUIWASA could benefit from gaining a creative way to raise environmental awareness in the community. There are similar opportunities for LaGoSan WaSA with CSSAC and Partido State University (PSU).
5. Strengthen Financial Independence of Watershed Networks
It was observed that Watershed Networks are heavily dependent on IIRR for financial support. In order to move these Networks away from this dependence, the SIPA team recommends a series of actions.
5.1 Enhance current financial management training
IIRR has already provided trainings on proposal writing to the Networks. However, in focus group interviews with MAQUIWASA and LaGoSan WaSA members, proposal writing was cited as a needed training. Therefore, the SIPA team recommends that IIRR revisit the impact of its past proposal writing workshops in order to identify ways to improve its reach.
5.2 Link to public and private funding opportunities
The evaluation team also recommends that IIRR couple proposal writing trainings with linkages to potential public and private funding opportunities so that the Watershed Networks can apply the trainings in proposal writing.
5.3 Promote income–generating projects
The evaluation team recommends that IIRR give special attention to the promotion of income–generating projects and work toward these projects’ sustainability. This has begun to happen at a limited degree but should be increased within both Watershed Networks.
In trying to ensure the sustainability of income–generation projects, IIRR should facilitate demand–driven activities. For example, in the child–feeding pilot program, the women’s groups and CBOs are interested in selling the Insumix on a larger scale. However, they have not determined a buyer for the Insumix. The team recommends that IIRR facilitate ties between the women’s groups and CBOs and government procurement projects, as it has in Napo with the Watershed Network’s efforts in mung bean production and the jatropha saplings nursery. Doing so would provide projects with a reliable source of funding and decrease risks associated with project expansion.44
By increasing the Watershed Networks’ abilities to independently seek grant funds as well as to establish more income–generating projects, IIRR will promote an increased sense of community ownership within the Networks as well as a more diversified funding base for the Networks. This would further establish the Networks’ independence from IIRR support.
6. Explore Alternative Funding Opportunities for IIRR’s BICOL Program
It is also worth mentioning that IIRR is currently in discussion with potential donors to fund the second phase of the BICOL Program. If these discussions prove unsuccessful or result in partial funding of the second phase, the evaluation team recommends that IIRR explore the use of climate change and disaster risk reduction as platforms for funding.
6.1 Explore climate adaptation opportunities
One such opportunity may lie with climate adaptation financing opportunities, such as the United Nations Clean Development Mechanism. The Kyoto Protocol adopted in February 2005 established the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which allows industrialized countries to offset their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by investing in carbon projects in developing countries. Currently, the CDM website lists 19 carbon projects in the Philippines.45
Unfortunately, reforestation—one main initiative of the BICOL Program—is not listed as an approved CDM project. However, review of the Kyoto Protocol will occur at the end of April 2008 and a force of 300 high–level endorsers is campaigning for the inclusion of reforestation in approved CDM projects.46 The SIPA evaluation team recommends that IIRR explore possible opportunities related to the Clean Development Mechanism in addition to other sources of financing related to climate adaptation projects.
6.2 Explore disaster risk reduction (DRR) opportunities
Following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, there was a heightened global awareness for natural disasters and to develop methods to mitigate their devastating effects. Though the Philippines has had a “National Plan on Community Disaster Preparedness” (Presidential Decree No. 1566) since 1978, the national government has continued to adapt its disaster management policies over the past few decades. The most recent of DRR initiatives implemented by Philippine government began in 2005 and is known as the “Four Point Action Plan for Disaster Preparedness.” The Points include 1) enhancing early warning mechanism; 2) information education campaigns; 3) capacity building of LGUs; and 4) building private–public partnerships for post–disaster relief and rehabilitation.47
The Points 2 and 3 of the national government’s “Four Point Action Plan” relate directly to the objectives of the BICOL Program. Moreover, as mentioned above, IIRR has produced a manual on community–managed disaster risk reduction (CMDRR). This could be an opportunity to collaborate with the national government. IIRR can leverage its institutional knowledge on CMDRR as well as its links to Bicol communities through the Watershed Networks in exchange for financial and/or technical support in information education campaigns and capacity–building of LGUs.
7. Re–strengthen the Watershed Concept
Though the immediate recommendations by the SIPA team calls for a strengthening of the existing Watershed Networks before expansion, the evaluation team recognizes that IIRR aims to scale–up its program nearly four–fold (from 12 targeted barangays to 42). In light of this objective, the evaluation team recommends that IIRR re–strengthen the watershed concept.
7.1 Incorporate equal representation of all parts of the watershed eco–system
As the Program expands, it is highly recommended that IIRR work to incorporate equal representation from the watershed eco–systems, namely, upland, lowland and coastal regions. Specifically, because most targeted communities are lowland areas and thus far, no coastal communities are involved in the Program. Therefore, the SIPA team recommends that IIRR facilitate partnerships with additional upland barangays and try to initiate interest in coastal communities to ensure that the Networks are truly representative organizations.
7.2 Return to the original concept of a watershed as a unit for development
The Program was originally conceptualized around the idea of a watershed as a unit for development. By reinforcing this concept, the credibility of the Program will be strengthened. In turn, this legitimacy will foster more partnerships within the community among the local government, CBOs, and universities as well as with external parties, such as donors and international NGOs.
In re–strengthening the watershed concept, IIRR will bring the BICOL Program closer to its ultimate goal—to institutionalize community–based integrated watershed management.
Notes
- International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), http://www.iirr.org/publications.htm.
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), “Philippines,” World Factbook 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rp.html.
- A barangay is defined as “the smallest political unit in which cities and municipalities in the Philippines are divided. It is the basic unit of the Philippine political system. It consists of less than 1000 inhabitants residing within the territorial limit of a city or municipality and administered by a set of elective officials, headed by a barangay chairman. For more information, see Republic of the Philippines: The Official Website, “General Information,” http://www.gov.ph/ aboutphil/general.asp.
- The Philippines officially recognizes its independence on 12 June 1898, the day the Philippines declared itself free from over 300 years of Spanish rule.
- B. M. Villegas, The Filipino Phenomenon (Manila: Belgosa Publishing, 1998), 1.
- World Bank, World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development (Washington, D.C., 2007), 337.
- Ibid., 321, 337.
- CIA (2008).
- National Statistical Coordination Board (NCSB) Region 5 Division, “Number of Provinces, Cities, Municipalities and Barangays,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru5/updates/npcmb.html.
- Eastern Visayas Information Sharing Network, “Region 5: Bicol Region,” http://www.evis.net.ph/ subregions/subregion5.htm (data for 1990); Regional Development Council V, “Socio Economic Profile,” http://www.rdc5.gov.ph/bikol/sep.htm (data for May 2000); and Regional Development Council V, “Region V History/Profile,” http://www.rdc5.gov.ph/bikol/bickol_history.htm.
- Ibid.
- NCSB, “Poverty Statistics: Poorest 44 Provinces,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2000/44_ poorestprov.asp.
- National Statistical Coordination Board Region 5 Division, “The Bicol Region Millennium Development Goals,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/ru5/mdg/stats/goal1.htm (data for 2003).
- NSCB, “2006 Gross Regional Domestic Product,” http://www.nscb.gov.ph/grdp/2006/2006concap.asp. Per capita GDP figures are for 2006 (given at constant 1985 prices): Bicol 6,685 pesos. National average: 14,676 pesos. Metro Manila: 37,855.
- IIRR, “Integrated Watershed Management Approaches to Alleviation to Alleviating Poverty in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Learning from Past Experience” (Y.C. James Yen Center, Silang, Cavite: 2003), 1.
- IIRR, “A Proposal: Institutionalizing Community-based Integrated Watershed Management within the LGUs in the Bicol Region, Philippines,” 13.
- IIRR, “Program Document, 4th Draft: Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood (BICOL) Program” (Regional Center for Asia, Silang, Cavite), 3.
- IIRR, “Program Document, 4th Draft: Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood (BICOL) Program” (Regional Center for Asia, Silang, Cavite), 3.
- Ibid., 5.
- IIRR, “A Proposal: Institutionalizing Community-based Integrated Watershed Management within the LGUs in the Bicol Region, Philippines,” 15.
- IIRR, “Program Document, 4th Draft: Building Initiatives for Community Opportunities and Livelihood (BICOL) Program” (IIRR Regional Center for Asia, Silang, Cavite), 3.
- Pratima Kale, Personal communication, 21 November 2007, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
- IIRR’s Regional Center for Asia. BICOL Program: Program Document. (Cavite: Dr. Y.C. James Yen Center, 2007), 7.
- Writeshops are participatory workshops that bring together community leaders, government officials, NGOs and scholars to share experiences and document best practices on a given development issue. IIRR, Preliminary Terms of Reference, October 2007.
- For the remainder of the report, this project will be referred to as the “Institutionalizing Community-based Integrated Watershed Management project” or the “NZAID project.”
- Ibid.
- This model was developed through consultations of the SIPA team with its faculty adviser, Professor Miguel Pinedo-Vasquez.
- International Institute of Rural Reconstruction. List of Skills Conducted in Bicol.
- There is one field coordinator in each watershed area.
- International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), “Participatory Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (PPMEL) Framework for the Bicol Program”(Cavite: Y.C. James Yen Center, draft for discussion only).
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- International Institute of Rural Reconstruction Silang, Cavite. “Institutionalizing Community-based Integrated Watershed Management within the Local Government Units in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Year 3 Budget (April 1, 2007 to March 31, 2008).”
- The remaining 15.3% of the Year 3 budget was provided by a source labeled “Other Funder.”
- Reference section on NZAID change in support…
- Insumix is a nutritional mix comprised of mung beans, rice, and sesame.
- International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), “Institutionalizing Community-Based Integrated watershed Management within the LGUs in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Scaling-up and Sustaining Capactiy-Building Outcomes at Local Level – Progress Report as of October 31, 2005″(Cavite: Y.C. James Yen Center, 14 November 2005), 3-5.
- RCA Goal: To enable people and their communities in Asia to effect meaningful change in their lives through action research and learning processes, and to generate and acquire knowledge and participatory human development derived from practical experience and learning.
- International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), “Participatory Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning (PPMEL) Framework for the Bicol Program”(Cavite: Y.C. James Yen Center, draft for discussion only)
- Philip Penaflor, personal communication, 11 April 2008.
- This represents 10% of all the barangays in Mt. Masaraga-Quinale watershed.
- This represents 30% of all the barangays in Lagonoy watershed.
- Judith Tendler. Good Governance in the Tropics. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press), pp.113.
- For a complete description of the 19 CDM projects located in the Philippines, see http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/projsearch.html.
- Visit the website of Forest Now Declaration at http://www.forestsnow.org for a comprehensive list of supporters.
- Emilia Tadeo, “The Philippine Disaster Management System,” (Presentation for ADB’s Small-Group Workshop on Preparing for Large Scale Disasters, 5-6 July 2007), http://www.adb.org/Documents/Events/2007/Small-Group-Workshop/PPT-Tadeo.pdf, 14-17.
Appendix
1. Additional Context
1.1 Governmental and Non-government Development Initiatives in the Philippines
One of the most significant governmental changes that have had major implications for the growth and development of rural areas is through the empowerment of local government units (LGUs).i This policy shift came through a provision to the 1987 constitution known as the Local Government Code of the Philippines. The purpose of the policy, declared in 1991, was to “enable [LGUs] to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.”ii In the devolution process, LGUs have been “given more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources” in carrying out the following functions: to provide efficient service delivery, manage the environment, promote economic development and reduce poverty.iii
The Local Government Code encourages the participation of civil society in local governance. Chapter IV of the Code, entitled “Relations with People’s and Non-governmental Organizations,” lists the following provisions:
Local government units shall promote the establishment and operation of POs and NGOs to become active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy.
Local government units may enter into joint ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with POs and NGOs to engage in the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and livelihood projects and to develop local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversify agriculture, spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance and enhance the economic and social well-being of the people.
A local government unit may, through its local chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise to such POs and NGOs for economic, socially-oriented, environmental or cultural projects to be implemented within its territorial jurisdiction.iv
One specific development strategy written into the Code is the establishment of Local Development Councils (LDCs) within each Local Government Unit. The aim of the LDCs is to establish a “comprehensive multi-sectoral development plan” and to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development.”v An interesting feature of the LDCs is that members of civil society are represented alongside local politicians. The Local Government Code requires that members of POs and NGOs make up at least 25 percent of the total membership in these councils.vi
The Local Government Code has also altered the role of civil society in the Philippines. With the devolution of powers from the central government to the LGUs, “NGO efforts in advocacy and activities have shifted from the national to the local, and networking mechanisms are becoming increasingly area-based rather than sector-based.”vii This “localization” of NGOs has been positive for enhancing community participation: “Their knowledge of local conditions, sensitivity to local cultures, and participatory approaches in dealing with communities makes them ideal for community organizing and resolving conflicts.”viii
The Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development, ratified in 1989, also acknowledges the importance of civil society actors in the development process:
In promoting the active participation of the citizenry for sustainable development, non-government organizations (NGOs) can be the central vehicle in mobilizing people to participate. NGOs have certain advantages. They have less bureaucratic red tape and can thus move fast. They have already established strong direct links with the grassroots. Their members are the very citizens whose participation is needed and who see their NGO membership as a citizen’s responsibility. They are thus imbued with the needed commitment and drive to deal with difficult sustainable development issues.ix
1.2 Natural Resource Management in Philippines
Several provisions of the Local Government Code outline the functions of LGUs in environmental conservation and natural resource management. For the municipal governments, these responsibilities include the implementation of water community-based forestry projects and soil resource utilization and conservation projects as well as the establishment of solid waste disposal and environmental management systems.x
The decentralization of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), however, has been less effective. As the “primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural resources,” DENR has been reluctant to fully devolve its functions and personnel to the local governments. xi Another impediment to LGU leadership in natural resource management has been a Local Government Code clause stating that “all environmental activities are subject to the supervision and control of DENR.” xii The result has been the disengagement of some LGUs from local resource management.xiii
Despite the challenges, the field of natural resource management in the Philippines has made significant progress in recent years. One such example is the adoption and implementation of the United Nations’ mandate known as Agenda 21. The program sets out a plan for the universal adoption of sustainable development as the means for the “fulfillment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better protected and managed ecosystems and a safer, more prosperous future.”xiv Within this framework, the Philippines has also established national and local versions of Agenda 21 to promote and institutionalize sustainable development at all levels of government. Memorandum Order No. 47, issued by the Office of the President in 1999, directs LGUs to “coordinate closely with non-governmental organizations and people’s organizations in the formulation of Local Agenda 21.” xv IIRR has reported that “[s]everal development agencies implementing projects in the [Bicol] region such as the academe, non-governmental organizations, and national government agencies have…forged partnerships with LGUs to implement Agenda 21.”xvi
2. PPMEL Forms
2.1 PPMEL
| Objectives | Activities | Expected Results | Time | Responsible | Resources | ||
| Outputs | Outcomes | Frame | Persons/Agencies | Needed | |||
2.2 PPMEL Assessment
| Activities | Status/Progress | Facilitating | Hindering | Lessons | |
| Factors | Factors | Learned | |||
3. March Field Trip Schedules, 3 – 8 March 2008
3.1 March Field Trip Schedule for Lagonoy Watershed
| Date/ Time | Activity | Participants | Location | ||
| Part 1: Networks Meeting | |||||
| March 3, 2008 | o | ||||
| 8:00AM- | With mayors and | Mayor , MPDC, MAO | Mayor’s Office, Goa | ||
| 10:00AM | respective LGU officials | ||||
| who have been involved | Municipal Administrador, | ||||
| during the | MPDC, 3 MAO, 2 RHU, | Mayor’s Office, | |||
| 10:30AM- | implementation of the | MENRO | Lagonoy | ||
| 1:30PM | program | Municipal Administrador, | Mayor’s Office, San | ||
| 2 MAO, MPDC, 1 SB, 2 RHU, | Jose | ||||
| 2:00PM-5:00PM | DILG-LGOO | ||||
| March 4, 2008 | o | ||||
| 8:00-9:30AM | PSU | Extension Coordinator | PSU, San Jose | ||
| Municipal agricultural officers | |||||
| 10:00AM- | o | DENR-CENRO | CENRO Office, | ||
| 1:00NN | Phone conversation with | Goa | |||
| o | |||||
| 3:00PM-4:30PM | CSSAC | Director of Extension | CSSAC, Pili | ||
| Date/ Time | Activity | Participants | Location | ||
| Part 2: Watershed & Field levels meeting | |||||
| March 5, 2008 | o | ||||
| 9:00AM-4:30PM | General evaluation | (22) LaGoSan WaSA | MAO, Lagonoy | ||
| through LaGoSan WaSA | |||||
| meeting | |||||
| March 6, 2008 | FGD with: | ||||
| 8:00AM - | o | Women’s Health and | (4)Barangay Council | Minoro | |
| 10:00NN | Environment Association | (10) Members of CBOs | |||
| o | Cagaycay Rural | (5)Barangay Council | Cagaycay | ||
| 1:30PM -4:30PM | Development Association | (15) Members of CBOs | |||
| (CRDA) | |||||
| March 7, 2008 | FGD with: | ||||
| 8:00 – 12:00NN | o | Green and Health | (2)Barangay Council | Mampirao, San Jose | |
| Movers’ Association | (19) Members of CBOs | ||||
| o | (GaHMA) | ||||
| Barangay Mampirao | |||||
| Farmers’ Association | |||||
| o | (BMFA) | ||||
| Mampirao Youth | |||||
| 1:30PM-4:30PM | Development and | (8)Barangay Council | Genorangan, | ||
| Productivity (MYDaP) | (14) Members of CBOs | Lagonoy | |||
| o | Genorangan | ||||
| Environment and | |||||
| Economic Development | |||||
| Association (GEEDA) | |||||
| March 8, 2008 | o | ||||
| 10:00AM | CSSAC | Professor | CSSAC, Pili | ||
3.2 March Field Trip Schedule for Mt. Masaraga-Quinale A Watershed
| Date/Time | Activity | Participants | Location |
| March 3, 2008 | Meeting with MAQUIWASA | (8) MAQUIWASA officers | IIRR Field Office, |
| 10:00AM - | officers | Ligao City | |
| 2.00PM |
| March 4, 2008 | Informal meeting with Ligao | Municipal agricultural | Ligao City | |||
| 1:00 – 2:00PM | municipal agricultural | officer/MAQUIWASA | ||||
| officer/MAQUIWASA | member, | |||||
| member, field coordinator, | (3) | IIRR staff | ||||
| administrative assistant, and | ||||||
| RCA M&E specialist | ||||||
| 2.30 | - 3.00PM | Meeting with Polangui Mayor | Mayor | LGU office, Polangui | ||
| 3.30 | - 4.00PM | Meeting with Municipal Health | Municipal Health Worker | Municipal Health | ||
| Worker | Office, Polangui | |||||
| 4.00 | - 5.00PM | Trip to Napo | (3) | IIRR staff | Nursery and mung | |
| bean projects, Napo | ||||||
| March 5, 2008 | Community focus group | (2) | Barangay representatives, | Private home, Balinad | ||
| 9:00 – 11:00AM | discussion | (1) | Sari-sari owner, | |||
| (1) MAQUIWASA officer | ||||||
| 2.00 | - 4:30PM | Community focus group | (2) | MAQUIWASA members | Community Hall, | |
| discussion | (11) Residents* of Herrera | Herrera | ||||
| barangay | ||||||
| March 6, 2008 | Meeting with municipal | Municipal Health Officers, | Municipal office, Oas | |||
| 9.30 | - 10.30AM | officers | Secretary to the Mayor, | |||
| Member of Municipal | ||||||
| Development Council, | ||||||
| (2) | Agricultural technicians | |||||
| 11.00 – 2:00PM | Community focus group | (6) | Residents* of San Ramon | Restaurant, Libon | ||
| discussion | barangay | |||||
| 2.30 | - 3.00PM | Meeting with Ligao Mayor | Mayor | Municipal office, | ||
| Ligao | ||||||
| 3.00 | - 5.00PM | Meeting with municipal | City Planning Officer, | Municipal office, | ||
| officers | (2) | City Councilors | Ligao | |||
| (1) | Agricultural | |||||
| Technician/MAQUIWASA | ||||||
| member | ||||||
| March 7, 2008 | Meeting with BUCAF | Professor/MAQUIWASA | BUCAF, Guinobatan | |||
| 9:00 – 12:00PM | professors | president, Associate professor | ||||
| 1.30 | - 4:00PM | Meeting with field staff | Field coordinator, | Field office, Ligao | ||
| Administrative assistant | City | |||||
| Debrief with MAQUIWASA | (4) MAQUIWASA officers | |||||
| officers | ||||||
| March 8, 2008 | Trip to Balogo | n/a | Landslide sites, | |||
| 3.00 | - 5:00PM | Balogo | ||||
*Residents may include youth, farmers, Barangay Council members, sari-sari owners and health workers
4. Evaluation Guides
4.1 Evaluation Guide for the Watershed Networks
Set up administrative and logistical support on-site
| KRAs | QUESTIONS |
| Onsite office established in appropriate | Do you use the field office? To what extent? How far is it from your |
| location. | community? |
To establish trust and partnership with communities & local stakeholders in the watershed (as well as create awareness on water resources issues & problems)
| KRAs | QUESTIONS | |
| Does baseline watershed data exists? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | How was it obtained? | |
| local watershed data | Do you have a resource map? Can we see it? | |
| How many transect walks have been conducted? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | Were the PRAs/problem tree analysis conducted and with whom? When? | |
| What was the purpose of these analyses? | ||
| local issues | Can you describe the process of the problem tree, stakeholder analysis and | |
| PRAs? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | Were SWOT/solution(s) tree conducted and with whom? When? | |
| What was the purpose of these analyses? | ||
| local opportunities | ||
| Can you describe the process of these analyses? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | Were institutional analyses conducted and with whom? When? | |
| What was the purpose of these analyses? | ||
| local institutional arrangements | ||
| Can you describe the process of these analyses? | ||
| Identify potential conflicts & prevention | What types of conflicts exist between stakeholders? | |
| How are these conflicts mitigated (i.e. at the barangay level, WN level, | ||
| mechanism | ||
| LGU-level)? | ||
| Validate information as basis for | What are the main issues/opportunities/potential conflicts of your | |
| planning, partnership building & | ||
| community? | ||
| continuing dialogue w LGUs & | ||
| Can you rank them? | ||
| community groups | ||
| Did you participate in an IIRR workshop? | ||
| Conduct community watershed | How did you find out about it? | |
| What did you do there? | ||
| planning workshop (WN and | ||
| Why was the workshop held? | ||
| Community) | ||
| What was your first interaction with IIRR (how did you get involved)? | ||
| What came out of the workshop? | ||
| Who are the CBIWM stakeholders? | ||
| Which are involved in current BICOL program? Why? | ||
| How can you involve them in the process? | ||
| Why did you join MAQUIWASA / LAGOSAN? | ||
| Define stakeholder roles, responsibilities | How do you become a member of MAQUIWASA / LAGOSAN? | |
| & actions | Are there other stakeholders that are not involved that you feel should be? | |
| What are the responsibilities and roles/actions of each stakeholder (ask | ||
| stakeholder)? | ||
| Have they changed at all since the beginning of the BICOL Program? | ||
To create awareness about water resources
| KRAs | QUESTIONS | |
| Identify start-up micro-watershed sites, | Where are the micro-watershed sites? How were they identified? (who | |
| involved? what process?) What are the key research and learning | ||
| research and learning questions | ||
| questions? How were research and learning questions developed? | ||
| Is there a joint proposal on CBIW? | ||
| Develop joint proposal by community | What was the role of the LGU in its development? | |
| What was the role of the community in its development? | ||
| and LGU on CBIW | ||
| Who within the LGU was involved in the proposal development? | ||
| Who within the community was involved in the proposal development? | ||
| Develop guideline for conducting | Is there a guideline for conducting CBIW resources assessment, planning | |
| and monitoring? How was it developed? When was it developed? Who | ||
| CBIW resources assessment, planning | ||
| developed the guideline? | ||
| and monitoring, | ||
| Has the guideline been used? How? How frequently? | ||
| Develop consolidated watershed action | 5Ws and H | |
| plans | ||
| Setting up watershed education and | How many watershed education programs were conducted? How were | |
| outreach program within the | ||
| topics decided? When was it? Who participated? How did they get | ||
| structure/mechanism for watershed | ||
| involved? Who is in charge of managing these programs? … | ||
| management (for IIRR and WN) | ||
| Setting up watershed education and | |
| outreach program within the | How important is…? Some questions about education program |
| structure/mechanism for watershed | contents… |
| management. (for | |
To develop a community-based watershed action plan w/ participation of various stakeholders including initial capacity development for planning, monitoring, and evaluation (for Napo and Balinad)
| KRAs | QUESTIONS |
| What are the current advocacy campaigns being undertaken? | |
| Conduct watershed awareness and | What were the baseline advocacy campaigns prior to IIRR involvement? |
| stakeholder responsibility dialogue | When and where were these meetings conducted? |
| workshops, TNA, community and local | What was the purpose of these meetings? |
| government dialogue meetings | What were the outcomes of these meetings? |
| How successful has IEC program been? | |
To facilitate the process for community and LGU participation and partnership in implementing watershed resource development and management actions
| KRAs | QUESTIONS | |
| How did initial participants become involved with WN? | ||
| Involvement of all (or as many as | How are new members, if any, recruited? | |
| When and where do your meetings take place? | ||
| possible) stakeholders | ||
| Why do / don’t people participate in the WNs? | ||
| What many hours per month do you commit to WN-related activities? | ||
| What are some of the administrative challenges your WN faces (i.e. | ||
| resource needs, participation,)? | ||
| Administrative systems in place | Define your organizational structure. (social network mapping) | |
| How are budgets allocated? Is this process efficient? | ||
| Is there a mechanism to report issues/concerns/problems in your | ||
| organization? | ||
| Management information system in | How is information recorded? How do you (IIRR, WN) disseminate | |
| information to stakeholders? Who keeps track of WN records of | ||
| place | ||
| meetings? How are these documents usually used? | ||
| How long have you participated in the WN? | ||
| Active and sustained membership | How did you initially become involved in the WN? | |
| What was your role? | ||
| How did you assume this role? (i.e. election?) | ||
| How are your officers elected? | ||
| Distribution of power | What is their length of term? | |
| How are your WN’s decisions made? | ||
| How many women/youth are in officer positions? | ||
| Does the WN have a M&E system in place? Where? Please define | ||
| (WN) Institutionalize of a community | guidelines of M&E. (PPMEL) | |
| How often is M&E conducted? | ||
| based monitoring and evaluation system | ||
| Who conducts M&E (PPMEL at WN committee level and barangay | ||
| level)? | ||
| Youth volunteer program to assist in | How many youth volunteers are involved in WN activities? What are these | |
| activities | ||
| watershed education and outreach | ||
| What is their role? | ||
| activities established | ||
| How long have they been involved? | ||
| What is the role of IIRR in your community? What programs has IIRR | ||
| (IIRR) Support to relevant and | supported? | |
| appropriate activities currently | How many IIRR trainings have been done in your community? What has | |
| implemented in selected barangays of | participation been like? | |
| watershed areas | How are these projects funded? | |
| Describe other development projects in your community? | ||
| (WN) Support to relevant and | What is the role of the WN in your community? What programs has WN | |
| appropriate activities currently | implemented? What has the participation been like? | |
| implemented in selected barangays of | How are these projects funded? | |
| watershed areas | What problem did these projects address? (i.e. were they relevant?) | |
| Improve (WN) coordination and | What is the LGU presence in WN meetings? | |
| What is the WN relationship like with LGU officials/leaders? | ||
| institutional arrangements for | ||
| How does the Barangay Development Council operate and implement | ||
| partnership-building with LGU at | ||
| Development Plan? What is the WNs involved in this activity? | ||
| barangay and municipal level | ||
| Has WN been able to secure funding from Development Plan? | ||
| Improve (WN) coordination and | ||
| institutional arrangements for | What other CBOs and NGOs operate in your community/region? | |
| partnership-building with non- | ||
| government bodies (i.e. private and | To what extent, if any, do you work with these organizations? | |
| other local NGOs) at barangay and | ||
| municipal level | ||
4.2 Evaluation Guide for the Communities
To establish trust and partnership with communities & local stakeholders in the watershed (as well as create awareness on water resources issues & problems)
| KRAs | QUESTIONS | |
| Does baseline watershed data exists? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | How was it obtained? | |
| local watershed data | Do you have a resource map? Can we see it? | |
| How many transect walks have been conducted? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | Were the PRAs/problem tree analysis conducted and with whom? When? | |
| What was the purpose of these analyses? | ||
| local issues | Can you describe the process of the problem tree, stakeholder analysis and | |
| PRAs? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | Were SWOT/solution(s) tree conducted and with whom? When? | |
| What was the purpose of these analyses? | ||
| local opportunities | ||
| Can you describe the process of these analyses? | ||
| Identify, review, and analyze existing | Were institutional analyses conducted and with whom? When? | |
| What was the purpose of these analyses? | ||
| local institutional arrangements | ||
| Can you describe the process of these analyses? | ||
| Identify potential conflicts & | What types of conflicts exist between stakeholders? | |
| How are these conflicts mitigated (i.e. at the barangay level, PN level, LGU- | ||
| prevention mechanism | ||
| level)? | ||
| Validate information as basis for | What are the main issues/opportunities/potential conflicts of your | |
| planning, partnership building & | ||
| community? | ||
| continuing dialogue w LGUs & | ||
| Can you rank them? | ||
| community groups | ||
| Disseminate lessons from entry point | Have you met with IIRR to discuss their work within community? How often? | |
| “trust building” activities & the | ||
| “dialogue” workshop to community | What type of work do they do with communities? What information do you | |
| leaders and local policymakers (for | gain from IIRR? | |
| community and LGU) | ||
| Did you participate in an IIRR workshop? | ||
| Conduct community watershed | How did you find out about it? | |
| What did you do there? | ||
| planning workshop (PN and | ||
| Why was the workshop held? | ||
| Community) | ||
| What was your first interaction with IIRR (how did you get involved)? | ||
| What came out of the workshop? | ||
| Who are the CBIWM stakeholders? | ||
| Which are involved in current BICOL program? Why? | ||
| How can you involve them in the process? | ||
| Why did you join MAQUIWASA / LAGOSAN? | ||
| Define stakeholder roles, | How do you become a member of MAQUIWASA / LAGOSAN? | |
| responsibilities & actions | Are there other stakeholders that are not involved that you feel should be? | |
| What are the responsibilities and roles/actions of each stakeholder (ask | ||
| stakeholder)? | ||
| Have they changed at all since the beginning of the BICOL Program? | ||
| To create awareness about water resources | ||
| KRAs | QUESTIONS | |
| Is there a joint proposal on CBIW? | ||
| Develop joint proposal by community | What was the role of the LGU in its development? | |
| What was the role of the community in its development? | ||
| and LGU on CBIW | ||
| Who within the LGU was involved in the proposal development? | ||
| Who within the community was involved in the proposal development? | ||
| Develop consolidated watershed | 5Ws and H | |
| action plans | ||
| Setting up watershed education and | ||
| outreach program within the | How important is…? Some questions about education program contents… | |
| structure/mechanism for watershed | ||
| management. (for | ||
To develop a community-based watershed action plan w/ participation of various stakeholders including initial capacity development for planning, monitoring, and evaluation (for Napo and Balinad)
| KRAs | QUESTIONS | |
| Conduct watershed awareness and | What are the current advocacy campaigns being undertaken? | |
| What were the baseline advocacy campaigns prior to IIRR involvement? | ||
| stakeholder responsibility dialogue | When and where were these meetings conducted? | |
| workshops, TNA, community and | What was the purpose of these meetings? | |
| local government dialogue meetings | What were the outcomes of these meetings? | |
| How successful has IEC program been? | ||
To facilitate the process for community and LGU participation and partnership in implementing watershed resource development and management actions
| KRAs | QUESTIONS |
38
| How did initial participants become involved with PN? | ||
| Involvement of all (or as many as | How are new members, if any, recruited? | |
| When and where do your meetings take place? | ||
| possible) stakeholders | ||
| Why do / don’t people participate in the PNs? | ||
| What many hours per month do you commit to PN-related activities? | ||
| Does the PN have an M&E system in place? Where? Please define | ||
| (PN) Institutionalize of a community | guidelines of M&E. (PPMEL) | |
| based monitoring and evaluation system | How often is M&E conducted? | |
| Who conducts M&E (PPMEL at PN committee level and barangay level)? | ||
| (IIRR) Support to relevant and | What is the role of IIRR in your community? What programs has IIRR | |
| supported? | ||
| appropriate activities currently | How many IIRR trainings have been done in your community? What has | |
| implemented in selected barangays of | participation been like? | |
| watershed areas | How are these projects funded? | |
| Describe other development projects in your community? | ||
| (PN) Support to relevant and | What is the role of the PN in your community? What programs has PN | |
| appropriate activities currently | implemented? What has the participation been like? | |
| implemented in selected barangays of | How are these projects funded? | |
| watershed areas | What problem did these projects address? (i.e. were they relevant?) | |
| Improve (PN) coordination and | ||
| institutional arrangements for | ||
| partnership-building with non- | What other CBOs and NGOs operate in your community/region? | |
| government bodies (i.e. private and | To what extent, if any, do you work with these organizations? | |
| other local NGOs) at barangay and | ||
| municipal level | ||
5. List of IIRR Trainings Conducted in Bicol
(received from Bicol Administrative Assistant on 20 February 2008)
| Masaraga Watershed Area | ||
| # | Title of the Training | Date and Venue |
| 1 | Soil and Water Conservation Training | 9-11 August 2006 |
| Brgy. Herrera, Ligao City | ||
| 2 | Soil and Water Conservation Training | 8-10 March 2006 |
| Brgy. San Ramon, Libon, Albay | |||
| 3 | Joint Proposal Making Workshop | 26-30 June 2006 | |
| Mayon Spring Resort | |||
| Sto. Domingo, Albay | |||
| 4 | Soil and Water Conservation Training | 24-26 July 2006 | |
| Sitio Garayon, Balinad | |||
| Polangui, Albay | |||
| 5 | Inter-watershed CBIWM Youth Training | 26-27 October 2006 | |
| Mayon Spring Resort, | |||
| Sto. Domingo, Albay | |||
| 6 | Masaraga Watershed CBIWM Youth Training | 13-14 January 2007 | |
| Kuyang’s Function Hall | |||
| Dunao, Ligao City | |||
| 7 | Nursery Establishment and Management Training | 25-26 January 2007 | |
| Barangay Hall | |||
| Napo, Polangui, Albay | |||
| 8 | Insumix Preparation Training | 30 January 2007 | |
| IIRR Field Office | |||
| Policarpo, Tinago, Ligao City | |||
| 9 | Workshop on Facilitating Participatory Risk Assessment and | 6-9 February 2007 | |
| Action Planning | Kuyang’s Function Hall | ||
| Dunao, Ligao City | |||
| 10 | Livestock Production Training | 15-16 February 2007 | |
| Barangay Hall | |||
| Mahaba, Ligao City | |||
| 111 | Participatory Development Communications Training | 20-22 February 2007 | |
| Kuyang’s Function Hall | |||
| Dunao, Ligao City | |||
| 12 | Organizational Development Assessment Workshop | 27-29 March 2007 | |
| Twin Peaks Farm Resort | |||
| Batang, Ligao City | |||
| 13 | Bio-Intensive Gardening Training | 13-15 June 2007 | |
| Barangay Hall | |||
| Bagsa, Oas, Albay | |||
| 14 | Rural Enterprise Development Training | 29 August 2007 | |
| Twin Peaks Farm Resort | |||
| Batang, Ligao City | |||
| 15 | MAQUIWASA Organizational Assessment Workshop | 29-30 January 2008 | |
| IIRR Field Office | |||
| Policarpo St., Tinago | |||
| Ligao City | |||
| Lagonoy Watershed Area | |||
| 1 | Nursery Establishment and Management Training | March 2006 | |
| Cagaycay, Goa, Camarines Sur | |||
| 2 | Joint Proposal Making Workshop | 26-30 June 2006 | |
| Mayon Spring Resort | |||
| Sto. Domingo, Albay | |||
| 3 | Youth CBIWM Training | 5-6 January 2007 | |
| Peñafrancia Resort | |||
| Sabang, San Jose | |||
| Camarines Sur | |||
| 4 | Rural Enterprise Development Workshop | 30 August 2007 | |
| SB Hall | |||
| Lagonoy, Camarines Sur | |||
| 5 | Bio-intensive Gardening Training | 28-29 September 2007 | |
| Goa, Camarines Sur | |||
| 6 | Kalinga Food Processing Training | 4 October 2007 | |
| Goa, Camarines Sur | |||
6. List of Community-Managed Projects to Date
6.1 Community-Managed Natural Resource Management
| Activity | Expected Output | Expected Outcome | Status | |||
| Collect baseline data on | Baseline data collected for | Monitoring of environmental | Planning | |||
| the status of forest cover | forest cover and vegetation | indicators | ||||
| and vegetation | ||||||
| Establish central and | Three nurseries established | Functional nurseries to | In progress | |||
| satellite nurseries | that include fruit-bearing | support reforestation | ||||
| and timber seedlings | ||||||
| Establish financial | Seeds/seedlings purchased | Systems to monitor | Not started | |||
| resources for seed, | and disseminated. | seeds/seedling dispersion | ||||
| fertilizer and other | Monitoring plan utilized. | developed and implemented | ||||
| planting materials | ||||||
| Establish and maintain | Seedlings are planted and | Functional nursery to | In progress | |||
| pilot nursery as seedling | nursery is being monitored. | support reforestation | ||||
| source for reforestation | ||||||
| 6.2 Community-Managed Livelihood/Rural Enterprise | ||||||
| Activity | Expected Output | Expected Outcome | Status | |||
| Trainings on livelihood | Networks and CBOs trained | Increased family income; | In progress | |||||||
| and rural enterprise | in alternative income | Generate funds for future | (two trainings | |||||||
| generation techniques | projects of Networks and | conducted in | ||||||||
| CBOs | 2007) | |||||||||
| Livestock raising (goat, | Distribution of livestock to | Increase farming production | In progress | |||||||
| mallard duck, carabao) | low income households | and income of farmer | ||||||||
| households by at least 10% | ||||||||||
| Insumix Food Processing | Production of Insumix as an | Improve nutritional status of | Planning | |||||||
| income generating activity | community; | |||||||||
| for women’s groups | Generate funds for future | |||||||||
| projects | ||||||||||
| 6.3 Community-Managed Health and Nutrition | ||||||||||
| Activity | Expected Output | Expected Outcome | Status | |||||||
| Assessing baseline and | Baseline data on | Monitoring of | In progress | |||||||
| monitoring of | malnourished children | nutritional/health status of | ||||||||
| malnourished children | collected; Monitoring of | children | ||||||||
| children’s weight | ||||||||||
| Planning and | Malnourished children reach | Decrease in malnutrition in | In progress | |||||||
| implementation of | normal height/weight ratio | community by at least 10% | (Lagonoy | |||||||
| feeding program | Watershed) | |||||||||
| Establishment of Bio- | BIG established in 20% of | Increased availability of | In progress | |||||||
| Intensive Gardens (BIGs) | households (20 square | nutritious vegetables for | ||||||||
| meters plots per household) | household consumption | |||||||||
| 6.4 Community-Managed Disaster Risk Reduction | ||||||||||
| Activity | Expected Output | Expected Outcome | Status | |||||||
| Facilitate review, | CMDRR implemented in | Increased awareness of the | Not started | |||||||
| re-planning, and | two barangays | communities on disaster risk | ||||||||
| implementation of | reduction; Ability to mitigate | |||||||||
| CMDRR in Bagsa and | negative impact of disasters | |||||||||
| Herrera | ||||||||||
| Facilitate / support tree | One central and two satellite | Functional nurseries with | In progress | |||||||
| nursery plan | tree nurseries established to | available seedlings for | ||||||||
| support 200 ha area for | reforestation, woodlot, and | |||||||||
| reforestation | orchard farming | |||||||||
| SALT (Sloping Agricultural | Farmers learn SALT | Improve fertility and stability | In progress | |||||||
| Land Technology) Training | techniques | of agricultural soils | ||||||||
| Soil and Water Conservation | Farmers learn Soil and | Control soil erosion and | In progress | |||||||
| Training | Water Conservation | improve soil fertility | (three trainings | |||||||
| techniques | conducted in | |||||||||
| 2006) | ||||||||||
| 7. Priority Issues Identified by Stakeholder Groups | ||||||||||
| Mt. Masaraga-Quinale | Lagonoy | |||||||||
| Environmental Issues | Lack of livelihood opportunities | |||||||||
| Watershed | Lack of livelihood opportunities | Environmental degradation and lack of | ||||||||
| sanitation | ||||||||||
| Networks | Health Problems | Health | ||||||||
| Lack of education about | Participation of stakeholders | |||||||||
| watershed issues | ||||||||||
| Poverty | Poverty | |||||||||
| Lack of livelihood opportunities | Lack of livelihood opportunities | |||||||||
| Malnutrition | Irrigation | |||||||||
| Farm to market roads | Access to markets | |||||||||
| Community | Lack of flnancial capital (for | Lack of financial capital (for agricultural | ||||||||
| agricultural inputs) | inputs) | |||||||||
| Floods and landslides | Flooding | |||||||||
| Soil erosion | Lack of cooperation of barangay officials | |||||||||
| Illegal logging | Illegal logging | |||||||||
| Overpopulation | Politics | |||||||||
| LGUs | Farm to market roads | Lack of livelihood opportunities | ||||||||
| Electrification | Malnutrition | |||||||||
| Increasing access to filtered water | Water resource management | |||||||||
| Need for reforestation | Environment | |||||||||
| Education Campaigns | Sanitation | |||||||||
| High cost of farmer inputs | Illegal logging | |||||||||
| Malnutrition | Natural Disasters | |||||||||
| Climate change | Politics | |||||||||
| Applicability/Appropriateness of | Poverty | |||||||||
| technologies | ||||||||||
| Academe | Systemization/Synchronization of | Insurgency | ||||||||
| Barangay level demographic and | Lack of leadership at provincial level | |||||||||
| environmental data | ||||||||||
8. Examples of Baseline Indicators
8.1 Example indicators adapted from “Appendix 2: Outcome Indicators” from “BICOL Program Fourth Draft Program Document: Second Phase (Jan 2008 – Dec 2011)” written by RCA:
Average annual income of targeted households in three watersheds
Morbidity rate of population in general and women and children in particular
Incidence of water-borne and preventive diseases in the three watersheds
Forest cover in three watersheds
Number of drinking water facilities
Area of agriculture land with irrigation facilities
Area of eroded land
Number of micro-enterprises as main occupation of residents
Division of responsibilities between male and females
Number of female CBO members actively involved in community activities
Number of conflicts over resources within communities
8.2 Example indicators from interview with Julieta Gonzales, Associate Professor, BUCAF [March 7, 2008]:
Type and area of vegetative cover
Types of existing ecological niches
Types and number of endemic and indigenous species
Number of economic, ecological, and social services available to community members
Mapping of farming systems / land use
Type of farm practices utilized
Mapping of vulnerabilities / hot spots (i.e. landslide locations/flood locations)
Measurements of poverty
Income sources from community-based forest enterprises
Type and number of ordinances at local level and the extent of implementation
8.3 Example indicators other source:
8.3.1 Source: Stormwater Manager’s Resource Centerxvii
Water quality (pollutant concentration)
Sediment contamination
Number of aquatic species
Number and type of public involvement groups
Quantity of volunteer monitoring performed
8.3.2 Source: Participatory Evaluation of Collaborative and Integrated Water Management: Insights from the Field. Journal of Environmental Planning and Managementxviii
Indicators measuring increased capacity (technical, collaborative & financial)
Increased confidence of individuals to analyze watershed issues
Increased ability of individuals to reach agreements
Increased support for organizations to access funding
Increased ability of local organizations to understand provincial and federal level initiatives
Indicators measuring building alliances
Development of new long-term work relationships among individuals
Development of new links among organizations
Appendix Notes
i Local government units (LGUs) are the provincial, city/municipal, and barangay governments.
Republic of the Philippines: Department of Interior and Local Government, http://www.dilg.gov.ph/aboutus.htm.
Ibid; and UNESCAP, Country Reports on Local Government Systems: Philippines, 4.
A sanggunian is a government council. Republic of the Philippines: Department of Interior and Local Government, “The Local Government Code of 1991,” Book 1, Sec.34-36.
Ibid., Sec. 106.
UNESCAP, Country Reports on Local Government Systems: Philippines, 15.
Asian Development Bank, “A Study of NGOs: Philippines” (Manila, 1999), 17.
Ibid., 6.
Philippine Council for Sustainable Development, “Philippine Strategy for Sustainable Development,” http://pcsd.neda.gov.ph/pssd.htm.
Republic of the Philippines: Department of Interior and Local Government, “The Local Government Code of 1991,” Book 1, Sec. 17.
Republic of the Philippines: Department of Environment and Natural Resources, http://www.denr.gov.ph/about. The World Bank estimates that only 4 percent of the DENR’s 23,000 staff has been devolved to local governments.
Kenneth Ellison, Local Governance and Participatory Natural Resources Management: USAID’s Gold Project in the Philippines, 10.
World Bank, “Governance of Natural Resources in the Philippines: Lessons from the Past, Directions for the Future”(2003), x.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) Division for Sustainable Development, Agenda 21 (UNDESA 1992), Chap. 1.3.
Office of the President, Memorandum Order No.47, “Strengthening the Operationalization and Localization of Philippine Agenda 21 and Monitoring Its Implementation.” http://pcsd.neda.gov.ph/mo47.htm.
International Institute of Rural Reconstruction (IIRR), “Integrated Watershed Management Approaches to Alleviation to Alleviating Poverty in the Bicol Region, Philippines: Learning from Past Experience” (Cavite: Y.C. James Yen Center, 2003), 12.
http://www.stormwatercenter.net/intro_monitor.htm.
C. Ferreyra and P. Beard, Participatory Evaluation of Collaborative and Integrated Water Management: Insights from the Field. Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, March 2007, 50(2):271-296.
A. Leung
University of Chicago
E. O’Donnell
Michigan State University
S. Moore
Princeton University
H. Travis
Central Washington University
Scholarly Abstract
This article joins the debate over factors which affect sustainability in China’s rural areas at both the village and individual level. It assesses gender-based differences in response to environmental problems, effects of farmer innovation circles on village sustainability, and development of environmental consciousness. We find that both sexes have low environmental consciousness, but women are more likely to be environmentally aware. Despite an increase in labor from agriculture reforms, women’s status does not increase within the family, limiting their ability to act on their environmentalism. Education, income, and age are additional demographic factors related to environmental consciousness. Villagers feel the village is most responsible for environmental protection. The importance of governmental sources of agricultural information was highlighted, as was the impact increasing wealth has on environmental consciousness. In the future women must be vital participants in future sustainability programs, due to high incidence of male migrant city workers, and women’s deep connectedness and dependence on the land.
Introduction
China’s environment is in dire straits. Seven of the world’s ten most polluted cities are in China. Forest cover has been reduced to some 3% of total land area, and up to 80% of major rivers are too polluted to even support fish. The impact of this environmental degradation is particularly severe in China’s northwestern areas, where rapid desertification and groundwater depletion on already marginal land form a lethal cocktail of environmental stress. Investigators of such situations emphasize the need for locally and culturally specific practices to counter such stresses. Despite this consensus, there is little detailed research on how people in northwestern marginal areas address these stresses. This lack of knowledge precludes a full understanding of how residents in marginal areas of China may deal with ever-increasing levels of environmental degradation.
This study was conducted in an arid stretch of marginal land called the Loess Plateau in northern Shaanxi Province, which typifies the poor marginalized lands of China. This area is characterized by two major, interconnected environmental phenomena: groundwater depletion and desertification. Rampant deforestation has destroyed ground cover and root systems, causing erosion of fertile topsoil and leaving the area vulnerable to the encroachment of the Gobi desert. Water resources, already scarce in an arid environment, have been severely depleted by wasteful irrigation practices and intensive farming of marginal land. Moreover, the people in this region are among the poorest in China. These features mean that northern Shaanxi is a segment of society extremely vulnerable to deleterious changes in the environment.
This research attempts to redress this gap in sociological knowledge of contemporary China by conducting a detailed study of Shaanxi province. Three areas of research were identified in particular that have received little attention by academics that could help address China’s environmental problems in both a top-down governmental approach, as well as a bottom-up, citizen-autonomy approach. We addressed gender-based differences in response to environmental problems, the use of informal networks to spread sustainable farming technologies, and what influences the environmental consciousness (EC) of the rural Chinese.
Past Literature on the Rural Chinese Environment
Since the 1990s, scholarship on rural development in reform-era China has taken on five major themes: environment, political economy, political tension, sustainable development, and gender and migration. The rising popularity of the so-called “China threat theory,” which generally views China’s reemergence onto the global spotlight is a danger to the existing balance of power in international relations, has produced a cottage industry of books and articles that, among other things, deal with rural social discontent. The rising number of news reports in the West about China’s environmental woes, and high-profile peasant riots in the past year, has provided further focus towards the future of China’s rural environment,,,,. Furthermore, books on rural poverty and environmental damage are rising in popularity in China (sometimes for their sensational and shock value), and have attracted the attention of the central authorities and the international media,. Despite the broad spectrum covered by existent literature, much of it does not encompass multiple perspectives in their analysis, and few seriously study the relationship between rural citizens and the environment, rural perceptions of the natural environment, and environmental awareness.
One of the few comprehensive pieces of literature written to date in the West on the Chinese environment is Elizabeth Economy’s The River Runs Black. Economy points out that the moral engine behind China’s environmental exploitation began with the millennia-long legacy of Confucian and Legalist principles, which advocated man’s supremacy over the environment, stemming from the power given to the local magistrate to decide on most state matters for localities. The resulting conflicts of interests created a rule-of-man culture that often subverted state policy in favor of economic gain, leaving issues of conservation low or off the totem pole. This man-over-nature relationship was radicalized under Mao, who repeatedly declared nature as the enemy of man, and pursued campaigns such as the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution, which dramatically worsened water pollution, land fertility, soil erosion, and deforestation.
Unfortunately, much of this current literature on the rural environment in China at present are composed through a top-down framework, focusing on central government solutions, grain market reforms, or economic incentives to resolve issues and administrative incompetence,,,,. In addition, the passage of the “Three Rurals” (san nong) reforms, three major pieces of legislation aimed to reduce the financial burden of peasants and improve their agricultural production capabilities, have been the focus of many books in China,. Press attention on the environment has also reflected the direction of existing literature of recent,,,. Thomas Bernstein and Xiaobo Lü focus on the financial squeeze on peasants from tax policy and local government fees in rural areas as a primary flashpoint of potentially destabilizing unrest. They take an economic view of peasant burdens, noting that the greatest tax burden is upon the rural poor, while the rural rich actually enjoy a negative tax rate. Disparities in tax burden, ineffective tax collection, illegal local fees, and general corruption, are directly linked to the largest and most publicized peasant riots in the 1990s. Though the argument frames the decision-making process of rural peasants around economic incentives, the argument ultimately draws the dominant, almost exclusive, link of peasant happiness with government responsibility and pro-activeness. Studies of Shaanxi province, and other western provinces, under Beijing’s Great Western Development Strategy (Xibu da kaifa) shows how the government’s billions of yuan in investment towards massive public works projects is more of a subsidy program rather than a development plan for rural, impoverished provinces,. Yet again, these discussions analyze rural strife through a top-down approach of government policy to the plight of rural residents. This approach ignores the complex dynamism of the lives and environment around rural peasants, akin to the central government’s poverty reduction campaigns as simply throwing money at localities without regard to peasants’ diverse needs and challenges.
Other studies view the rural environment through the lens of political agitation and peasant discontent. A sizable amount of research has looked into the dynamics of rural protests, primarily caused by pollution or government corruption and incompetence,,,,,,. O’Brien and Li’s research point toward then peasants’ disillusionment with the local government, and now increasingly the central government, is a serious problem in the central government’s efforts to maintain Party supremacy and social stability,. Ho’s study on the “institutional ambiguity” of rural land policy, a legacy of the commune and household responsibility systems, may serve to stir up considerable conflicts as the state pursues to more clearly define property and intellectual rights under the banner of economic development and maturation. However, the vast majority of such studies on the rural peasantry too often draw an implicit but direct correlation between state intervention and the welfare of peasants.
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has also conducted an extensive study on social development in China, with a particular eye towards rural areas and the environment. Like Economy, the UNDP report identified environmental degradation, such as land erosion, water pollution, air pollution, and desertification, as serious potential causes for unrest, and are issues that the government must take immediate and effective action towards in order to maintain social stability and economic growth. The report provides to main scenarios: the “perilous path” and the “green reform path,” based on whether or not the central government decides to wholeheartedly back sustainable development and a civil society.
On the other hand, scholars who have written on China’s sustainable development and environmental policies in rural areas, such as Ellen Judd and Bin Wu, do take care to take a grassroots approach to analyze the role of peasants’ initiative and networks in improving their livelihood,. Wu’s study displayed that farmer initiatives have the capability to organize to share technologies and innovate without state or external intervention, and typically along clan or other traditional ties. He challenges the mainstream political approach towards viewing rural development and environmental issues by illustrating the dynamism of China’s marginal rural areas that have various issues of poverty, migration, and environmental degradation. China’s “classical approach” towards environmental response in the form of poverty reduction programs and extension services alone, he explains, simply does not match up to farmers’ needs and challenges. Overall, ordinary peasants can and do play important roles in resolving environmental problems. Policies centered on state intervention, often are ineffective because they do not address peasants’ incentive structures and the complex social and environmental difficulties in many marginal areas.
From this brief survey of major recent literature on rural China, it becomes apparent that most studies have taken a state/institution-first approach in analyzing various rural and environment-related issues, primarily because the state has so thoroughly penetrated society under communist rule. The disjuncture in the various directions of recent Chinese rural and environmental studies thus necessitates a systematic analysis of the identity of the rural Chinese peasant. Furthermore, the existent literature, though extensive on examining the political, economic, and developmental aspects of the Chinese natural environment, fails to seriously consider perceptions on the natural environment and environment consciousness among citizens, especially in rural agricultural areas. A closer look into how Chinese peasants conceptualize the natural environment, how they interact and relate to this environment, and their awareness of environmental conservation and preservation, are critical to understanding the basis for their social, economic, and political incentive structures in making environment-related decisions. In addition, understanding their views on how external forces, such as the government, agricultural extension services, the media, and NGOs, interact with their lives is crucial to constructing a basic portrait of identity of their roles as peasants and their relation towards the natural environment.
Methodology
Research was conducted over a one and a half month period in June and July 2005. Mizhi County was chosen as the focus of research, after a review of previous literature, because of its access to researchers, and the lack of existing research in the areas of the hypotheses: gender, informal agricultural networks and measures of environmental consciousness.
A survey and interview were designed to measure environmental consciousness and explore the possible existence of Farmer Innovation Circles. Both the survey and the interview also requested demographic indicators to be used in comparison between and within the above factors. Demographic indicators refer to demographics of respondents. This includes information on age, sex, education level, migrant status, and annual household income. The purpose of demographic indicators are to determine the demographic composition of the survey sample population, and also to use in correlation analysis against environmental indicators. Environmental indicators measure the respondent’s level of environmental consciousness, as well as how that person perceives responses to environmental change. Environmental indicators include questions regarding changes in environmental quality, personal impacts on the environment, the relative importance of environmental quality, responsibility for environmental quality, and sources of farming adaptation techniques. Environmental consciousness was measured using the following environmental indicators: perception of change in environmental quality (see question 10), perception of personal impact on the environment (see question 14), perception of importance of improving environmental quality to future standard of living(see question 13), satisfaction with environmental conditions in the village (see question 12), and farming adaptation in response to environmental concerns (see question 18).
Interviews were designed to obtain supplemental information to the surveys, including more detailed questions about the environment and the role respondents take in regards to the environment. Interviews were conducted by each researcher alongside graduate students from Shaanxi Normal University, Shaanxi University, and Northwest University. The interview also included questions about women’s rights and specific forms of collectivization. The survey and interview questions were also translated from English to Mandarin to enable those taking the survey to respond independently and to accommodate the China-based researchers.
The respondents were usually selected on a convenience sampling basis, with the researchers going door to door in search of families willing to talk or talking with the families selected by the village leaders. The researchers attempted to separate themselves from village leaders as their presence was expected to create a bias in responses. The time limit on the researchers in the village did not allow for a random sample to be developed and carried out.
Each person or family was given a survey to fill out. Some people encountered were unable to read and write; thus many were administered orally. After the survey was conducted, if there was still time, an interview was also conducted. The surveys were anonymous, but many people still chose to give their name and other identifying information in the interviews. The interviews were conducted by way of a translator, usually a Chinese researcher and responses were recorded by hand. Meals and overnight accommodations in Yangjiagou were arranged with local families who were also interviewed.
Interview teams were formed of 2 researchers: one American and one Chinese. This group formation served two purposes. First, the Chinese researcher acted as translator and was able to develop a rapport with the respondents through shared language. Secondly, the presence of the American researcher oftentimes encouraged people to speak when they were otherwise unwilling. A few respondents that the researchers encountered had been schooled in English and were willing to be interviewed in English. The Chinese researcher could administer surveys orally if a respondent was unable to read, write, or could not otherwise fill out the survey on his or her own. A total of 123 surveys and 36 interviews were administered and collected.
The third phase of research consisted of translation of surveys and interviews into English. This was done in collaboration with Chinese student researchers. The data from surveys and interviews was then coded and entered into Microsoft Excel and SPSS for analysis and tests. Correlation analyses were run between demographic factors responses to questions measuring environmental consciousness (See table 9). Since, in all cases except age, the data was non-normally distributed, correlation analysis was conducted using bi-variate nonparametric analysis. For a regression analysis, Multivariate General Linear model analysis was used to analyze regression and variance for dependent variables (environmental indicators) by factor variables (demographic indicators).
Discussion
The discussion of data collected from this research is split into three sections, reflecting the three focus areas of this research: gender and environment, adaptation in response to environmental change, and EC in rural China. Each section begins with a reiteration of the relevant hypotheses. Data collected from each phase of the research is then discussed, as is interview data. Finally, third section will discuss the hypotheses. Demographic correlation analysis is not discussed separately, but is referred to in the hypothesis discussion session.
Overall, 26 interviews and 123 survey responses were collected at three villages in Mizhi county, northern Shaanxi province, over the course of four days. This data is displayed graphically in a number of tables. Table 1 summarizes the demographics of respondents. Table 2 summarizes significant relationships between gender and environmental indicators. Table 3 offers a display of significant relationships relating to FICs. Table 4 relates sources of information on farming techniques and environmental indicators. Table 5 analyzes the effects of age, education, and income on several environmental indicators. Table 6 contains the results of correlation analyses between environmental indicators. Table 7 summarizes data on factors important to future standard of living. Table 8 summarizes perceptions of who is responsible for environmental quality. Finally, Table 9 presents detailed view of all relationships between demographic and environmental indicators. All tables are set in the Appendix section.
Gender and Environment
Our hypothesis with regards to gender was based on the idea that female respondents would have a higher EC than males. This is based on a wide variety of literature suggesting that women have a more intimate connection with the environment than men.
- Women will be more likely to rank the environment as first or second most important to their future standard of living, perceive a personal impact on the environment, and changed farming practices in response to environmental conditions.
Statistical analysis did not reveal any of significance to the hypothesized correlations. Table 2 outlines this analysis. In terms of both correlation and regression analysis, none of the hypothesized correlations were significant. However, one relationship between demographic factors was discovered. One of the strongest relationships between data sets in this research is that between sex and the importance of increasing income. Females tend to place a greater emphasis on the importance of increasing income in the future. Much research, including that of Ahmad and our own interview data, suggests that women typically make many everyday household decisions. This intimate familiarity with economic status may prejudice women to take a more essential view with regards to future income. In addition, migrant labor, which is often, though not exclusively, male, may exaggerate male earnings with respect to females, causing females to perceive a need to earn more by comparison.
Women are often responsible for all work on the farm the entire year except harvest and planting times when the husband and family members come home to help. Women’s status has increased a small amount in the village since the agricultural reforms and increased labor, but villagers believe this is only a result of the family appearing wealthier due to family members working in the city. Despite the increase in labor, there was no change in status for women within the family. According to Matthews and Nee, female family members can lose status because the woman’s income becomes smaller in comparison to wages earned by family members in the city despite increased labor.
In the case of gender, there is little statistical evidence to suggest that females are more EC than males. Indeed, the only significant correlation involving gender was with the importance of income. Correlation and regression analysis revealed no statistically significant relationships with regards to the hypotheses. On this basis, the null hypothesis that if the respondent is female, the level of EC will be greater is accepted. However, the results of the cross tabulation analysis do point out that EC respondents are more likely to be women. These findings, while not statistically significant, are still valuable for the gender gap they highlight in terms of environmental indicators.
Adaptation to Environmental Changes
We hypothesized that Farmer Innovation Circles would be revealed through a connection of kin both inside and outside the village. The environmental indicator summary called these hypotheses into question, but statistical analysis provides a more complex picture. Table 3 summarizes analysis of these hypotheses.
- Respondents who have received information on farming techniques from kin inside the village will be likely to have received information from kin outside the village as well (and vice versa), suggesting participation in FICs
- Respondents who have received information on farming techniques from kin outside or inside the village as part of an FIC will be more likely to adapt their farming practices in response to environmental concerns.
Satisfaction with environmental conditions in the village shared a fairly strong positive relationship with farming adaptability- those who were unsatisfied with environmental conditions were more likely to change their farming practices as a result of environmental problems. This relationship suggests that farming adaptation may partially be spurred by dissatisfaction with environmental conditions. Given interview responses, however, it seems that most farming adaptation is spurred by government directives.
Farming adaptability and perception of local government concern for the environment demonstrated a negative relationship- the strongest correlation across the survey data (-0.514). Respondents who did not modify their farming practices thought the local government was less concerned about the environment. Many informants reported during interviews that farming adaptability is most likely to be initiated by government directives. The correlation referred to above could reflect the fact that if governments did not issue directives or advice to change farming practices because of the environment, respondents would also report lower concern on the part of the local government towards the environment.
Respondents were no more likely to give more environmentally conscious answers to environmental indicator questions if they were involved in an FIC. Additionally, based on the results of correlation and regression analysis, participation in an FIC was not more likely to lead to adaptation of farming techniques in response to environmental concerns.
Extension services and other avenues of agricultural information varied widely from village to village. The most help was offered to Gauxigou, the model eco-village. The people of Gauxigou believe the government pays attention to their environmental concerns, but responses were less positive in other villages, where the government was pegged with varying levels of involvement with environmental concerns. There was little evidence of information sharing within villages or between villages.
The correlation coefficient for the relationship between receiving farming information from kin inside and outside the village was quite strong, displaying a correlation coefficient of 0.515. This relationship is also highly significant (0.000).
This relationship means that respondents receiving information on farming techniques from kin inside the village also received information on farming techniques from kin outside the village, and vice versa. Such a result is interesting because it suggests a relationship between the sharing of farming techniques between kin inside and outside the village- in other words, it suggests the existence of FICs. The researchers thus accept the hypothesis that if a respondent has received information on farming techniques from kin inside the village, he or she will be likely to have received information from kin outside the village as well (and vice versa).
However, participants in FICs were no more likely to adapt their farming techniques in response to environmental concerns. Additionally, statistical analysis shows no significant relationship between participation in FICs and any measure of environmental consciousness. Additionally, interview responses seem to corroborate this result, with little evidence that FICs led to farming innovation in the survey area. Thus the researchers accept the null hypothesis that participation in FICs has no discernible effect on farming adaptation.
EC in Rural China
Several hypotheses were formulated with regards to EC. Many of these were dependent on demographic factors such as age and education. The third, however, considered the effect of information sources on the transfer of sustainable farming practices. Please refer to Table 5 for details of relationships between demographic and environmental indicators. The hypotheses are listed again below:
- Respondents who get information on farming techniques from the government will not rank the environment as first or second most important to their future standard of living, perceive a personal impact on the environment, or have changed farming practices in response to environmental conditions. Receiving information on farming techniques from the government is defined as getting them from any source aside from kin inside or outside the village.
- Respondents who have a higher level of education will be more likely to rank the environment as first or second most important to their future standard of living, perceive a personal impact on the environment, and changed farming practices in response to environmental conditions.
- Respondents older than 61 will be less likely to perceive a personal impact on the environment, and more likely to consider the government as chiefly responsible for the environment.
As evidenced in Table 6, several strong correlations were observed between the environmental indicators themselves. One of the more interesting of these is the negative relationship between perceived changes in environmental quality and satisfaction with environmental conditions in the village. As respondents perceived more improvement in environmental conditions, their satisfaction with environmental conditions decreased. This is counterintuitive, yet given the relatively strong correlation coefficient (-0.438) and the high level of significance (0.000), this discrepancy deserves some attention.
Although it would appear that the two environmental indicators are related, it may have appeared to respondents that they were not. For example, “changes in environmental quality” may have been interpreted on a very general, macroscopic scale. “Satisfaction with environmental conditions” may have been taken by respondents to indicate factors more closely related to their everyday lives. If, for example, various catchment ponds have been constructed in a given village, and reforestation projects initiated, a respondent may perceive that the overall environment has increased. However, concern over a hydrologic drought that year may be expressed in dissatisfaction with environmental conditions- conditions being more transient.
The more a respondent perceived improvement in the quality of the environment, the less likely he or she was to change farming practices as a result of environmental conditions. This result makes perfect sense; if the environment has improved, there is no need to adapt one’s farming practices.
Similarly, respondents who thought that the environment had improved also ranked the local government’s concern for the environment more highly. This relatively strong relationship (0.413) conforms with several interview responses to the question of how the environment has changed. Several informants described a positive change because of reforestation programs, and these programs were promoted by local governments. The linkage made by several informants between the government and improving the local environment through reforestation probably finds expression in this strong relationship.
One particularly interesting relationship is that between satisfaction with environmental conditions and perception of personal impact on the environment. Respondents who reported having a personal impact on the environment tended to be more satisfied with environmental conditions. This is an interesting result, as it opens up the possibility that if a respondent was aware of his or her impact on the environment, he or she could adopt more sustainable practices. However, given that there was no significant correlation between personal impact on the environment and a change in farming practices, this interpretation is unsubstantiated by the remainder of the data.
Respondents who were dissatisfied with the environmental conditions in their village ranked local government concern for the environment lower. This result, while intuitive, is interesting for the direct link it suggests between dissatisfaction and placing blame on the local government. As noted by Economy, there are isolated reports of rural people protesting against local governments on the basis of environmental factors. This result may reflect similar discontent.
Several trends came to light through the comparison of interviews conducted in Mizhi County. First of all, people overwhelmingly believe the environment is getting better. Several explanations were given. The main reason listed was the increase in non-native trees and grasses that the villagers were paid to plant on steep hills by the government. Other reasons included the increase in roads, pressurized tap water, and the fact that their standard of living was increasing. Villagers rarely focused on the actual health of the soil, water, or ecosystem.
Additionally most respondents did not feel their daily life had any impact on the environment. Only one person believed the chemical fertilizer they were applying was bad for the soil and was aware of the degradation it was creating. In Guangzhong, there was some concern over the lack of trash collection, and the negative effects of urbanization. One informant says people do not pay close attention to environmental problems because many of them work in the city. This is a possible explanation for the apparent distance many richer respondents evidence from the environment. Overall, there was little awareness nor concern for the environment.
Most people have wells, and divert streams for irrigation, or depend on rain. A few people expressed concern about the factories upstream releasing wastewater into the rivers they use to irrigate crops, which sometimes die from the water. One informant from Guangzhong theorizes that chemical plant will contaminate well water, but village officials assured residents the plant will clean its water. Another informant mentioned that the river flowing through their village used to be much deeper and flow much stronger. Today it is reduced to the thinnest trickle.
When asked whether there were better farming methods that could be employed, nearly everyone answered yes. But the methods mentioned almost entirely relied on expensive machines or increased use of chemicals. Only one person mentioned more sustainable methods, but lamented that they were too expensive and time consuming.
One final interesting anecdote is found in that the richest family interviewed, with an income of over 30000 RMB, specifically expressed a great deal of concern in the environment. This contradicts the trend expressed in the correlation analysis which predicted that respondents with higher incomes generally cared less about the environment.
One of the few significant correlations involving education was between years of schooling and perception of personal impact on the environment. This relationship has been detailed in the earlier discussion of correlation analysis between demographic and environmental indicators. However, this is the only indicator of EC that demonstrated a significant relationship with years of schooling. The researchers thus, while not accepting the null hypothesis, reject the assertion that education level is a reliable predictor of EC in general.
A separate table, Table 4, details relationships between respondents who received farming information from governmental sources and measures of EC. Those who received information on farming techniques from media were more likely to rank higher the importance of the environment. However, those who received information on farming techniques from governmental sources were unlikely to perceive a personal impact on the environment. Respondents receiving information on farming techniques were no more likely to adapt farming practices to environmental concerns. Respondents receiving information on farming techniques from government documents and female cadres were no more likely to be EC.
Those receiving information on farming practices from male cadres were, interestingly enough, less likely to adapt farming practices. However, there is no corresponding tendency for those who obtained farming information from female cadres to adapt farming practices in response to environmental concerns. Respondents receiving information from specialists or extension services were similarly less likely to adapt farming practices in response to environmental conditions. In sum, receiving information on farming techniques from governmental sources was not correlated with a lower EC. The researchers thus accept the null hypothesis.
Based on correlation and regression analysis, age was a predictor of perception of personal impact on the environment. Older people were less likely to perceive a personal impact on the environment than younger people. This relationship was confirmed to be significant by both analyses, with a confidence interval of at least 98%. On this basis, the researchers accept the hypothesis that older respondents are less likely to perceive a personal impact on the environment.
Conclusion
Culture and the Environmental Ethos
Western environmentalism is the result of complex intellectual synthesis. It is an ethos that was spawned from several centuries of experience with industrialization, as well as the exploration of vast wilderness areas during the colonial period. China has not had large areas of wilderness for centuries, and has only experienced large-scale industrialization in the past half-century. As researchers, we approached this project with Western biases. Our conception of “environment” is very abstract, and accepts as a precondition a divorce of human and natural interests; those of humans cannot as a matter of course take precedence.
Such a conception does not make adequate accommodation for China’s status as a developing nation. Poverty is still the overwhelming concern, and our data reflected its urgency. In the design of our survey, we were possessed of a developed nation bias that assumed being EC would mean placing the environment first. In China, assigning the natural environment such pre-eminence is a rare phenomenon.
Part of the reason for such rarity is that the abstract nature of the English word “environment” is reflected by its Chinese translation. The Western conception of environment is not automatically translated by its Chinese equivalent. Interview informants would often say that the environment had improved because roads had been constructed. In one case, an informant responded that the environment must have gotten better because “my standard of living has gotten better.”
Any conclusions drawn from this research must be rooted in these biases. For the most part, null hypotheses were accepted, suggesting that most of our perception of environment in rural China was incorrect. Many of these perceptions were based on the idea that in certain aspects elements of the Western ideal of environmentalism could be identified in China. This has proven not to be the case. Nonetheless, numerous important and encouraging environmental realities have been evidenced through this research. In the conclusion, these realities will be discussed with a view towards creating conditions for a sustainable future in rural China.
Gender and Environment
We hypothesized that females would be more EC than males. This hypothesis was not borne out by correlation analysis. However, correlation analysis and interview data revealed that women in fact placed more emphasis on increasing income. Thus, women appear to place primary emphasis on increasing social mobility, a far more tangible goal than “improving the environment.”
Nonetheless, the cross tabulation analysis suggests that women may be more predisposed to environmental concerns than males. In the case of virtually all environmental indicators, women were more likely to give the “environmentally correct” response than males. This suggests that sustainable development efforts may be more effective if they are designed to specifically include or target women.
Our research suggests that women are vital to sustainable development efforts for another reason. The rate of migration in the survey area is tremendous, with some 73% of households having someone working outside the village. Interview data suggests that most of these migrants are male. Several female interview informants noted that their burdens, as well as the number of decisions they make, increased as males left for work. Given this trend, females will likely become more and more important in the implementation of sustainable practices in rural China.
Adaptation to Environmental Changes
Our hypothesis was that non-governmental innovation in the form of FICs would lead to more farming adaptation in response to environmental concerns. We further hypothesized that FICs would be identified by kin-based networks that include relatives both inside and outside the village. Given that respondents who received farming advice from kin in villages also received advice from kin outside villages (though to a lesser extent), there is evidence that farming advice spreads from kin outside the village to kin inside the village, and then throughout the village itself. This in turn may indicate the existence of FICs in Mizhi.
However, it seems that any such FICs do not necessarily lead to farming adaptation in response to environmental concern. Most innovation, environmental or otherwise, is spurred on by government action. This suggests that government may actually be the best conduit through which to spread sustainable farming techniques in rural China. Of all governmental sources of information, media appeared to have the most influence. A majority of respondents reported that they had received information on farming techniques from media sources- the case in which most people had received such information from any source. This result suggests that media-based approaches to spreading sustainable techniques may be most effective.
EC in Rural China
It was hypothesized that, in terms of developing sustainable practices, governmental sources would be less effective. Further, education would be a reliable predictor of concern for the environment, and finally that older respondents would place less emphasis on personal responsibility and impact on the environment. All of these hypotheses were rejected. Governmental sources in fact appear to be more effective in spreading sustainable agricultural practices. Education seems to a predictor of perception of personal impact on the environment, but not of EC in general. Age seems to be a negative predictor of personal impact on the environment, and a positive predictor of the importance of the environment. There is thus substantial evidence for a “generational gap” in these aspects of environmental consciousness.
In general, there appeared to be a low level of EC. Environment was ranked third in importance overall, behind more tangible factors such as increasing education and income. Few people think that they had a personal impact on the environment. Interestingly however, respondents said that village people had the most responsibility for environmental quality. This suggests a latent capacity for developing sustainable practices, perhaps catalyzed by government action.
One trend evidenced by the environmental indicators was that increasing incomes tended to be associated with increasing distance from environmental concerns. In many cases, this was also related to increasing urbanization. In most cases, high incomes result from economic ties to urban areas. Increasing urbanization also tended to result in less concern for environmental factors. Given that both incomes and urbanization are likely to increase as the pace of China’s development continues, people may continue to feel more distanced from immediate environmental concerns.
One clear finding of this research has been that there is little conception of abstract “environmentalism” in the Western sense. Perception of the environment tended to be limited to specific and discrete conditions. Most interview informants thought of the environment in terms of the number of trees or the extent of grass cover, or things like roads. When concern for environmental issues expressed, it was similarly in response to such specifics. One informant talked about how plastic bottles were bad for the environment because they piled up by the roadside. Another was concerned about the effect of chemical fertilizers.
Perhaps most tellingly along these lines, the greatest concern over the environment was expressed where it faced the greatest number of visible threats. Guangzhong village (location 3) is adjacent to Mizhi city, and is the site of a major new chemical plant. Here informants expressed concern at how farmland had been consumed by infrastructure projects, how the river flow had been reduced, and how the chemical plant may affect the quality of shallow well water. It is no coincidence that this rash of environmental concern was collocated with a large number of visible signs of environmental degradation. It seems that only when people come into intimate contact with environmental degradation does it become a concern- there is no intrinsic, abstract sense of environmentalism in the Western sense. This interpretation agrees with Economy’s view of Chinese environmentalism being engendered by severe conditions in urban centers.
Sustainable Futures in Rural China
This research offers a number of suggestions for the development of a sustainable future in rural China. The first is that environmental quality cannot be seen as an independent or pre-eminent objective. Pursuit of this ideal requires accommodation of the powerful desire in rural China to increase incomes and urbanize to a large extent. Both of these objectives are in many ways counterproductive to the goal of improving environmental quality. The key is to minimize harm to the environment in the course of inevitable development. This research offers five suggestions to help guide such an effort.
First, data gathered in the course of this investigation suggests that sustainability campaigns be undertaken in response to specific cases of environmental degradation. Efforts at the local level should be concentrated on confronting specific, visible issues such as the buildup of trash along roadsides or the decline in water flow. Our data suggests that this approach would more effectively garner the enthusiasm of the population.
Second, the government should develop a comprehensive plan to spread techniques for sustainable development, both for rural and urban workers. Media should play a key role in the dissemination of these techniques. At the same time, the government should not ignore FICs, and should encourage villagers to spread these techniques by telling their relatives.
Third, in provincial areas sustainability campaigns should be village-based, as respondents invested village people with a high degree of responsibility for the environment. Given this, they may be more likely to participate in village-based programs.
Fourth, it is essential that sustainability campaigns make extensive provision for women. Besides their potential for being more EC than men, women are also gaining importance in rural areas as more men migrate for work. Sustainability campaigns may harness this trend to best use by assigning specific leadership roles to women.
Five, age should be a consideration. Although more research is necessary to determine the exact ways in which age influences the development of sustainable choices, this research suggests that older people may be more disposed to take a long-term view of development. Pilot programs could thus be developed which tap older people for environmental education programs, and their generational wisdom should be sought on major development projects.
Environmentalism in China differs considerably from that of the West. Much of our data has highlighted these differences. Nonetheless, significant potential exists to create the conditions for sustainable development in rural China. In response to concerns at severe environmental degradation in the coastal cities which have been the vanguard of China’s modernization, rural development strategies incorporate tenets of sustainable development. By looking past notions of Western environmentalism existing in China, it is possible to discern conditions under which such development may be effectively focused. Rural China may not be possessed of environmentalism in the Western sense, but this does not preclude the possibility of a sustainable future in the fullness of time.
Appendix
Table 1: Summary of Demographic Indicators in Mizhi County, China, July 2005
|
Demographic Factor |
Valid Percentage |
| Male |
45.5 |
| Female |
54.5 |
| Family Member Working Outside the Village |
73.0 |
| Family Member Not Working Outside the Village |
27.0 |
| Age 0-30 |
16.4 |
| Age 31-60 |
61.5 |
| Age 60+ |
22.1 |
| Years of Schooling None |
30.5 |
| Years of Schooling 1-9 |
51.7 |
| Years of Schooling 10+ |
17.8 |
| Annual Household Income 0-10000 RMB |
82.9 |
| Annual Household Income 10001-20000 RMB |
13.5 |
| Annual Household Income 20001+ RMB |
3.6 |
Table 2: Relationships Between Gender and Environmental Indicators in Mizhi County, China. July 2005
|
Hypothesized Correlation |
Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coefficient |
Kendall’s tau_b Significance |
N Sample Size |
Type III Sum of Squares |
df |
Mean Square |
F |
Sig. |
| Sex*Importance of Environment |
-0.089 |
0.302 |
123 |
.006(c) |
1 |
0.006 |
0.032 |
0.858 |
| Sex*Personal Impact on Environment |
-0.019 |
0.821 |
123 |
.097(d) |
1 |
0.097 |
0.559 |
0.457 |
| Sex*Farming Adaptation in Response to Environmental Concerns |
0.142 |
0.129 |
115 |
.814(e) |
1 |
0.814 |
3.342 |
0.072 |
Table 3: Relationships between FICs and Environmental Indicators in Mizhi County, China. July 2005
|
Hypothesized Correlation |
Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coefficient |
Kendall’s tau_b Significance |
N Sample Size |
Type III Sum of Squares |
df |
Mean Square |
F |
Sig. |
| Farming Adaptation in Response to information from kin inside the village* outside the village |
0.515 |
0 |
116 |
n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |
| Farming Adaptation in Response to information from kin inside/outside the village* Farming adaptation |
-0.096 |
0.312 |
111 |
0.092 |
1 |
0.092 |
0.354 |
0.554 |
Table 4: Relationships Between Sources of Farming Techniques and Environmental Indicators in Mizhi County, China. July 2005
|
Governmental Source of Farming Techniques |
Statistic Information |
Farming Adaptation |
Importance of Environment |
Personal Impact on Environment |
| Media | Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coeficient |
0.088 |
0.186 |
0.235 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.357 |
0.039 |
0.008 |
|
| N Sample Size |
111 |
116 |
116 |
|
| Government Documents | Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coeficient |
-0.008 |
0.164 |
0.111 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.936 |
0.069 |
0.213 |
|
| N Sample Size |
111 |
116 |
116 |
|
| Female Cadres | Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coeficient |
-0.108 |
-0.064 |
0.055 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.258 |
0.478 |
0.536 |
|
| N Sample Size |
110 |
115 |
115 |
|
| Male Cadres | Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coeficient |
-0.405 |
-0.058 |
-0.125 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.521 |
0.160 |
|
| N Sample Size |
111 |
116 |
116 |
|
| Specialists/Extension Services | Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coeficient |
-0.439 |
-0.084 |
-0.048 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.348 |
0.588 |
|
| N Sample Size |
111 |
116 |
116 |
Table 5: Relationships Between Demographic and Environmental Indicators in Mizhi County, China. July 2005
| Statistic |
Importance of Environment |
Personal Impact on Environment |
Farming Adaptation in Response to Environment |
|
Age by 10-Year Intervals |
|||
| Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coefficent |
0.066 |
-0.109 |
-0.096 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.357 |
0.128 |
0.218 |
| Kendall’s tau_b (N) |
122.000 |
122.000 |
114.000 |
| Type III Sum of Squares |
1.501 |
2.447 |
0.633 |
| Df |
6 |
6 |
6 |
| Mean Square |
0.25 |
0.408 |
0.106 |
| F |
1.446 |
2.771 |
0.394 |
| Significance |
0.213 |
0.019 |
0.88 |
|
Years of Schooling |
|||
| Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coefficent |
0.031 |
0.173 |
0.042 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.690 |
0.026 |
0.616 |
| Kendall’s tau_b (N) |
121.000 |
121.000 |
113.000 |
| Type III Sum of Squares |
0.085 |
0.242 |
0.057 |
| Df |
2.000 |
2 |
2.000 |
| Mean Square |
0.042 |
0.121 |
0.028 |
| F |
0.216 |
0.659 |
0.127 |
| Significance |
0.807 |
0.522 |
0.881 |
|
Annual Household Income in 5000 RMB Intervals |
|||
| Kendall’s tau_b Correlation Coefficent |
0.053 |
-0.074 |
-0.208 |
| Kendall’s tau_b Significance (2-tailed) |
0.490 |
0.340 |
0.013 |
| Kendall’s tau_b (N) |
111.000 |
111.000 |
103.000 |
| Type III Sum of Squares |
0.022 |
0.247 |
2.451 |
| Df |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Mean Square |
0.022 |
0.247 |
2.451 |
| F |
0.114 |
1.348 |
11.032 |
| Significance |
0.737 |
0.251 |
0.002 |
Table 6: Detail of All Relationships Between Environmental Indicators in Mizhi County, China. July 2005
|
Environmental Indicator |
Descriptive Statistic |
Changes in Environmental Quality |
Importance of Environment |
Personal Impact on the Environment |
Satisfaction with Environmental Conditions in Village |
Farming Adaptation |
Local Government Concern for Environment |
| Kendall’s tau_b Analysis | |||||||
| Changes in Environmental Quality | Correlation Coefficient |
1.000 |
0.145 |
-0.075 |
-0.438 |
-0.427 |
0.413 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) | . |
0.079 |
0.359 |
0.000 |
0.000 |
0.000 |
|
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
123 |
|
| Importance of Environment | Correlation Coefficient |
0.145 |
1.000 |
0.008 |
-0.071 |
-0.096 |
0.080 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.079 |
. |
0.927 |
0.427 |
0.286 |
0.356 |
|
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
123 |
|
| Personal Impact on the Environment | Correlation Coefficient |
-0.075 |
0.008 |
1.000 |
0.263 |
0.036 |
-0.019 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.359 |
0.927 |
. |
0.003 |
0.684 |
0.826 |
|
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
123 |
|
| Satisfaction with Environmental Conditions | Correlation Coefficient |
-0.438 |
-0.071 |
0.263 |
1.000 |
0.343 |
-0.304 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.427 |
0.003 |
. |
0.000 |
0.001 |
|
| N |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
111 |
117 |
|
| Farming Adaptation | Correlation Coefficient |
-0.427 |
-0.096 |
0.036 |
0.343 |
1.000 |
-0.514 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.286 |
0.684 |
0.000 |
. |
0.000 |
|
| N |
115 |
115 |
115 |
111 |
115 |
115 |
|
| Local Government Concern for Environment | Correlation Coefficient |
0.413 |
0.080 |
-0.019 |
-0.304 |
-0.514 |
1.000 |
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.356 |
0.826 |
0.001 |
0.000 |
. | |
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
123 |
|
| Spearman’s rho Analysis | |||||||
| Revised Perception of Changes in Environmental Quality | Correlation Coefficient |
1.000 |
0.122 |
-0.202 |
-0.498 |
-0.526 |
|
| Sig. (2-tailed) | . |
0.179 |
0.025 |
0.000 |
0.000 |
||
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
||
| Revised Perception of Importance of Environment to Future Standard of Living | Correlation Coefficient |
0.122 |
1.000 |
0.008 |
-0.074 |
-0.099 |
|
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.179 |
. |
0.932 |
0.429 |
0.290 |
||
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
||
| Revised Perception of Personal Impact on the Environment | Correlation Coefficient |
-0.202 |
0.008 |
1.000 |
0.276 |
0.038 |
|
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.025 |
0.932 |
. |
0.003 |
0.685 |
||
| N |
123 |
123 |
123 |
117 |
115 |
||
| Satisfaction with Environmental Conditions in Village | Correlation Coefficient |
-0.498 |
-0.074 |
0.276 |
1.000 |
0.345 |
|
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.429 |
0.003 |
. |
0.000 |
||
| N |
117 |
117 |
117 |
117 |
111 |
||
| Have You changed Farming Practices as a result of Environment Problems? | Correlation Coefficient |
-0.526 |
-0.099 |
0.038 |
0.345 |
1.000 |
|
| Sig. (2-tailed) |
0.000 |
0.290 |
0.685 |
0.000 |
. | ||
| N |
115 |
115 |
115 |
111 |
115 |
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Endnotes
World Health Organization 1998
Bernstein and Lü 2000 Bernstein and Lü 2000: 746-749
Bernstein and Lü 2000 Bernstein and Lü 2000: 752-753
Bernstein and Lü 2000 Vermeer 2005
Bernstein and Lü 2000 Holbig 2004
Bernstein and Lü 2000 Goodman 2004
Bernstein and Lü 2000 O’Brien and Li 2004
Bernstein and Lü 2000 Yep 2004
Full name: Ms. Alletta Brenner
E-mail address: A.Brenner@lse.ac.uk
Brief biography: Alletta, who recently completed a two-year tenure in Great Britain as a Marshall Scholar, holds Masters degrees in Human Rights from the London School of Economics, and International and European Politics from the University of Edinburgh. In addition, she has a B.A. in History and Women’s Studies at the University of Oregon. Her areas of interest include: international political discourse, normative change, and women’s and human rights. This paper, which was originally written for a class on Gender and Development at the University of Edinburgh, arose from the early stages of research for her masters thesis on the pseudo-feminist language deployed by the U.S. Bush Administration in its description and justification of the ‘War on Terror,’ especially with regard to the invasion of Afghanistan, and the question of whether this discourse represented actual changes to U.S. development strategy. A shortened version of this thesis, “Speaking Transformation: US Foreign Policy Discourse and the Language of Feminism,” is forthcoming in the Journal of International Women’s Studies.
Scholarly Abstract
In recent years there has been increased attention to the importance of gender in securing long-term development goals. Consensus has now been reached that increasing the social status and economic capacity of women is an effective way of improving outcomes. The subject of this paper is the viability of the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) paradigm as a means of establishing socially and politically sustainable gains for women in developing countries. The author examines the GAD paradigm using the case study of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’ in the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan since 2001. Through an analysis of some of the problems encountered so far, the author questions whether such an approach is likely to actually result in long-term, sustainable improvement in that country. Three key issues include: marginalization of ‘Gender Mainstreaming’; lack of state capacity; and failures to fully integrate programs into social and cultural contexts. Though reconstruction efforts have clearly resulted in some improvement, it is argued that it is unclear whether such an approach will lead to long-term progress. Rather, there is strong evidence that GAD can actually contribute to the further politicization of gender and result in a backlash against reforms. Ultimately, the goals that the GAD paradigm attempts to achieve are extremely difficult to translate into effective practice, especially in highly volatile and politicized situations. In conclusion, the author finds that sustainable and transformative change may be elusive if one simply applies new aims to old models of aid provision.
Author’s Note
A great deal of feminist scholarship focuses either on how the world we live in is rife with inequality and injustice. What is often missing in between however is a road map for how it may be possible to overcome these problems to envision and create a better future. The field of development, on the other hand, tends to be concerned primarily with pragmatic questions of how we can improve the lives of people around the world. In this context, the ‘end point’ of such efforts is often uncritically assumed. A feminist approach to development attempts in many ways to bring together these two disparate tendencies, combining a critical standpoint with a pragmatic approach. However appealing such an approach may seem, however, it is perhaps unsurprising that feminist models of development have often proved incredibly problematic, both in theory and practice. A feminist approach to development reveals particular challenges for the goals of sustainable development. For, while it is argued that gender equality is a necessary step in creating sustainable development, how to create such change in socially and politically sustainable ways remains unresolved. The holistic and transformative aims that gender-sensitive approaches to development aspire to are incredibly difficult to realize. In the end, to achieve these, it may be necessary to conceive of a wholly different model of aid provision.
Keywords: Gender, Development, Mainstreaming, Afghanistan, Post-conflict Reconstruction
GAD and Gender Mainstreaming: A Pathway to Sustainable Development?
Until recently, the issue of gender has tended to be ignored and undervalued by the development community. Providers of aid have paid little attention to the particular needs and problems of women and likewise have failed to recognize the importance of their well being for the overall success of the societies in which they live. Since the 1970s however, a shift in thinking has been under way. Ester Boserup’s landmark study on agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa, published in 1970, pointed to the crucial role of women’s labor in sustaining local and international economies. Since then, feminist scholars across a range of disciplines have sought to show how women act as essential players in the economic, social and cultural development of their societies and how gender-sensitivity is a crucial part of sustainable development. As a result of this work there has been a monumental shift in attitudes among development practitioners. Increasingly, aid donors, providers and scholars alike have come to recognize the links between the status and welfare of women and a whole range of development goals, from political stability and economic growth to environmental sustainability. As the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action proclaimed: “The advancement of women and the achievement of equality between women and men are a matter of human rights and a condition for social justice… they are the only way to build a sustainable, just and developed society.” Promoting ‘gender equality’ would be identified as a key component of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. More recently, the passage of UN Resolution 1325, which declared that the empowerment of women was critical to the processes of both peacemaking and democratization, has affirmed this view. Across the board, investment in a country’s women has proven to be one of the most effective and cost-efficient means of generating substantial and sustainable development gains.
A significant manifestation of the growing recognition of the special role women play in development has been the creation of new gender-sensitive paradigms for aid provision. One of the most important of these is the ‘Gender and Development’ (GAD) approach, which evolved in the late 1980s in response to the limitations of earlier attempts at feminist development practice, such as a continued marginalization of women and a limited capacity for transformational change. Defined and promoted by the theoretical work of both ‘Third World’ and socialist feminists in the ‘West,’ the GAD approach argues that development programs cannot be successful if they only take on economic problems in isolation of the social and political structures that underlie all transactions. Individual capacity to command and allocate resources is just as important as access to them in the first place. Thus, drawing on the theoretical foundations of radical feminism, and in contrast with other paradigms for women and development, which have tended to focus on women in isolation from larger development programs, GAD draws attention to how sexual difference is constructed and inscribed via gender on social, political and economic relations within the communities where development programs function and to the ways in which these relations play a role in the need for assistance in the first place. As a result, it seeks not just to meet basic, material needs but to make women (and men) aid recipients aware of the structural inequalities that lead to poverty and to engage them as agents in their own improvement and thereby create more lasting and sustainable change. In other words, the GAD approach goes beyond simply trying to integrate women into development, but argues that the whole mode by which development operates must be transformed in order to take on social and political transformation in addition to economic reallocation. In this way, GAD aims to change the social, economic and political structures that contribute to the need for external assistance in the first place-empowering women in all aspects of their lives as a means of strengthening the foundations of their societies.
The GAD framework offers a new and appealing way of thinking about the goals and means of development because it presents the recipients of aid in a more holistic light and doesn’t shy away from culture and politics. One key strategy for the implementation of a GAD approach that has emerged is ‘Gender Mainstreaming,’ which seeks to end the oppositional dualism between ‘women’s issues’ and the rest of politics, economics and culture by bringing women ‘in from the periphery.’ On one level, this involves making the structures of government and civil society sensitive to women’s needs. However, at the same time, mainstreaming also means bringing women into the public sphere by increasing their participation. Nonetheless, putting a Gender Mainstreaming program into practice poses a number of difficult problems. How should international development programs go about implementing this kind of approach? Should change come from the bottom up through the grassroots work of non-governmental organizations? Or, can it only come from the top down via aggressive intervention from the state? The possibility of this kind of transformation implies a process of re-structuring social and economic relations on a broad scale. How does one actually set in motion this sort of process and even then, how can we measure its ‘progress’? Finally, does the whole idea of directing this kind of cultural and political change from the outside (as the whole development framework implies) render such a program problematically imperialistic?
Despite a perceptible shift in thinking within the international community towards a gender-sensitive approach, GAD has largely remained on the sidelines of large-scale development programs. However, one exception has been the application of a GAD approach to the development and reconstruction of Afghanistan since 2001, primarily through the strategy of Gender Mainstreaming. In this case, the goal of improving the status and welfare of Afghan women was defined both as a central goal of development in of itself and as a means of achieving greater efficiency for resources spent. In accordance, a flurry of Gender Mainstreaming programs and initiatives would emerge in the years immediately following the overthrow of the Taliban. However, realities on the ground in the country have proven that the broader transformative agenda that GAD embodies is extremely difficult to translate into effective practice. While programs may have helped improve the welfare of Afghan women in some contexts up to the present, it is unclear whether a GAD approach articulated through Gender Mainstreaming is capable of ensuring the social and political sustainability of such changes.
After decades of relative isolation, Afghanistan reappeared on the geopolitical stage in late 2001, when in the wake of the September 11th bombings in the USA it became the first of a series of targets in the international ‘War on Terror.’ Ironically, though the terrorism that the United States was reacting against had little to do with gender specifically, issues of culture, religion and political rights became the sites where the U.S. clash with Al Queda could be measured, and the issue of ‘women’s rights’ in Afghanistan became a focus of attention. Thus, Afghan women were suddenly thrown into the international limelight as the embodiment of the kind of oppression Muslim terrorist groups like Al Queda allegedly intended to impose on the entire world. As First Lady Laura Bush proclaimed: “The brutal oppression of women is a central goal of the terrorists…[The regime in Afghanistan] is the world the terrorists would like to impose on the rest of us.” In this vein, the Bush Administration quickly adopted a kind of pseudo-feminist rhetoric in its framing of the Afghanistan invasion. Using the emancipation of Afghan women as a means of justifying the war, the Bush Administration began to insist “the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women.” Accordingly, in the aftermath of the fall of the Taliban, many saw the ‘liberation’ of Afghanistan’s women as a litmus test for the success of the re-building and ‘modernization’ of this former ‘failed state.’ It is upon this backdrop that the GAD approach was adopted as a guiding principle in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and that Afghanistan itself became a sort of testing ground for the application of GAD on a broad scale.
With the establishment of a new government in Afghanistan pursuant to the Bonn Agreement, which was signed in December 2001, advancing women’s status and welfare by a variety of mechanisms became a central tenet of state-building and development strategy in Afghanistan, with the express goal of reversing Taliban era restrictions on women’s lives and furthering their advancement in Afghan society overall. As the new government’s National Development Strategy proclaimed: “The government’s goal is to eliminate discrimination against women, develop their human capital and promote their leadership in order to guarantee their full and equal participation in all aspects of life in Afghanistan.” Likewise, many of the key donors in the reconstruction also took up an aggressive GAD standpoint, with USAID for example proclaiming that “that gender be integrated into all of the work of USAID in order to contribute to effective programs, social equity, and sustainable change.” The development program in Afghanistan has thus sought to apply a GAD framework in several ways, each attempting to engage women’s strategic as well as immediate needs.
Building from the framework established by the Bonn Agreement, Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan since 2001 has taken a number of forms. One of the most prominent of these has been in the political sphere: from the writing of specific rights and protections for women into the state’s new Constitution and other laws, to mandating minimum levels of female participation in the country’s new governing structures via a gender quota system for the election of parliamentary representatives, which reserves a quarter of seats for female candidates. Due in large part to such policies and laws, the percentage of women representatives and civil servants in the new Afghan government is relatively high, even compared to more-developed countries in the West. Likewise, a number of specific institutional organizations and mechanisms have been created with the aim of furthering Gender Mainstreaming and women’s advancement, namely: the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, charged with developing and implementing mainstreaming projects into other government ministries; the Office of the State Minister for Women, responsible for advising the president; the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, which both ensures that Afghan laws are in agreement with international standards and monitors conditions within the country; and a Gender Advisory Group to help with mainstreaming and work with donors. At the same time, development projects, particularly in the urban area of Kabul, have spent considerable energy raising the level of participation among Afghani women and getting them involved as much as possible in community politics. Finally, a significant component of Mainstreaming efforts have been ‘gender training’ projects-often in tandem with other programs directed at ‘capacity building’-which attempt to educate and inform both ordinary Afghans as well as community leaders about ‘gender issues’ and thereby gain their appreciation and support for the goal of female empowerment in that country.
On the surface of things, Gender Mainstreaming has had a significant impact on the development of the new Afghan state. For example, the new government has proclaimed establishment of a “broad-based, gender sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government” one of its central goals. Across the country, women are entering the public sphere-from thousands of girls returning to newly constructed schools to the large-scale participation of women in the nation’s first presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2005. The new Constitution proclaims formal equality and non-discrimination between women and men, and in the new National Assembly over a quarter of seats are held by women, a vast improvement over the three percent who held seats in 1990. Similarly, ten percent of government employees at the ministerial level today are women. Likewise, the building of hospitals and schools, often with a focus on providing specially for women’s basic needs, have played a real and important role in healing wounds left by decades of war.
However despite these apparent successes, serious problems hamper the advancement of the GAD agenda, resulting in significant gaps between women’s formal and substantiative rights. One reason for this may be the structural nature of the gender inequalities Gender Mainstreaming seeks to overcome. For, even though the need for Mainstreaming has been well recognized in Afghanistan, efforts to put the approach into practice have inevitably been subject to the same forces that make it necessary in the first place. Despite a large amount of fanfare on the progress of women’s rights in the country, Mainstreaming has tended to be sidelined-made a feature of ‘special initiatives’ aimed at certain women, rather than integrated into the whole country’s development and democratization. For example, while the new government promptly established the new Ministry of Women’s Affairs as stipulated by the Bonn Agreement, it gave the new ministry neither the legal jurisdiction nor the powers needed to implement its policies. Similarly, though the new Constitution proclaims equal rights, many have criticized its overall weak language and many loopholes, which ultimately undermine and weaken the legal protections it affords. At the same time those programs aimed at creating this transformation have tended to be marginalized in the funding they have received from international donors, as the vast majority of funds have been diverted instead to the nation’s security needs. These days, it appears that Gender Mainstreaming (and with it the whole GAD agenda in Afghanistan) has been progressively left behind in favor of other concerns. As one NGO worker has noted: “In 2001, after the fall of the Taliban, improving the rights of Afghan women was at the top of the international agenda; [Now], despite many well-intentioned programs for women, women’s human rights appears to be more of an afterthought.” Indeed, even the United States, which was integrally involved with the advancement of women in Afghanistan in the past, seems to have lost interest. In USAID’s 2008 “Afghanistan Strategy” no mention was made whatsoever of the particular role of Gender Mainstreaming or of women’s empowerment at all as a key goal or benchmark for progress in that country. Indeed, the last time USAID published any report specific to gender issues in Afghanistan was in 2006. While the War in Iraq has largely taken over the focus of US foreign policy and development assistance, the United States apparent special concern for Afghan women also seems to have diminished significantly.
Moreover, even those Mainstreaming efforts that have been fully implemented have had debatable success. For example, despite aggressive efforts to bring women into the formal structures of governance, it is reported by observers that even when they do take part, women continue to be excluded from the actual decision-making processes where policy is made, raising questions about the actual impact of such measures. For example, despite a significant female presence at the nation’s first constitutional assembly (“Loya Jirga”), it was extremely difficult for these women to either work together or push ‘women’s issues’ to the front of the agenda. In fact, some argue, rather than create community support for the empowerment of Afghan women, there is some evidence that Mainstreaming has had the opposite effect, especially among those ordinary Afghans for whom the Western vision of the oppressed Afghan woman has never held much resonance. Instead, many seem to find this focus disingenuous and troubling. As one woman lamented: “Right now our women are all over the place, being used for politics, used like dolls… Every event they are in front of the TV, the camera. They are being used just to show that women were there.” Despite large scale attempts to normalize the involvement of women in public decision-making, the attitudes of most Afghans appear unchanged; they feel that only ‘educated’ women (who make up a very tiny portion of the overall population) ought to participate and then only in certain ways, with men remaining ultimately dominant. Likewise, even as women have been increasingly encouraged to take public roles, using these to actually challenge gender inequality has proven to be extremely difficult. More often than not, these women have tended to find it necessary to accede to more traditional norms in order to be accepted as legitimate. Finally, despite all the programs targeting them, women in Afghanistan remain for the most part politically disengaged-far less likely than men to be aware of important political developments or to vote.
These realities highlight the very real tensions inherent any time development projects become intertwined with the complex politics of state building. For even as gender has become a dominant rhetorical theme, translating this rhetoric into effective practice in an environment that lacks both political strength and stability has proven exceedingly difficult. Decades of conflict and turmoil have left Afghanistan a largely fragmented nation, split along regional, ethnic and even family lines, with many parts of the country largely outside of the national government’s influence and control. Enforcing a national policy on women’s rights in the nation’s periphery has thus posed a monumental task that the new Afghan government has not always been able to carry out. Likewise, while Mainstreaming may have helped make some more sensitive to women’s issues, the goals of Gender Mainstreaming have overall remained a peripheral concern in Afghan politics. In the end, even as the new government has made genuine attempts to promote gender equality, these ideals have had to compete with the necessity of political maneuvering and coalition building. Ultimately, in a context where the national government itself is incredibly weak and the judiciary very limited in capacity, the appropriate-ness of the kind of top-down approach that Gender Mainstreaming requires has in many ways proven questionable.
The effectiveness of Gender Mainstreaming as a means to social and cultural transformation in Afghanistan has also been limited by the nature of Mainstreaming itself. For, while it has clearly been effective at increasing the participation of at least some women in the public sphere, Mainstreaming is less adept at addressing gender inequalities in the private sphere. Thus, even with the participation of women in government at an all time high and many new laws and policies aimed at combating them, problems like forced marriage and domestic violence have continued unabated. One reason for this may be the way that Mainstreaming tends to focus on certain groups of women in isolation from the social ties that are so central to the way gender is defined and expressed in Afghan culture. For Afghans, ‘woman’ is an interconnected and contested source of Afghan identity and political orientation that is seen as important and deserving of protection: “Women have always been, and remain, wards of their families and communities…The domestic domain and the control of women are among the most jealously guarded areas in the reproduction of sub-national identities.” Conflicts over gender in Afghanistan have always been related to larger socio-political tensions, such as that between those Western-educated elite Afghans in urban areas who today act as the representative voice of the whole of Afghanistan in the development process, and the conservative majority of the country which live in rural areas. Likewise, Afghans understand the identity ‘woman’ in far more complex, relational terms than acknowledged by the dominant stereotype of ‘oppressed victim.’ As one ethnographer has argued:
Contemporary scholarly and humanitarian discourses evolve around the victimisation of Afghan women, employ culture as a deterministic explanatory device and use Islamic fundamentalism as represented by the Taliban as a scapegoat to summarily account for all forms of distress in Afghanistan…[These tropes fail] to account for how gender has been inflected by violence, war and occupation and subsequently what work war and its accompanying forces have performed on social institutions, family structure and individual subjectivities.
Development projects that attempt to target women, especially certain classes of women such as widows, in isolation from these relational fields results in a situation where development projects neither acknowledge the experiences of Afghans–men and women alike–nor respond to the true dimensions of their needs.
Indeed, despite its emphasis on ‘gender’ (instead of simply on ‘women’) men have been almost entirely left out the transformative agenda. As one 2004 survey found, no development workers interviewed could come up with a single Mainstreaming program that meaningfully incorporated men as well as women. If the Mainstreaming project in Afghanistan ultimately fails to include the whole of Afghan society in its transformative project, it risks inciting resentment and frustration and setting off a reactionary response that is all-too-familiar. As one Afghan man reported, to most men Gender Mainstreaming means: “increasing the power of women while decreasing the power of men. Women over men.” Such attitudes are further deepened by the mistrust and hostility that many Afghans feel toward foreign aid and development in general, as unhelpful and self-serving, or as the popular Afghan phrase puts it: “like cows who drink their own milk.” While it may be too early to gauge the full political consequences of such perceptions, there is increasing evidence that a backlash is already occurring, often in the form of increased violence against women, both in the home and in public spaces.
In the end, the big problem may not be the mainstreaming of Afghan women into the public sphere, but the incorporation of the country’s men and women into a more holistic and gender-aware development program that not only seeks to increase their participation, but that aims to empower women along with their whole families and communities so that they can live better and more secure lives. Sadly, Gender Mainstreaming as it has been realized in Afghanistan today has tended to fall short of this goal. As one scholar has criticized: Gender Mainstreaming programs in Afghanistan today seem like they “may have more to do with international politics and the agendas of external agencies than with meeting the felt and expressed needs of the majority of Afghan women.” This is extremely problematic, because not only do such perceptions lead to a sense that the goals of GAD are illegitimate, they risk inciting a sense among Afghans that the prospect of changes to gender relations at all poses a threat to the very fabric of Afghan society. The project of creating greater gender equality in Afghanistan is not a new one, and in the past such attempts have often been seen in just such a light and been faced with stiff resistance. The danger of inciting a backlash is very real and should be taken very seriously by proponents of Gender Mainstreaming today in Afghanistan. More than anything, Afghans must view Mainstreaming with a sense of ‘ownership’ as something legitimately rooted in their own culture and traditions, not as a pet project of outside aid groups, no matter how well meaning they are.
In conclusion, Gender Mainstreaming has not lived up to its promise as the means of transforming gender in post-war Afghanistan. One reason for this is the way Mainstreaming has been executed as a policy. For, in the overall reconstruction effort Mainstreaming has tended to be marginalized and this lack of commitment has only worsened over time. Rather than becoming established as a new way of doing things, there has instead been a gradual decline in attention and resources paid to the advancement of women and a return instead to traditional, technocratic development programs that ignore gender completely. While an ongoing lack of security in Afghanistan due to continued fighting has no doubt played some part in this trend, one cannot wonder if this may also be due to the fact that the novelty of GAD has worn a bit thin for the countries and organizations that have so far been the lead drivers of development policy in the country. Indeed, as the attention of the United States and many of its allies has progressively turned toward Iraq, resources directed toward women in that conflict and for that matter any discussion of GAD at all have been almost entirely absent. Such a lack of sustained interest may be one of the biggest barriers of all for the success of GAD and Gender Mainstreaming in Afghanistan; after all, if there is one thing more than all others that large-scale societal transformations require, it is a sustained and long-term commitment. As it stands today, the lack of such commitment in Afghanistan is creating a real danger that GAD and with it Gender Mainstreaming will become seen as little more than a fashionable set of ‘buzz words’ devoid of actual meaning.
However, not all of the problems I have highlighted in this paper can be attributed to lack of commitment and effective implementation. Some are related to the inherent limitations of Mainstreaming as a strategy. GAD cannot be effective in transforming gender relations if it only means placing women in the political arena and ‘gender’ on the agenda, or as some have said ‘adding women and stirring.’ Other structural dimensions of gender inequality such as family organization and economic independence must also be addressed, and Mainstreaming is in many ways not well suited to addressing these. As a result of such limitations, some have raised the question of whether Mainstreaming, or in fact any strategy of GAD will ever manage to accomplish the goal of long-term sustainable change. For, a fundamental transformation of ‘gender’ may not be unattainable via the kinds of externally driven, technocratic-focused projects that make up the bulk of development practice today. As one scholar has noted:
A more creative engagement with the complexities of the politics of gender, which is laden [there] as elsewhere with its own historical baggage, would mandate a contextual, non-technocratic approach which requires temporal horizons, levels of commitment and types of coalition building and collaborating which far exceed the time frames and resources of ‘project’ cycles.
More often than not, there has been a tendency in recent years for organizations to take up the language of GAD while continuing to apply the same old kinds of strategies to their work. In many ways, one can argue that Mainstreaming is exactly this sort of old strategy. For though the concept of Gender Mainstreaming may fit well into the theoretical aims of GAD, its tendency to take this kind of top-down form may mean it is not an ideal strategy for achieving these goals. For, by focusing almost exclusively on formal equality, it fails to take into account the vast complexity that a successful transformation of gender relations would actually require. Gender Mainstreaming is an inherently ‘blunt’ instrument, where something much more flexible, creative and grassroots-oriented is needed.
In the end, however, one should not take the limitations of Gender Mainstreaming to mean that GAD simply cannot work. Gender Mainstreaming remains only one tactic for achieving gender transformation, and as it stands today, there have been so few attempts at implementing a large-scale GAD development program it is impossible to say what outcomes are actually possible. Moreover, those few attempts that have been made, such as in Afghanistan, have not had nearly enough time to truly reveal all their impacts. Before we can close the book on GAD, far more creative and committed attempts to implement this approach will be needed. For, ultimately, if GAD can ever hope to be successful, one thing is clear: it will require a whole range of localized tactics rather than one single strategy, and many years of stanch work, not just a few. However, in spite of the many challenges its application in Afghanistan has revealed, GAD remains a crucial link for achieving more sustainable development everywhere in the world. For, in order to create truly sustainable outcomes, development must encompass and uplift whole communities, women as well as men, and to this end GAD presents the most thoughtful and nuanced approach yet.
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Suhrke, Astri. “The Limits of Statebuilding” Paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meting San Diego 21-24 March 2006. Bergen, Norway: CMI, 2006. Available online at: <http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/publications/2006/isapapermarch 2006.pdf>. Last Accessed 17 April 2007.
Thakur, Ramesh Chandra and Oddny Wiggen eds. South Asia in the World: Problem Solving Perspectives on Security, Sustainable Development and Good Governance. New York: United Nations University Press, 2004.
UNIFEM. “Afghanistan Factsheet.” Available online at: <http://afghanistan.unifem.org/PDF_ Documents/UNIFEMAfghanistan_FactSheet_081205.pdf> Last Accessed 16 April 2007.
United Nations Development Programme: Afghanistan. “Institutional Capacity Building for Gender Equality,” Available online at <http://www.undp.org.af/> Last Accessed 17 April 2007.
Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007/8. Available online at <http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/data_sheets/cty_ds_AFG.html> Last Accessed 14 July 2008.
Wardak, Ali, Daud Saba and Halima Kazem. Afghanistan Human Development Report: Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. Kabul: Center for Policy and Human Development, 2007.
United Nations Secretary General. Women, Peace and Security. New York: United Nations Publications, 2002.
USAID. Afghanistan Strategic Plan 2005-2010. Washington D.C.: USAID, 2005. Available online at: <http://dec.usaid.gov/>. Last Accessed 20 February 2009.
Afghanistan Strategy. Washington D.C.: USAID, 2008. Available online at: <http://dec.usaid.gov/>. Last Accessed 21 February 2009.
Visvanathan, Nalini et al eds. The Women, Gender and Development Reader. London: Zed Books, 1997.
Walby, Sylvia. “Gender Mainstreaming: Productive Tensions in Theory and Practice,” Social Politics 12.3 (2005): 321-343
Ware, Vron. ‘Info-War and the Politics of Feminist Curiosity,’ Cultural Studies 20.6 (2006): 526-551.
Wakefield, Shawna. Gender and Local Level Decision Making: Findings from a Case Study in Panjao. Kabul: AREU Case Studies Series, 2004.
White House Office of the Press Secretary (December 17, 2008). Fact Sheet: President Bush Has Kept America Safe. Press release. Available online at: <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-5.html>. Last Accessed 2 March 2009.
Zulfacar, Maliha. “The pendulum of gender politics in Afghanistan,” Central Asian Survey 25.1-2 (2006): 27-59.
In general usage, the term ‘gender’ tends to be interchangeable with ‘sex.’ However, ‘gender’ is actually distinct from biological sex in that it describes the social aspects of being a man or woman. As Beckwith describes it: Gender is made up of “socially constructed, fluid, politically relevant identities, values, conventions and practices conceived as masculine and/or feminine” which are mapped in multidimensional ways onto political structures, rules and norms (131).
Visvanathan et al, 1-29; and Parpart et al, 31-36.
For more on the UN Millennium Development Goals see <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>. (Last Accessed 22 February 2009).
United Nations Secretary General; and Cohn, 1430-40.
See Roy, Tisdell and Blomqvist, 4-24.
Jaquette and Summerfield, 5-6.
Parpart et al., 62. In general, Radical Feminism is the school of feminist thought that challenges the construction of sex and gender in society and aims for the transformation of these relations. For a discussion on radical feminism and some examples of radical feminist theory, see Kemp and Squires.
Parpart et al., 63; and Visvanathan et al, 51-54.
Jaquette and Summerfield, 87-106. This argument is also made in Chant and Gutmann.
Marchand and Parpart, 180, 204-207.
For more discussion about the use of a GAD approach by non-governmental organizations in the development sector, see the journal Gender and Development, published three times annually by Oxfam and Routledge.
In Afghanistan, the line between reconstruction and development is very blurred. Much of what is currently being ‘rebuilt’ was actually destroyed not in the most recent conflict but over the course of the many different wars that have devastated the country repeatedly in the last fifty years. Moreover, in many cases it can be argued that much of what is being ‘rebuilt’ was never there in the first place to start. This issue is not limited to Afghanistan. For more on this critique of ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ see Englebert and Tull.
See White House Bush Administration archives for use of “War on Terror” rhetoric: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/12/20081217-5.html.
First Lady Laura Bush, on CNN 17 November 2001, quoted in Khattak, 221.
Kandiyoti “Politics”, 1; Ferguson, 9-24; and Khattak, 221-223.
See USAID, 3; and Kandiyoti “Politics”, 15-32.
National Development Strategy Working Group, 21.
Rojos and Aziz, 5. Similarly, in USAID’s Strategic Plan for 2005-210, the empowerment of women as a means of creating an environment of ‘social inclusion’ was identified as a crucial aspect of sustainable development and the goal of achieving ‘gender equity’ proclaimed to be built into ‘every-aspect’ of USAID’s program; see “Afghanistan Strategic Plan,” 5-11, 15.
Wardak et al. 84; also See Oates and Helal.
According to the most recent numbers available, 25.9 percent of seats in the Afghan Parliament and held by women. See Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007/8.
Kandiyoti “Politics”, 17. Also see United Nations Development Programme.
Greenblatt-Harrison, 9; and National Development Strategy, 21.
See UNDP, “2007/2008 Human Development Report: Afghanistan.”
This marginalization also continues to be reflected in the approaches and priorities of major aid providers. For example, Hirschmann argues that even though it often employs a rhetoric of gender sensitivity, USAID continues to exclude “women’s specific constraints and contributions” from broader policy analyses (in Jaquette and Summerfield 71-86).
This language comes from the Preamble to the Bonn Agreement. Quoted in Khattak, 225.
According to the latest figures available the per capita aid received was $110.7 (in US dollars). Though this has gone up from $76.6 in 2004, it still compares unfavorably with aid received in other countries. See United Nations Human Development Report: Afghanistan (2007/8). Also Khattak, 227-228. Ironically, the percentage of aid from the USA has earmarked for women has been even lower, just $189 million out of $4.2 billion! See Greenblatt-Harrison et al., 18; and Rehn and Sirleaf, 24.
Human Rights Watch, 4 (Quoted in Abirafeh, 8).
USAID “Afghanistan Strategy,” 1-2.
See Khattak, 225-226 and Oates and Helal, 24-35.
Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, 27. Women’s lack of ‘knowledge’ is a common justification for their exclusion in public decision-making. See Wakefield.
Barakat, 98, 100-105; Suhrke, 4-5.
Khattak, 225-228. In the period of the civil war rural warlords galvanized support precisely on the issue of resisting imposed reforms on gender relations and today many these same leaders remain in power.
Kandiyoti “Political Fiction”, 135.
Kandiyoti “Politics”, 24-27; and Amnesty “Women Still Under Attack.”
Khattak, 218-219; and Barakat, 117-118. According to the most recent numbers, more than seventy percent of Afghans live in rural areas. See United Nations Human Development Report: Afghanistan (2007/8), Section 5: “Demographic Trends.”
Barakat, 119-120; and Kandiyoti “Politics”, 19-28, Dualatzai, 14-15.
Abirafeh, 13. Also see Kandiyoti “Politics”, 30.
See Human Rights Watch; and Amnesty “No One Listens.”
Full name:
Franz Xaver Perrez
E-mail address:
franz.perrez@bafu.admin.ch
Acknowledgement:
This article is a shortened version of the presentation “The Pareto Optimum of Stakeholder Participation in Environmental Governance” made at the Conference on Environmental Governance and Democracy – Institutions, Public Participation and Environmental Sustainability: Bridging Research and Capacity Development, which was organized by Yale University Center for Environmental Law & Policy in conjunction with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, UNITAR, on May 10-11 2008 at the Yale University in New Haven. See generally: http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/envdem/index.htm.
The ideas expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the view of the Swiss Government. The author would like to thank the comments on a previous draft of this article received from Dr. Jürg Schneider; Stephan Michel and Alexander Kopp.
Brief biography:
Dr. Franz Xaver Perrez, head of Global Affairs Section in the International Affairs Division of Switzerland’s Federal Office for the Environment; J.S.D. 1998 (NYU School of Law); LL.M. 1996 (NYU School of Law); additional studies at University of Bern School of Law and Université de Paris II. Dr. Perrez teaches international environmental law at the University of Bern School of Law.
Scholarly Abstract
This paper examines the participation of stakeholders in environmental policy formulation and implementation. After a short discussion of the main functions and challenges of environmental governance the paper addresses the issue of stakeholder participation and the claim of “democratic deficits” in international environmental governance. It stresses that while non-state actor involvement does not necessarily increase democratic legitimacy, it may nevertheless increase the quality of the environmental policy processes. It will then argue that certain international processes such as the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) have led to an unsatisfactory situation of non-state actor involvement where excessive formalization and proceduralization impede active interaction and input of expertise from non-state actors. It seems that the interaction between state and non-state actors in some of today’s international processes, such as the CSD, has led to a zero-sum game where no party is really benefiting from the contributions of the other. This paper will suggest several changes to get beyond this zero-sum game mentality, including de-formalization of participation, replacement of generalist non-governmental organizations with those that specialize in specific fields, and reformation of the relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might come to see the other as a partner, not as a competitor. It will conclude by arguing that neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective central institution addressing the main environmental problems, nor the so-called “democratic deficit” is the main challenge to today’s international environmental governance, but the lack of political will. Political will, however, is not an absolute; it can and has to be stimulated. And this may be one of the most productive contributions that non-state actors can make.
Author’s Note
The international environmental policy processes are often criticized for inadequate involvement of non-state actors such as NGOs or international organizations. This is often referred to as a ‘democratic deficit’. Yet my experiences as head of delegation or lead negotiator for the Swiss government in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) or in international chemicals negotiations such as the development of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM) have revealed that not all NGO participation is as fruitful as often claimed. In some international processes such as the CSD, NGO participation has become an overly formalized procedure that prevents rather than stimulates interaction and exchange within the NGO community and Commission participants. Today’s interaction between state and non-state actors in the CSD can be described as a zero-sum game where no party is benefiting from the contributions of the other. The expertise and perspectives of non-state actors, however, is invaluable to consensus decision-making, policy-formulation and eventual impact through international governance like the CSD. This article proposes the following steps to increase the effectiveness of non-state actors in environmental policy processes: a de-formalization of non-state actor involvement, a replacement of generalist NGOs with those that specialize in specific fields, a reformation of the relationship between state and non-state actors so that each might come to see the other as a partner, not as a competitor, and finally a strategic change whereby NGOs re-focus their energy towards raising public awareness, influencing nations’ negotiation positions, and triggering the political will and commitment that is needed to effectively formulate and implement the policies of environmental governance.
Keywords:
international environmental governance, non-governmental actors, NGOs, stakeholder participation, legitimacy, democratic deficit
How to Get Beyond the Zero-Sum Game Mentality Between State and Non-State Actors in International Environmental Governance
Today, it is well recognized that threats to the environment undermine the resource base of human development and well-being. As UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2005) has held, “[o]ur efforts to defeat poverty and pursue sustainable development will be in vain if environmental degradation and natural resource depletion continue unabated.” In order to address the challenge of global environmental degradation and natural resource depletion, a complex and multi-layered international environmental governance structure has materialized over the past few decades with an abundance of institutions, organizations and processes emerging-sometimes overlapping, sometimes cooperating, oftentimes conflicting. Several factors contribute to the lack of effectiveness and efficiency of today’s system of international environmental governance, namely its fragmentation, the dilution of the authority of its core-institutions such as the UN Environment Programme UNEP, the imbalance between the environmental regime and other regimes, the lack of institutional leadership within the international environmental regime, the inefficient use of already limited resources, and the lack of political will and commitment. To further complicate the situation, this governmental environmental structure is complemented by an intricate network of thousands of active non-government organizations, initiatives and action groups. Environmental governance has become so complex, that even specialists have lost oversight.
This paper examines the participation of stakeholders (i.e. all actors that have an interest at stake, thus both states as well as non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations and
international organizations) in forming and implementing international environmental policy.
One body of stakeholders commonly discussed is that of “nongovernmental organizations” (NGOs), which is understood as including both, so-called “public interests NGOs” and industry and business representatives. The paper will focus on the international level of environmental governance and will draw from experiences of international processes, such as those of the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) and international chemicals negotiations, namely the development of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM).
After a short discussion of environmental governance, its actors and institutions, and its main functions and challenges (Section 2), the paper will address the issue of NGO participation and the claim of a “democratic deficit” in international environmental governance. It will stress that while NGO involvement does not directly increase the democratic legitimacy as such (Section 3), it may nevertheless increase the quality of environmental policy processes (Section 4). It will then argue that over time, NGO participation has become an overly formalized procedure that prevents rather than stimulates interaction between conference participants. This is especially the case in processes like the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), where stakeholder participation is confined to a portion of any given meeting known as the “multi-stakeholder segment.” Today, interaction in the CSD could be said to represent a zero-sum game where the contributions of one party are seen as hindrances by the other. On the other hand, there are processes such as the development of the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management that do not limit stakeholder participation to specific segments and which are characterized by abundant, interactive and direct stakeholder involvement throughout negotiations and the decision making process. The paper will suggest that a de-formalization of non-state actor involvement is imperative to allow for valuable active stakeholder participation. A proposed method for how such reforms can be made will be detailed in this paper. It will conclude that non-state actor involvement may be less effective in general environmental governance processes addressing broad issues. Similarly, NGOs with a very general background may have less impact on specialised political processes. On the other hand, in processes where the issue in question is more specific, NGOs and stakeholders with greater expertise in specific fields will be vital as active participants in policy making (Section 5). Finally, it will argue that neither the alleged lack of an authoritative, effective central institution addressing the main environmental problems, nor the so called “democratic deficit” are the main challenge to today’s international environmental governance, but the lack of political will, i.e. the continued political prioritization of other issues over the environment. Non-state actors such as NGOs, however, can be crucial in addressing this lack of political will.
Environmental governance is the political and administrative system established to address environmental problems. It embraces institutions, principles, rules, procedures and instruments that regulate, manage, and implement the processes of environmental protection. The function of environmental governance is to provide a comprehensive, coherent, effective and efficient framework for the protection and sustainable use of natural resources.
Traditionally, it is argued that the main pillars of an environmental institutional framework are government authorities, appointed and authorised by elected officials to carry out tasks at the national (federal) and sub-national (regional and lower) levels. This traditional model has been changing rapidly – non-state actors are no longer seen only as an “object” of environmental policy, they have also become a “subject” of environmental policy making. Today, non-state actors are fulfilling increasingly important roles as engines of international environmental policy-making, setting agendas for international policy processes and development, providing knowledge and scientific information,, monitoring implementation of international policies and lobbying state actors. They are also involved in partnership initiatives with governments, as well as the development of voluntary standards, and implementation of environmental protection programs. The establishment of private label schemes such as that from the Forest Stewardship Council, a not-for-profit organization established to promote the responsible management of the world’s forests, is a prominent example of international environmental governance conducted without national government involvement. Today more than ever there is a growing corpus of rules, principles and decisions with a direct impact on private actors that has not been negotiated in a traditional inter-state context. Rules such as technical guidelines for best available technologies and best environmental practices are often made by international organizations with strong support from non-state expertises and the direct participation of non-state actors; international partnerships are being formed between public and private entities; international codes of conduct are being developed by private actors or private initiatives such as the Forest Stewardship Council. All of the above have become important elements of international environmental governance. Thus, international governmental organisations and non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations, corporations, other collectives and even individuals have become important actors of both national and international environmental governance.
Governance can generally be seen as the system how actors, through institutions and processes, identify, address and solve common problems. It addresses not only how decisions are being made, who is responsible for making decisions, how decision makers carry out their mandate and how they are held accountable, but also how decisions are implemented and reviewed. International environmental governance is thus the international regime that has been developed to identify, address and solve environmental problems. International environmental governance is relatively young and dynamic. Over time, a multi-layered regime has emerged, and a proliferation of instruments, processes, institutions and actors has evolved that bears the risk of duplication and even of conflict. Today’s multi-layered international environment regime and its numerous institutions and processes demand an increased level of international cooperation; it might even be argued that cooperation is increasingly an obligation or necessary duty of state actors. Non-state actors, however, seem not to bear such a responsibility to cooperate.
The United Nations’ Environment Programme UNEP is one of the main institutions of today’s international environmental governance. However, UNEP is lacking resources, authority and support to fulfil its role as central pillar of the international environmental regime. In addition to UNEP, over 500 international environmental treaties and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention on Biodiversity or the Montreal Protocol for the protection of the Ozone Layer have addressed specific environmental concerns. Each treaty establishes specific rules and obligations and creates its own mini-institutional machinery that includes annual meetings and an administrative structure to serve these meetings and to oversee the implementation of the conventions’ directives.
In addition, while the UNEP and the international environmental treaties and MEAs have the primary political-normative functions of international environmental governance, their work is complemented by specialized organizations and institutions such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Maritime Organization, or the UN Commission on Sustainable Development. Today, many of the most important decisions affecting the environment stem from institutions and processes outside of the complex web of the core global environmental governance system like the WTO, multilateral development banks or bilateral investment and free-trade agreements. Additionally, implementation and financing of environmental activities is often tasked to other institutions such as the United Nations Development Programme UNDP, the World Bank, the Global Environment Facility, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research UNITAR, or United Nations Industrial Development Organization UNIDO.
This proliferation of MEAs, international environmental rule-setting bodies, and organizations and institutions engaged in environmental activities, often with overlapping or conflicting goals and strategies has lead to a fragmentation within the sphere of international environmental governance. Due to the weak position of the UNEP, there is a lack of cooperation and coordination among the different relevant international institutions and a lack of implementation and enforcement, and the limited financial resources are not always used efficiently. These challenges or shortcomings of the international environmental regime can be structured into four groups or clusters: i) insufficient commitment to and prioritization of environmental considerations by states, ii) fragmentation of the regime, iii) limited authority and limited resources of UNEP, and iv) a structural and institutional imbalance between the environmental regime and other regimes. This proliferation of international environmental institutions and processes also makes it difficult for state and non-state actors to follow the work of all the relevant institutions and processes in international environmental governance.
In response to its weaknesses, several propositions have been made to strengthen international environmental governance over the past several years. The most recent initiative was taken at the 2005 UN World Summit, which recognized the need for more efficient international environmental governance with enhanced coordination, improved policy advice and guidance, strengthened scientific knowledge and assessment, better treaty compliance, as well as better integration of environmental activities in the broader sustainable development framework; at the operational level, the heads of state and government agreed to explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework to address this need. It is interesting to note that all these propositions refer to institutional aspects of international environmental governance and politics and that they make no specific reference to the involvement and the general role of non-state actors. However, non-state actors can significantly contribute to addressing several of the identified needs.
The involvement of non-governmental actors in the international environmental policy regime is a typical characteristic of environmental governance. The UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) is said to have been a pioneer in engaging non-governmental actors in its work by including in its annual meetings “multi-stakeholder dialogues” where representatives from diverse sectors convene and share their experience and forge common grounds. This has led to a significant increase in NGO representatives from around the world attending CSD meetings. Today, non-governmental organizations regularly participate as observers at meetings of international environmental institutions and processes and make effective use of their right to intervene and submit their views and proposals.
Nevertheless, the involvement of non-state actors is often said to be insufficient and international institutions and processes are frequently criticized for suffering from a “democratic deficit.” The increased involvement of these non-state actors is said to be crucial, as they are typically deemed representatives of the global civil society and of the public interest worldwide; enhancing their role in international decision-making would enhance the democratic legitimacy of international institutions and processes.
The claim that NGO participation can enhance the democratic legitimacy of international governance relies on the assumption that the concept of democracy can as such be directly applied to international governance. “Democracy” is generally understood as a form of government in which the supreme power is held by the people, i.e. all individual subjects of the government live under a free electoral and participatory system. Democracy is thus a form of self-governance by the people of a political entity. Since there is no global government (a single government responsible for the political functioning and decision-making of the whole globe) and no global “people” (demos), international governance is difficult to associate with the act of democratic governing. And, it is argued that because of the fundamental absence of the premise of majority rule on a global scale, the concept of democracy seems hardly applicable to international governance, and any attempt to bring international governance “into the laboratory of democracy will result in a reductionist and impoverished understanding of international law, of democracy and of the actual and potential relationship between the two.”
However, even if the applicability of democratic principles to international governance were to be accepted, the claim that NGO participation could correct a so-called democratic deficit of international governance seems to be superficial and short-sighted. In fact, NGOs represent the views of specific interest groups – this does by no means imply that NGOs represent the general public or a “global civil society.” Therefore, NGOs do not have greater democratic legitimacy than governments and cannot justify playing an activist role through arguing that they better represent the public than government representatives. While it could be argued that the aggregation of NGOs as agents of special interests could theoretically holistically represent the views of the global community in the same way that democracies incorporate the special interests held by their constituents, this is not the case. For such democratic aggregation to occur, all views and interests would have to be represented by specific NGOs, each with equal access to the international decision making processes. Since this is not the case, this counter-argument may is not convincing. In fact, the involvement of stakeholders in international governance may even pose democratic challenges: while it’s assumed that governments defend the interests of the states they represent, and while government authorities are typically appointed and authorised by elected officials to carry out their tasks, NGOs and stakeholders exert their influence without such control by and accountability to the general public. Thus, the active NGO and stakeholder involvement in international environmental governance could raise concerns with respect to their accountability and democratic legitimacy.
This concern of accountability and democratic legitimacy becomes even more pressing if the existence of a “New World Order” is accepted, as is proposed by Anne-Marie Slaughter: Building on examples where international institutions function effectively when drawing significantly upon the existence of informal policy networks, Slaughter presents a world that is largely run by networks of elites with close personal ties to one another. In her model, the individuals who make up these networks are public servants such as regulators, bureaucrats, diplomats and judges-personalities with explicit mandates under public law, formally held accountable to the people through elected governments and representative institutions. While Slaughter’s “network” conception seems to depend on the continuing viability of a clear boundary between public and private, there is a real risk that these networks operate in a way “whereby network ‘insiders,’ both governmental and non-governmental, cooperate in a manner that defies formal boundaries between public and private”. But if global governance is run by networks that include both governmental and non-governmental actors, then the selection of who should be a member of the decision-making body becomes complex and raises important questions of accountability and legitimacy, as the general public is excluded from the selection of the members of the network and the non-governmental members of the network are not accountable to the general public but to special interests.
The Benefits of NGO and Stakeholder Participation
Although the claim that NGOs would enhance the democratic legitimacy of international environmental governance must be rejected, there are nevertheless other important benefits of non-state actor involvement in international environmental policy making and implementation. NGOs, as compared to state actors, have the benefit of being able to focus on one specific interest and can express themselves more freely on that issue, being less constrained by the general interest of a specific nation at large. Moreover, NGOs often have specific expertise and knowledge. They enhance public support and assist in the domestic internalization and implementation of internationally agreed norms and commitments. Additionally, “[i]n being entrepreneurial, NGOs compete with other actors in a dynamic marketplace of ideas” and can be more creative in constructing and encouraging new norms, and new models of governance.
Non-state actors can play vital, supportive roles in each step of the process of developing, implementing, and monitoring international environmental policies within international environmental governance:
i) By collecting, analyzing, and disseminating relevant information, drawing attention to new and emerging issues that need international attention and by mobilizing public opinion through information campaigns and broad outreach activities, they can influence the agenda-setting of international environmental governance.
ii) They can inspire and shape the development of international norms and policies by providing expert advice to state-centered international negotiations, formulating views and expressing interests that might otherwise be ignored by state actors, by mobilizing public opinion at the national level to influence the position of representatives, and by lobbying and monitoring governmental delegations during negotiations. Several forms or channels for non-state actors involvement exist to influence the development of norms and policies by international governmental institutions: The most common form of this type of influence is non-state actor participation as observers in international meetings, negotiations and national delegations. Moreover, some international institutions directly seek the expertise and the advice of NGOs on specific issues or include NGOs in technical committees or advisory groups. Finally, non-state actors can strongly influence international policy development by formulating and applying norms, standards, codes of conduct, or practices that influence governmental policy formulation.
iii) They can contribute to the understanding of international norms and policies through dissemination of information to the public, engaging in interpretation of international rules and norms, and by contributing to international adjudication by making amicus curiae (friends-of-the-court) submissions.
iv) They can support the implementation of international environmental policies by advising state actors, supporting state implementation and by performing operational functions themselves.
v) Finally, they can support compliance with commitments and policies by monitoring state action, by drawing the public attention to implementation problems, sue institutions at the national level for non-action, and, in specific environmental regimes, by triggering compliance procedures, i.e. initiate the procedure established by any given international environmental agreement to assess the compliance of its parties with the obligations under the agreement.
These contributions of non-state actors to the process of developing, implementing, and monitoring international environmental policies undoubtedly increase the quality of international regulations and policies and improve the outcomes associated with them. Thus, i generally increase the legitimacy of international decision-making even if NGOs are unable to address the “democratic deficit” of environmental governance. However, in order to ensure that such benefits of stakeholder and NGO participation are possible, it is crucial that non-state actors do have specific expertise and actively accompany, monitor and support the governmental negotiations. And, it is important that the processes are organized in a manner which allows for real interaction between non-state and state actors. Experience shows that this is not always the case.
The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) has been praised in the past for having been a pioneer in engaging non-governmental actors, for organizing rich and stimulating multi-stakeholder dialogues at each of its meetings, and for including NGO representatives in many of its official government delegations. However, a critical analysis of the stakeholder and NGO participation of the CSD would come to less positive conclusions. Most of the time, the multi-stakeholder segment does not provide for active interaction between state and non-state actors but rather, is a platform for repeating already-known positions instead of a forum for collective brain-storming that provides new insights, expertise and stimulates new ideas that would be relevant for the issues under debate. A more provocative description would even argue that the CSD stakeholder dialogues-which, in the interest of political correctness, are openly lauded as enlightening, thought provoking and crucial for quality and success of the CSD deliberations-have evolved into formalized rituals that restrict the non-state actors’ impact. As a result, each year non-state representatives repeat more or less the same mantras, which too often fail to provide useful insights or tangible approaches to addressing the issues under consideration. The fact that a representative of the indigenous people is wearing a marvellous dress does not guarantee that his or her intervention is enlightening; the fact that the presence of a youth delegate is refreshing does not add value to the substance of his or her contributions; and the fact that a representative of the environmental community is deeply concerned about the issues under discussion does not guarantee a constructive analysis of the problem at hand. Additionally, as a time specifically demarcated for non-state actor involvement, the introduction of multi-stakeholder segments has provided an excuse for excluding non-state actors from other parts of the CSD sessions.
Given the fact that the multi-stakeholder segments do not provide additional or new insights in the issue under debate, the governmental delegations often use the multi-stakeholder segment to work on their position or to consult and coordinate informally. However, as it would be considered as political incorrect if a national delegation did not attend the multi-stakeholder segment, leaving its seat in the meeting room empty during this time, an intern, a junior member of the delegation or the NGO-representative in the government delegation is often sent to attend the multi-stakeholder segment so as to mark governmental presence and interest. Later in the process, as delegations exchange non-non papers and begin to negotiate in small informal-informal contact groups, which perhaps due to their unofficial nature are absolutely vital to the negotiation process, NGOs and non-state representatives are excluded. And in the final negotiation phase when delegates are overwhelmed with work and responsibilities, they no longer have the time to respond to questions or contemplate potentially important proposals that NGOs attempt to introduce to the state representatives. Although a simplified-and thus, potentially controversial-picture of the dynamics within the CSD, the above description highlights important shortcomings of the current system that are too often overlooked.
Thus, the once-commended NGO and stakeholder participation at the CSD is not an adequate example of the positive impact of proactive involvement of non-state actors. CSD multi-stakeholder segments fail to ensure that non-state actors provide useful forms of expertise that could be usefully employed by delegates. Additionally, these segments do not provide sufficient in-depth interaction between non-state actors and other delegates. Despite the shortcomings of multi-stakeholder segments, non-state representatives have greatly appreciated their inclusion in the formal agenda; as non-state actors have come to increasingly enjoy their new formal role, they have consequently begun to behave more formally. However, it seems that the formalization and proceduralization of stakeholder participation has not furthered its impact and value. While some thought that formalizing the stakeholder participation would not only secure a prominent time-slot for interaction with non-state actors but also give more weight and importance to the non-state actors as such, the reality seems to be that by allocating specific time segments to NGOs and by formalizing their participation in the deliberations of governmental representatives, flexibility and dynamic have been lost. Additionally, the formal multi-stakeholder segment has legitimized the exclusion of non-state actors from the other parts of the process, namely the less formal part where concrete results are negotiated.
In order to change the current procedure, non-state actors would have to be ready to renounce the time, procedural certainty, and formality that is allocated to them in the formal multi-stakeholder segment; delegates would have to invest real interest to exchange with non-state actors; or time that is reserved for governmental-only deliberations would have to be opened for non-state participation. However, non-state actors do not seem to be ready to give up what they have gained-namely, the special segment formally allocated to them as well as the semi-official status they have earned through this formalization; on the other hand, Government delegates are not ready to sacrifice any more of “their time” during CSD meetings to NGOs. It seems that the formalization and proceduralization of NGO participation in the CSD-and in many other processes-have lead to a zero-sum game where no party is benefiting from the contributions of the other. This suboptimal result cannot be rectified without reforming the zero-sum game mentality held by each of the parties at hand.
The benefits of expunging this zero-sum game mentality from environmental governance are clear. For example, there are other cases marked by more dynamic, direct and active non-state actor participation where a more fruitful non-state actor involvement has been reached due to a cooperative approach taken by state and non-state actors. One such example is the process to develop the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM). The decision to develop SAICM was taken in 2004. In light of the desire to bring in the specific knowledge and expertise of the non-state actors involved in chemicals management issues, the need for a strong and direct involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the process was accepted from the beginning of the process. Thus, NGOs were allowed to participate fully in all of the work of the SAICM Preparatory Committee and to attend as equal partners both the formal sessions and the informal negotiations. Over sixty NGOs from the agriculture, development, environment, health, industry, and labour sectors participated actively in the negotiations of SAICM with the full right to take the floor, express their views and make constructive proposals. Throughout the SAICM process, NGOs brought valuable expertise and knowledge and in the end, many of their ideas and proposals were taken up. The adoption of SAICM was attended by over 140 governments, 60 specialized NGOs and 20 intergovernmental organizations from the agriculture, development, environment, health, industry and labour sector, a magnitude and diversity of attendees that lent the revolutionary stress on stakeholder participation even greater significance.
Several reasons made this participatory approach so productive: NGO participation at SAICM was not restricted by formalized procedures or a constrained stakeholder segment; NGO’s greatly invested in their SAICM participation, coming well-prepared with specific, concrete proposals; NGOs coordinated effectively among themselves and with governments throughout the process and they were clearly not perceived as competitors to the states but as active and competent partners. One could even argue that within the SAICM-setting, it has been possible to leave the traditional interstate paradigm and to move towards a collective concern or community interest approach. In this case, extensive NGO participation was not sought in order to achieve greater democratic legitimacy but rather in order to tap stakeholders’ practical expertise and competency.
Thus, there seem to be at least six fundamental differences between a CSD-like zero-sum game mentality case and the more dynamic SAICM model: (i) while the participation of non-state actors within the CSD is focused on a formalized stakeholder dialogue, this is not the case in the SAICM process; ii) while the CSD is perceived as a process dealing with the broad, overarching theme of sustainable development, SAICM addresses a more specific issue; iii) while the CSD seems to have attracted non-state representatives with a less focused background, less specialized expertise and little commitment to focus on the very details of the ongoing discussions between the government delegates, SAICM has attracted NGOs with specific expertise and knowledge in chemicals management; iv) while the non-state actors often formulate general and broad views not directly linked to the issues under debate at the CSD, they have provided specific comments and proposals during the SAICM process; v) while in the CSD-process the formalized multi-stakeholder segments are sometimes perceived as non-productive, so non-state actors are too often viewed as obstacles, stakeholders have been seen as competent partners bringing in needed expertise and information in the SAICM-process; and vi) while governments often primarily focus on the defence of their personal interests within the CSD, they have tended to search for solutions to pressing common challenges in the SAICM context.
For the CSD and other environmental governance structures, a move beyond the zero-sum game mentality towards a more flexible system that allows for direct interaction between state and non-state actors throughout the process would probably require several changes:
- De-formalization of participation:
Formalization and proceduralization by allocating preset and thus limited segments to stakeholders excludes them from other parts of the debate. It makes it easy for government representatives to escape interaction with non-state actors. Formalization and proceduralization also seem to attract non-state actors with less specific expertise and those that are inclined to focus on the form of participation and not the substance of contribution. Formalization and proceduralization should be replaced with more flexible meeting structure that allows for direct and spontaneous interaction between state and non-state actors. At the same time, non-state actors should not internalize form and procedure, but remain innovative and thought-provoking participants.
- Generality of expertise and input should be exchanged for specificity:
A key benefit of non-state involvement in policy deliberation is the specific expertise and information that they can provide and the fact that they may formulate interests and views that otherwise might have been lost in a state-centric process. By broadening the information base, they can contribute to an improvement in the quality of decision-making. Therefore, NGOs must not repeat generalities but focus on making specific comments and proposals on issues under debate.
- Non-state and state actors as partners not as competitors:
State actors should perceive the non-state actors not as competitors for time or influence but as partners who provide for the specific insights and information needed. At the same time, it is crucial that these partners, focusing on their role to broaden the information base for good decision making, do not perceive government representatives as enemies of the public interest who defend a short-term interest of a small privileged elite whenever government representatives take a different view than the one promoted by non-state actors. They must go beyond simple accusation and try to understand the concerns and challenges that the government actors face and contribute actively to a common search for the best solution to solve the specific challenge under debate.
This paper has argued that formalization and proceduralization of stakeholder participation may lead-and has led in certain processes such as the CSD-to a non-productive zero-sum game situation. Stakeholder participation, when excessively formalized and proceduralized, risks becoming an inefficient, crude ritual in which stakeholder influence is limited and the process of interaction between state and non-state contributors fails to be interactive and dynamic. Moreover, such a system is conducive to a less-than-desirable situation where the non-state actors most familiar with the system and its procedures will have their voices heard, while those non-state actors with the most needed expertise on a specific issue under debate will remain silenced. This will lead to zero-sum game situation where neither NGOs nor Governments are willing to change their allocation of time and resources, and any gains in time allotted to one party are seen as direct setbacks by the other. Although all sides are not entirely satisfied with the situation, each side fears losing more than they might gain if the arrangement were to be changed; NGOs would not be ready to lose their formal (but nonetheless limited) platform of influence and governments would not want to lose what they have been able to maintain as a “government only” sphere of policy making; both sides are afraid of “unknown territories” of state and non-state interaction.
Comparing the UN Commission for Sustainable Development-an example illustrating the zero-sum game situation of stakeholder participation-with the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management-an example with active and dynamic stakeholder involvement-it seems that NGO and stakeholder involvement is less effective in processes which address broad issues at a general level and where NGO and stakeholder involvement is strongly formalized and institutionalized. Such processes will attract NGOs with a less focused background, less specialized expertise and little commitment to focus on the very details of the ongoing discussions between the government delegates. However, because of the zero-sum game situation, it is difficult to move from such a formalized and static situation towards a more dynamic and interactive process. A move beyond this suboptimal situation, such as the one in the CSD, would require several changes: (i) de-formalization of participation: limited segments allowed to stakeholders and excluding them from other parts of the debate should be replaced with interaction throughout the whole process; (ii) generality with respect to NGO backgrounds should exchanged for specificity: NGOs should bring in specific expertise and they should make specific comments and concrete proposals on issues under debate; (iii) non-state actors as partners not as competitors: state actors should perceive the non-state actors not as competitors for time or influence but as partners bringing insights needed in the common search for the best solutions for environmental issues.
It seems as though the key challenge to today’s international environmental governance is not the lack of a strong and authoritative central institution addressing the main existing and emerging issues and providing overarching policy guidance, nor is it a “democratic deficit” or insufficient NGO and stakeholder involvement. Rather, the main challenge is the lack of political will, political commitment and prioritization of environmental interests. This lack of political will and commitment and lack of political prioritization of environmental concerns, however, cannot be an excuse for inadequate environmental policy. While the strength of a certain regime and the effectiveness of policies are a reflection of political will and political prioritization, political will and prioritization are not a given fact that cannot be influenced. By raising public awareness of challenges and problems and by monitoring policy development and implementation NGOs can become a strong force in addressing this exact fundamental failing of today’s system of environmental governance. As long as today’s overly formalized systems of non-state actor participation in processes of international environmental governance are maintained, NGOs and other non-state bodies will remain sub-optimally limited in their functionality. Until reform on this front is enacted, NGOs ought to devote their energies to raising awareness and lobbying at the national level when outside of the formalized processes of negotiation, and focus on their role as governance watchdogs when within. Specializing in these roles while shying away from certain international governance processes that constrain non-state actors through over-formalization of their involvement will serve to maximize non-state actors’ impact.
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+ This article is a shortened version of the presentation “The Pareto Optimum of Stakeholder Participation in Environmental Governance” made at the Conference on Environmental Governance and Democracy – Institutions, Public Participation and Environmental Sustainability: Bridging Research and Capacity Development, which was organized by Yale University Center for Environmental Law & Policy in conjunction with the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, UNITAR, on May 10-11 2008 at the Yale University in New Haven. See generally: http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/envdem/index.htm.
The ideas expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the view of the Swiss Government. The author would like to thank the comments on a previous draft of this article received from Dr. Jürg Schneider; Stephan Michel and Alexander Kopp.
Dr. Franz Xaver Perrez, head of Global Affairs Section in the International Affairs Division of Switzerland’s Federal Office for the Environment; J.S.D. 1998 (NYU School of Law); LL.M. 1996 (NYU School of Law); additional studies at University of Bern School of Law and Université de Paris II. Dr. Perrez teaches international environmental law at the University of Bern School of Law.
Zero-sum game represents the case where any gain experienced by one individual in a system is associated with losses elsewhere in the system of equal sum magnitude to that of the gain. All gains in such a system are cancelled out by losses and no aggregate, or social, gain is possible for the system as a whole.
Perrez and Ziegerer 2008, 254-255
Throughout this article, the term “stakeholders” is used as including all actors that have an interest at stake, thus state- and non-state actors; non-state actors include non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international (intergovernmental) organizations; NGOs include both, so-called “public interests NGOs” and industry and business representatives; private actors would include NGOs and individuals.
Concerning the criticism that the international regime suffers from a “democratic deficit”, see generally: Nye Jr., Joseph S (2001), Moravcsik 2004.
Esty 2006, 1497-1499; Najam, Papa, and Taiyab 2006, 3.
Esty and Ivanova 2002, 191-192; Perrez 2001; Roch and Perrez 2005.
Najam, Papa, and Taiyab 2006, 62 and 65-73; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002, 89-95.
Kingsbury, Krisch, and Stewart 2005, 23-25; Sands 2003, 70-122.
Perrez 2001; Roch and Perrez 2005.
Roch and Perrez 2005, 3-6; Sands 2003, 25-69.
Najam, Papa, and Taiyab 2006, 57-62.
Perrez and Ziegerer 2008, 254.
Ivanova 2005; Najam, Papa, and Taiyab 2006, 14-16 and 36-56; UNEP 2001.
Perrez 2001, 452-453; Roch and Perrez 2005, 15-17. See also: Perrez and Ziegerer 2008, 253-55.
Perrez and Ziegerer 2008, 255-258.
2005 World Summit Outcome, § 169.
Charnovitz 1997, 271-274; Charnovitz 2006, 352-355; Esty 1998, 129; Gemmill and Bamidele-Izu 2002, 83-95.
See e.g. Paragraph 18 of the Compliance Procedures of the Aarhus Convention, available at <http://www.unece.org/env/pp/documents/mop1/ece.mp.pp.2.add.8.e.pdf>.
“Non-non papers” are used to preliminarily test ideas or propositions, off the official record of a given conference. A “non-non paper” is one degree of informality higher than a “non-paper,” which is an unofficial document circulated during negotiations when one party seeks feedback on a certain proposition without being held officially responsible for the proposition in question.
“Informal-informal” groups are meetings of delegates even less formal than “informal” contact groups. An example of an informal-informal group is when delegates discuss an idea off of the record in the corner of a meeting room.
In fact, this author has several times benefited during the CSD negotiations from the exchange and discussion with NGO representatives and from the concrete proposals and suggestions on specific issues they were sharing with the author. However, these positive interactions have not taken place in the formalize setting of the multi stakeholder dialogue but informally in the corridors. And, they have always involved NGO representatives with specific knowledge and expertise addressing very concrete issues under debate.
“Formalization” refers to a process by which the form or the formality of certain activities becomes increasingly important, such as when statements must be made in certain prescribed ways: i.e. “the distinguished delegate from country X”.
“Proceduralization” is understood as a process by which activities are increasingly bound to follow strict procedures, such as when a participants cannot directly react to each other but have to ask questions through the chair, or when non-state actors are forced to speak once all the state actors have already spoken. As such, proceduraliziation can also include an element of formalization but is not limited to that.
Maher Abu-Madi * and Rashed Al-Sa’ed **
* Institute of Environmental and Water Studies, Birzeit University, P.O. Box 14, Birzeit, West Bank, Palestine. Tel/Fax: +972-2-2982120. E-mail: abumadi@birzeit.edu
Brief biography: Dr. Maher Abu-Madi received his PhD in Water and Environmental Engineering from Technical University of Delft in 2004. He is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Environmental and Water Studies, Birzeit University, and he is the Research Coordinator of UNESCO-IHE Partnership for Water Education and Research (PoWER).
** Institute of Environmental and Water Studies, Birzeit University, P.O. Box 14, Birzeit, West Bank, Palestine. Tel/Fax: +972-2-2982120. E-mail: rsaed@birzeit.edu
Brief biography: Dr. Rashed Al-Sa’ed is an Associate Professor in water and sanitation at the Institute of Environmental and Water Studies, Birzeit University. He has worked with a number of wastewater consultancy firms in Germany.
Scholarly Abstract
Water has a precious value, and each drop must be accounted for in water scarce regions such as the Middle East and North Africa. Therefore, wastewater has to be reclassified as a renewable water resource rather than as waste. This helps in augmenting water availability, and at the same time in preventing environmental pollution. Utilization of this resource requires collection, treatment, and use of all generated wastewater. Although reuse of wastewater is recognized in most water-scarce countries, the reuse of wastewater is still very low. This paper analyzes the major components of a sustainable wastewater reuse scheme. It also reviews the different methods that are frequently used to quantify and report progress and achievements in wastewater reuse. The paper also introduces an alternative yardstick named by the author as the Wastewater Reuse Index (WRI) that has a value between 0-100; WRI is calculated by dividing the amounts of wastewater being actually reused by the total amounts of wastewater generated at country level. WRI enables water resource managers and policymakers to put a figure on the gap between achievements at different junctures. Moreover, WRI recognizes water saving efforts such as low water consumption and reducing losses; thus, WRI highlights the way forward for improving the reuse efficiency as an integral part of water resources management. The paper highlights the major barriers to extensive reuse of the reclaimed wastewater in the MNEA countries.
Keywords: MENA region; wastewater; sustainable reuse; utilization
Authors’ Note
Wastewater reclamation and reuse is well recognized for its ability to mitigate water shortage, which is a major threat to sustainable development and political stability in the Middle East and North Africa region. Substantial efforts have been made to make better utilization of wastewater as a non-conventional water resource. These efforts have been undermined by the lack of vision towards integration of wastewater reuse within water resources management. This paper helps policymakers and experts in efficient planning of national water resources, especially wastewater management and extensive reuse.
Keywords: MENA; wastewater; sustainable development; utilization.
Towards Sustainable Wastewater Reuse in the Middle East and North Africa
Introduction
Water has a precious value, and each drop must be accounted for in water scarce regions such as the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). The region is home to five percent of the world’s population but has less than one percent of the world’s available water. Water scarcity is a major threat to food security and political stability in the region. Much of the water crisis is caused by the way water is used. More than 89% of MENA’s withdrawn water is allocated to agriculture and only 11% to municipal and industrial uses. Alleviation of the water scarcity would seem to require reallocation of freshwater from agricultural to domestic and industrial uses. According to the World Bank, a reduction in agricultural water use by 15% would double the water available to households and industries in the region. However, this would reduce irrigated agriculture at the time many countries aim to expand it due to food security reasons. Besides, the MENA countries have avoided inter-sector water transfer, mainly due to internal political considerations; for example, farmers in the Jordan Valley have strong influence on the Jordanian policymakers due to the clan-type of social structure. In search for additional water supplies, the regional water experts and aid agencies have recognized reclaimed wastewater as a valuable non-conventional water resource.
Substantial amounts of water that originate from different human activities used to be considered as waste due to the deterioration of water quality and psychological considerations. In addition to water scarcity, the wide range of technologies that now exist to purify this wastewater to acceptable levels has increased the chances for wastewater to be reclassified as a renewable water resource rather than as waste, , . In many countries, such as Israel, Jordan, and Tunisia, wastewater is becoming a preferred unconventional source of water, , , , , , whose supply is increasing due to population growth and the low cost of wastewater, , . Yet in the MENA countries, substantial proportions of wastewater are discharged with little or no treatment. In other words, wastewater utilization in the MENA region is very low despite water scarcity and strong demand for water supply augmentation.
identifies two basic requirements for utilization of wastewater as a solution for water shortage problems whilst minimizing the health and environmental risks: (i) comprehensive wastewater collection systems, and (ii) well-operated wastewater treatment facilities. Mills and Asano rightly emphasizes a third requirement, namely securing users for the treated effluents. Thus, to maximize the contribution of wastewater reuse to the total water availability, the generated wastewater needs to be collected, treated, and used: three “pillars” of wastewater utilization. In order to better understand why reuse is still limited in the MENA countries, reclaimed wastewater is recognized as a commodity whose market comprises: (i) a supply side, which refers to the production, collection, and treatment of wastewater, (ii) a demand side, which refers to the use of the reclaimed wastewater, and (iii) market control and monitoring, which refers to the regulatory and institutional framework. In the MENA countries, the reclaimed-wastewater market is unbalanced; i.e., growing supply, which is demonstrated by the increasing sewerage coverage and number of wastewater treatment plants, and stagnant demand, which is demonstrated by the substantial proportions of treated effluents that are not used but discharged into the receiving water bodies. Balancing the reclaimed wastewater market (i.e. reducing the gap between supply and demand) implies increasing the rates of collection, treatment, and reuse close to the rate of wastewater generation.
Water scarcity has made wastewater reuse more prominent in technical and policy literature as well as in national and international professional meetings. Several indicators are being used to quantify achievements and progress in wastewater reuse. However, until now no standard yardstick exists to measure overall reuse efficiency at a country’s level that: (i) considers all wastewater production (collected and uncollected), (ii) recognizes the importance of each of the subsequent steps of production, collection, treatment, and use of the wastewater, (iii) allows comparisons within and among countries, and (iv) accounts for wastewater that is utilized through on-site and low cost means. The currently used yardsticks are based only on the amounts of urban wastewater and fail to take account of the wastewater that does not pass through conventional collection and treatment.
To quantify achievements in wastewater reuse, the commonly used indicators are: (i) absolute flow rate (million cubic meters per year), (ii) flow rate as percentage of wastewater treated, (iii) flow rate as percentage of municipal sewage produced, (iv) flow rate as percentage of total tap water supplied, (v) flow rate as percentage of urban water supply, (vi) flow rate as percentage of agricultural water supply, (vii) flow rate as percentage of total area irrigated, and (viii) flow rate as area of land irrigated with reclaimed wastewater. For example, reuse efficiency in Israel is assessed in Freidler as 65% of the municipal sewage production, in Freidler as 80% of all irrigation water in the Jeezrael Valley, in Shelef and Azov as 24.4% of the total water supply, in Idelovitch as 250 million cubic meter per year, as 60% of the total urban water supply, as 83% of the treated effluent, and as 20% of the irrigated area. Bahri and Brissaud assessed reuse efficiency in Tunisia as 6,500 ha of irrigated land and as 15% of the available treated wastewater. Other country examples are shown in Table 1. These indicators are useful but inadequate to capture the potential for and achievements in efficiency improvement.
Table 1: Wastewater reuse rates for agricultural irrigation, .
|
Location |
Volume reused (million m3/y) |
As of total sewage (%) |
As of total irrigation (%) |
| Germany |
100 |
3 |
10 |
| China |
10,000 |
27 |
- |
| Mexico |
1,500 |
100 |
80 |
| Santiago, Chili |
190 |
100 |
70 |
Also, in the above cases the “potential” for reuse refers to the amounts of urban wastewater that is collected and treated through conventional means and possibly would be added to the national water balance 9, 11, . The author defines the “potential” for reuse as the actual hydraulic capacity of the wastewater resource – i.e., total amount of wastewater production (urban and rural) – combined with the existing enabling environment – i.e., technical, financial, regulatory, institutional, and socio-cultural capacity – to utilize this resource.
This paper aims to: (i) identify the components of sustainable wastewater utilization, (ii) analyze the indicators frequently used for quantifying achievements in wastewater reuse, and (iii) introduce a yardstick called Wastewater Reuse Index (WRI).
Wastewater utilization
generation
The total amount of wastewater generation is the hydraulic capacity of the wastewater resource, which can be quantified in three different ways:
Measuring water supply. The generated amounts of wastewater can be derived from the total water supply for domestic, industrial, and commercial uses. This method is not favored since it is difficult to make countrywide estimates for the amounts of water supplied from alternative non-public sources such as private water vendors, rainwater harvesting, and springs. Moreover, the unaccounted for water in the supply systems adds uncertainty.
Measuring wastewater flows. This method measures only the metered wastewater flows from sewered communities. The amounts of wastewater generated from communities using cesspits and septic tanks must to be estimated and taken into account.
Measuring water consumption. This method quantifies the amount of wastewater generated from domestic, commercial, and industrial water uses based on the average per capita water consumption, taking into consideration that not all the consumed water enters the sanitation system. This technique is most recommended since it allows easy calculation and takes into consideration the water saving efforts. Water saving means less per capita water consumption, less wastewater generation, and therefore lower costs. Table 2 shows estimates for domestic wastewater production and collection in some MENA countries.
Table 2: Domestic wastewater production and collection rates in some MENA countries.
|
Country |
Population
(thousands) |
Water consumption * (million m3/yr) |
Wastewater collection |
|||||||||
|
(% of population) ** |
( million m3/yr) *** |
|||||||||||
|
Urban |
Rural |
Total |
Urban |
Rural |
Total |
Urban |
Rural |
Total |
Urban |
Rural |
Total |
|
|
Algeria |
18,969 |
12,502 |
31,471 |
831 |
319 |
1,150 |
90 |
47 |
73 |
598 |
120 |
718 |
| Egypt |
30,954 |
37,515 |
68,469 |
1,356 |
959 |
2,314 |
98 |
91 |
94 |
1,063 |
698 |
1,761 |
| Iraq |
17,756 |
5,359 |
23,115 |
778 |
137 |
915 |
93 |
31 |
79 |
579 |
34 |
613 |
| Jordan |
4,948 |
1,721 |
6,669 |
217 |
44 |
261 |
100 |
98 |
99 |
173 |
35 |
208 |
| Lebanon |
2,945 |
337 |
3,282 |
129 |
9 |
138 |
100 |
87 |
99 |
103 |
6 |
109 |
| Libya |
4,911 |
693 |
5,604 |
215 |
18 |
233 |
97 |
96 |
97 |
167 |
14 |
181 |
| Oman |
2,135 |
407 |
2,542 |
94 |
10 |
104 |
98 |
61 |
92 |
73 |
5 |
78 |
| Saudi Arabia |
18,526 |
3,081 |
21,607 |
811 |
79 |
890 |
100 |
100 |
100 |
649 |
63 |
712 |
| Syria |
8,783 |
7,342 |
16,125 |
385 |
188 |
572 |
98 |
81 |
90 |
302 |
122 |
423 |
| Tunisia |
6,281 |
3,305 |
9,586 |
275 |
84 |
360 |
97 |
48 |
80 |
214 |
32 |
246 |
| Yemen |
4,476 |
13,636 |
18,112 |
196 |
348 |
544 |
87 |
31 |
45 |
136 |
86 |
223 |
| * Estimated based on 120 l/c/d for urban and 70 l/c/d for rural; it does not include commercial and industrial water.
** Sewerage and on-site collection systems. *** Assumed that 80% of the water consumption is collected as wastewater. |
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Collection here refers to the wastewater produced across the country that enters the sewage system or on-site disposal systems; to a large extent, it is approximated by figures of sanitation coverage. In most MENA countries, there is a continuing increase in the collection rate of wastewater, especially through sewerage networks that are gradually expanding. This is driven mainly because wastewater collection is considered an urban necessity that serves health and environmental purposes, . The estimates for total collection rates of wastewater are very high in many MENA countries (Table 2); this includes conventional sewerage and on-site disposal systems, such as cesspits and septic tanks. Thus, it can be assumed that sanitation coverage and wastewater collection are not the limiting factors for wastewater utilization in most of the region.
Wastewater treatment
Wastewater collected from communities and industries ultimately returns to receiving water bodies or to the land. Wastewater contains organic materials whose decomposition can lead to the production of large quantities of malodorous gases. In addition, untreated wastewater usually contains numerous disease-causing microorganisms that dwell in the human intestinal tract. Wastewater also contains nutrients, which can stimulate excessive growth of aquatic plants and algae (eutrophication), and it may contain toxic compounds. These contaminants have to be removed or reduced to a safe and environmentally sound level for environmental protection purposes in order that the water course can retain its utility (for fishing, bathing, etc.) downstream. In addition, if the wastewater can be treated to a high enough quality standard, it also provides a badly needed non-conventional water resource. The level of required wastewater treatment is case-specific and directly related to the quality requirements associated with the end-use4. The typical wastewater end-uses are: (i) discharge into the sea (with minimum disturbance of the existing ecosystem), (ii) discharge into surface water, (iii) discharge into groundwater aquifers, (iv) restricted agricultural irrigation, (v) unrestricted agricultural irrigation, (vi) aquaculture, (vii) non-potable domestic use, (viii) potable water use, and (ix) industrial use. In all these cases, wastewater treatment is a requisite.
Conventional wastewater treatment typically consists of a combination of physical, chemical, and biological processes and operations to remove solids, organic matter and, sometimes, nutrients from wastewater. General terms used to describe different degrees of treatment, in order of increasing treatment level, are preliminary, primary, secondary, and tertiary and/or advanced wastewater treatment. The conventional treatment systems tend to be expensive at small scale. Therefore, in rural and peri-urban environments, wastewater can be treated in alternative, low-cost treatment systems such as septic tanks with attached sub-drainage irrigation pipes, up-flow anaerobic tanks and ponds followed by furrow or pumped irrigation, etc. However, these systems are beyond the scope of this study.
The frequently used systems for urban wastewater treatment in the MENA are activated sludge systems, trickling filters, and lagoons, . In some countries, disinfection to remove pathogens sometimes follows the last treatment step.
The collected wastewater must be treated to adjust its quality to any of the following end-uses uses: (i) irrigation, (ii) artificial recharge, (iii) potable water supply, (iv) toilet flushing, and (v) industrial water supply. Reuse of wastewater has been practiced in many areas worldwide for thousands of years. There are two strong economic incentives to reuse reclaimed wastewater: (i) augmentation in regions with water scarcity, and/or (ii) avoiding the cost of the deterioration of the water resources and the environment that would be polluted when receiving untreated or partly treated wastewater.
As far as possible, the wastewater from rural and small communities should be reused as well. In those cases, on-site and low cost systems can provide for decentralized collection and treatment of the wastewater. However, in most cases, cesspits and permeable septic tanks are used whose effluents infiltrate into the surrounding soil, indiscriminately polluting groundwaterand jeopardizing public health27. Although their effluent is often indirectly partially “reused”, this flow must not be accounted for as this practice is not sound. Likewise, direct or indirect irrigation with raw wastewater must not be accounted for as this practice is not in accordance with national and international sound reuse standards, , .
: Since the beginning of the 1980s many countries have been using untreated or partially treated wastewater for agricultural irrigation25, . Treated wastewater is used for agricultural irrigation directly and indirectly. In direct reuse, the treated effluent is taken from the wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) to the irrigation site. For example, some of the treated effluents in Tunisia are used to irrigate about 6,750 ha of orchards (citrus, grapes, olives, peaches, pears, apples, and pomegranate), fodder, cotton, cereals, golf courses and lawns. In indirect reuse, the treated effluent is discharged into surface water or groundwater aquifers. The effluents, thus, are deliberately blended with freshwater available in the wadis, dams, rivers, and aquifers and used, on purpose or not, by downstream farmers. In most cases it is used for unrestricted irrigation; reclaimed wastewater can be used for all crops even those consumed raw or uncooked. For example, most of the treated wastewater in Jordan is blended with freshwater from the King Talal Reservoir and used downstream in the Jordan Valley for unrestricted irrigation12, . In the Dan Region Project of Israel, more than 100 million cubic meters of treated wastewater are leached annually to the groundwater aquifer. Water is then pumped by production wells to the main conveyance system and to the distribution network to be used for unrestricted irrigation12, 20.
: Municipal wastewater reuse can be divided into three categories:
i) Direct potable reuse. Wastewater is treated to a level that is acceptable for human consumption. Wastewater for direct potable use usually goes through two subsequent treatment processes: conventional and advanced. Despite the viability of the treatment technology to produce an acceptable drinking water quality from wastewater, it is unlikely that it will be widely adapted because of the high cost and low public acceptance.
ii) Indirect potable reuse. Treated wastewater is disposed into surface or groundwater, which is used downstream as a potable water supply source. This form of reuse is very common. Many of the large cities and towns that are located along the major rivers and lakes depend on water from those water bodies for their domestic water supply. These water bodies at the same time receive treated and raw sewage from upstream cities and industries24, 29.
iii) Non-potable reuse. This includes reuse of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation of landscape, greenbelts, golf courses, public parks, sport fields, in addition to fire fighting, and toilet flushing. The use of reclaimed wastewater for irrigation of landscape, public parks, sport fields, and recreational sites has become a widespread practice in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Tunisia6, , ,.
: The availability of well-treated wastewater at comparatively low cost and the scarcity of good-quality natural water are strong incentives for innovative reclamation projects. Reclaimed wastewater is ideal for many industries where processes do not require water of potable quality. Also, industries are often located near populated areas where centralized WWTPs already generate an available source of reclaimed wastewater. Wastewater reuse for industrial purposes is widely practiced in the world 6, 35, 38. Reuse of reclaimed wastewater for environmental purposes is becoming a common practice in arid and semi-arid areas, especially in the form of artificial recharge in order to protect groundwater from seawater intrusion39, 40.
(WRI)
Despite the existence of the aforementioned indicators measuring wastewater reuse, an indicator with more potential is the Wastewater Reuse Index (WRI) which quantifies the total amount of wastewater being reused as percentage of the total hydraulic capacity of the total wastewater production. More importantly, WRI enables water resource managers and policymakers to identify specific junctures where achievement in wastewater reuse is particularly deficient. The WRI calculation depends on the following realities: (i) wastewater collection is subsequent to wastewater production, (ii) wastewater treatment is subsequent to wastewater collection, and (iii) wastewater reuse is subsequent to appropriate wastewater treatment. Accordingly, the WRI derivation steps are represented in the following method.
Total amount of wastewater produced (G) from urban, rural, commercial, and industrial water users in the country depends on the population size, specific water consumption (l/c/d), and water losses, as in Eqn. 1:
G = f (domestic, commercial, and industrial water consumption, water losses) (1)
Total amount of wastewater collected (C) through sewerage and onsite systems is represented as percentage (x) of produced wastewater (G), as in Eqn. 2:
Total amount of wastewater treated (T) through appropriate offsite and onsite systems is represented as percentage (y) of collected wastewater (C), as in Eqn. 3:
Total amount of wastewater reused (R) through irrigation, groundwater recharge, industrial use, potable use, toilet flushing, and acceptable onsite reuse is represented as percentage (z) of treated wastewater (T), as in Eqn. 4:
The Wastewater Reuse Index (WRI) is the percent ratio of total amount of wastewater reused (R) to total amount of wastewater produced (G), as in Eqns. 5 and 6:
Substituting Eqn. 4 instead of R in Eqn. 6 gives WRI in terms of z, T, and G. Substituting Eqn. 3 instead of T gives WRI in terms of y, z, C, and G. Substituting Eqn. 2 instead of C gives WRI in terms of x, y, and z. These are shown in Eqns. 7 and 8:
Where
WRI = Wastewater Reuse Index (0-100)
x = wastewater collection as percentage of total production,
y = wastewater treatment as percentage of total collection,
z = wastewater reuse as percentage of total treatment.
WRI can be used by water resource managers and policymakers to put a figure on the gap between achievements at different junctures. Moreover, WRI recognizes water saving efforts such as low water consumption and reducing losses; thus, highlights the way forward for improving the reuse efficiency. Figure 3 provides WRI for all possible collection and treatment percentages at four different hypothetical reuse rates (z = 10, 40, 70 and 100%). Low values can be reached with an unlimited number of combinations of x, y, and z (collection, treatment, and reuse rates, respectively). Higher values of WRI can be reached only through higher rates of collection, treatment, and reuse, as these three factors are of equal importance in Equation 8.
In many MENA countries, the total collection rate through sewerage networks and on-site systems exceeds 90%, except in a few where it is around half this rate (Table 2). Table 3 compares the WRI in some selected MENA countries. Israel has reached a high collection rate of about 95% with 68% treatment of the collected wastewater and 83% reuse of the treated flow21, thus, with a WRI of 53.7%. Potentially, Israel can increase its WRI to 95% by increasing the treatment from 68% to 100% and reuse from 83% to 100%, assuming that the production and collection rates are unchanged. If Israel reuses all of its currently treated wastewater, its WRI will reach about 65%. High WRI values can be reached if the treatment and reuse rates are increased to a level closer to that of collection. For example, Jordan, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, respectively, could reach a WRI of 99%, 80%, and 100% if all their collected wastewater is treated and reused; Saudi Arabia currently is lagging behind, whereas Tunisia and Jordan take a middle position, and Israel is achieving slightly above half of its potential (Table 3). All these countries have high collection rates but need to increase their treatment and reuse efficiencies in order to reach such high WRI values. This can be achieved by constructing treatment plants and by encouraging on-site management of wastewater at household and community levels in peri-urban and rural areas.
As mentioned previously, most countries of the region have reasonably high rates of wastewater collection, which is driven by urbanization, public health, and environmental incentives. Thus, the low WRI values and the imbalance (failure) in the reclaimed-wastewater market are mainly due to low rates of wastewater treatment and/or reuse. For reuse, however, disincentives tend to be stronger than incentives because reuse offers direct benefit to a fewer groups, such as farmers and water resource managers.
Figure 3: Graphical representation of the WRI at reuse rates of 10, 40, 70, and 100%, respectively.
Table 3: WRI in selected MENA countries (flow rates per annum). 21, , ,
|
Country |
G (million m3) |
C (million m3) |
T (million m3) |
R (million m3) |
x = C/G (%) |
y = T/C (%) |
z = R/T (%) |
WRI (%) |
| Israel |
464 |
440 |
300 |
249 |
95 |
68.2 |
83.0 |
53.7 |
| Jordan |
241 |
239 |
80 |
67 |
99 |
33.5 |
83.8 |
27.8 |
| Tunisia |
395 |
316 |
148 |
50 |
80 |
46.8 |
33.8 |
12.7 |
| Saudi Arabia |
1,347 |
1,347 |
292 |
92 |
100 |
21.7 |